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ABSTRACT
This case study uses Systemic Functional theory to describe and analyse the multimodal
communication of an eight year-old boy, Bodhi, with both a severe intellectual disability
and a severe communication impairment. The study specifically explores the meanings
Bodhi makes and the resources he uses instead of speech to make those meanings. The
study also examines the underlying system of language Bodhi draws on to make his
meanings.
The theoretical resources of the Systemic Functional model of language are used to
capture both what occurs within Bodhi’s communicative turns and also what occurs
across the turns at the level of discourse semantics. Within the turn, the study uses the
theoretical resources of the interpersonal, ideational and textual metafunctions; above the
turn, the study uses the resources of Exchange Structure Analysis.
The corpus consists of data collected via tape recorder and observation notes. In order to
capture the effects of different communication partners on the interactions with Bodhi,
data collected via tape recorder consists of two transcripts of Bodhi communicating with
different communication partners, his father and his grandmother. Each transcript was
segmented into exchanges and moves. These were quantified to expose patterns of
communication. Each move was examined for the presence of metafunctional meanings,
which were also quantified.
The study demonstrates that Bodhi makes meaning in ways that are different to speakers
(of English). The findings also show that while he occupies a restricted semiotic space,
having what could be construed as a form of protolanguage, Bodhi’s communication also
has features of transition and adult language. The study also shows that while Bodhi is a
persistent communicator, intent on getting his meanings across, contributions of the
communication partner are crucial for the success of Bodhi’s meaning making. This
success relies on a willingness on the part of the communication partner to work together
with Bodhi in the joint negotiation and joint construction of meaning.

This study also identifies a lack of research within the field of Augmentative and
Alternative Communication that describes the meaning making of ambulant nonverbal
multimodal communicators with severe intellectual disabilities. The study also provides
an opportunity for understanding how the ‘other’, the nonverbal multimodal
communicator makes meaning.
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TRANSCRIPT CONVENTIONS
Transcripts presented in this study are textualised recordings and observations. As they are
written in ‘play script’ form, there are few codings to define. All names used are the actual names
of the people participating in the research.

Shooshi, Bodhi and Kai are traveling in the car together when Bodhi makes the sounds
that he uses for his grandparents, “Nanny” and “Nono”.
BODHI:

(makes 2 sounds: a kind of tongue click for “Nono”, and an /i/ for
“Nanny”)

KAI:

Why is Bodhi saying “Nanny and Nono”?

SHOOSHI:

I don’t know. Bodhi what are you saying that for? (Starts to look around
for clues and in the rear vision mirror sees a car behind that is the same as
Nanny and Nono’s car).

SHOOSHI:

I think he’s seen a car behind us that’s the same as Nanny and Nono’s. He
must have seen it in the side mirror.

BODHI:

(turns around to look at the car behind when Shooshi says “behind”)

Shooshi:

Is that right Bodhi? Have you seen a car like Nanny and Nono’s behind
us?

BODHI:

(taps chest = ‘yes’ and smiles)

______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
______________________________________________________________________
1.0

Introduction

This study is based on the premise that humans are semiotic beings who make meaning
with each other in a wide variety of ways. However, this study focuses on the meaning
making of a person whose semiotic behaviour presents as somewhat different from that
of most other humans. The subject of this study is my son Bodhi who, at the start of the
project, was eight years old. Bodhi has a rare chromosome disorder that has resulted in a
severe intellectual disability and a severe communication disorder1, meaning he cannot
communicate using speech. Nevertheless, although Bodhi does not speak, he does
communicate, both frequently and persistently, using a variety of modes of expression
other than speech. Some of these modes of expression have included what is known as
“problem” or “challenging” behaviour (Carr, Levin, McConnachie, Carlson, Kemp &
Smith 1994), and it has been his challenging behaviour, plus his insistence, almost to the
point of desperation, to communicate, that led me to this study. In my attempt as his
mother to provide appropriate means for Bodhi to communicate, it became evident that
before being able to help improve his communication I would first need to find out what
meanings Bodhi was already communicating.

1

Bodhi’s Rare Chromosome Disorder is labelled by its karyotype: 46xydel7q21-22. ‘46’ means he has 46

chromosomes (the ‘normal’ number); ‘xy’ relates to being male; ‘del’ means a deletion of genetic material;
‘7’ is the chromosome on which the deletion is located; ‘q’ is the long arm of the chromosome; and ’21-22’
is the band of deleted genes.
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1.2

Aim of this study

The aim of this study is to describe and analyse Bodhi’s multimodal communication.
Specifically, the aim is to describe the meanings Bodhi makes and the particular
combination of multimodal resources he uses to make those meanings. The study also
aims to investigate the underlying system of language that Bodhi draws on to ascertain
whether his system is similar to the system of language that speakers of English use,
despite the fact that he does not use speech to express his meanings. A further aim of the
study is to examine Bodhi’s ability to navigate the conversation environment.
In order to describe the meanings Bodhi makes, it is necessary to use a theory of
language that focuses on meaning making and function, rather than structure and form.
Because it views language and communication as meaning making behaviours, Systemic
Functional (SF) theory is the theory drawn upon in this thesis. That is to say, SF theory
approaches the study of language and language development through the investigation of
meaning making (Halliday 1978). SF theory is also a social semiotic theory in that it sees
language as occurring in social contexts and as designed to facilitate social life (McInnes
1998). In particular, SF theory shows how in every instance of language, three types of
meaning are being communicated simultaneously: interpersonal, ideational and textual.
The meanings Bodhi makes are described in terms of these three types of meaning. This
tripartite view of meaning making in language comes from Halliday’s work to understand
the structures of language based on the functions that these structures fulfill. In other
words, language is structured in particular ways because of what it has to do. This is
explained by Halliday (1975):
the system of natural language can best be explained in light of the social
functions which language has evolved to serve. Language is as it is
because of what it has to do (p.17).
An additional reason for the choice of SF theory as the theoretical framework for this
study is the broad range of areas to which it has been applied. Whilst Halliday developed
SF theory on spoken and written language, it has also been used by researchers to
describe and analyse other semiotic systems. These include visual communication (Kress
3

& van Leeuwen 1990), displayed art (O'Toole 1994), sign language (Johnston 1992,
1996), body movement (McInnes 1998) gesture (Martinec 1998, 2000) and threedimensional space (Stenglin 2004). In addition to these areas, the SF model has been
taken into the field of speech pathology, where clinician researchers have used it to both
analyse and remediate the communication of people with communication disorders. This
study aims to build on the above traditions.
1.3

Terms and descriptors used in this study

Contained within the title of this thesis is the classifier “nonverbal”. The definition of this
term by and large comes from Kendon (1981), a gesture theorist, who refers to nonverbal
communication as:
all the ways in which communication is effected between persons when in
each other’s presence, by means other than words. It refers to the
communicational functioning of bodily activity, gesture, facial expression
and orientation, posture and spacing, touch and smell, and of those aspects
of utterance that can be considered apart from the referential content of
what is said. Studies of ‘nonverbal communication’ are usually concerned
with the part these aspects of behaviour play in establishing and
maintaining interaction and interpersonal relationships (p 4).
However, this study focuses on the nonverbal as not only ancillary to speech, but as
constitutive of the meaning making in replacement of speech. In addition to the term
nonverbal, the term ‘non-speaking’ is occasionally used in this thesis, coming from a set
of studies by Light, Collier and Parnes (1985c, p.128) who used it broadly to describe
people whose speech is “inadequate to meet their communication needs”. Further, whilst
both terms are used within this thesis, another possibly less typical term is introduced:
non-speech language. From a commonsense point of view, language can be seen as
interchangeable or synonymous with speech. However, there are languages, such as
Australian Sign Language (Auslan) used by people with hearing impairments, which are
not spoken languages. Within SF theory, the distinction is made between spoken and
4

written language. However Auslan is neither written nor spoken. It is a non-speech
language – a language not constituted by speech. This primarily holds for Bodhi’s
communication as well, and can be depicted thus:
speech
languages
Language

signed languages (e.g. Auslan)
non-speech
languages

multimodal languages
(e.g. Bodhi’s)
Figure 1.1 A simple taxonomy of languages
This of course takes a particular stance that supports a broad view of language, that is,
one that sees language as any basis for communication and understanding rather than
language as being “by voice in the distinctly human manner, using arbitrary symbols in
conventional ways with conventional meanings” (Macquarie Dictionary 1997, p.1206).
In this study Bodhi is described as having a “severe intellectual disability” 2. This
classification comes from the American Psychiatric Association (2000) who describes
people with “severe mental retardation” as having an IQ level of between 25-40. People
who fall into this category are described as able to acquire little or no speech; can be
trained in elementary self-care skills; do not progress academically beyond some basic
recognition of words and numbers; and have more trouble functioning than others of the
same age and cultural group in at least two or more of the following areas:
communicating, caring for self, living at home, relating to others, using community
resources, directing self, academic functioning, working, using free time, health and
safety (Morrison 1995). Bodhi is affected in all of these areas. In order for the reader to

2

The assessment for this label was conducted in 2003 by Anahita Taleyarkhan,

psychologist at the Department of Ageing Disability and Homecare, Wollongong, NSW.
5

gain a sense of how this comes to life in Bodhi, I will provide a brief description of some
of the manifestations of Bodhi’s severe intellectual disability.
At the time of writing Bodhi is 11 years old. He still wears nappies most of the time, as
even though he can use the toilet, he does not seem to care where he defecates or
urinates. He has extremely poor fine motor skills. For example, he cannot dress himself,
undo or tie up shoelaces. He cannot open the fridge or remove or put lids on containers.
He has no road sense and frequently steps straight out into the road regardless of the
traffic. He cannot brush his own teeth or hair. He cannot skip, hop on one foot, nor write
letters or numbers.
Bodhi is also described as being a person with a “severe communication disorder”. This
categorisation comes from Mirenda and Iacono’s (1990, p.3) definition of people “who
have a severe speech impairment due to physical, neuromuscular, and/or intellectual
disabilities, and not due primarily to a hearing impairment; and (b) who cannot, at the
present time, use speech independently as their primary means of communication (e.g.,
cannot be readily understood by unfamiliar partners)”. Bodhi’s communication disorder
is part of his disability but not due to physical or neuromuscular disabilities.
Additionally, while it is obviously important to acknowledge that Bodhi has a severe
communication disorder, this thesis will also frame his disorder in terms of difference,
rather than disorder. That is to say, if we view Bodhi through a sociolinguistic lens, as
Armstrong (2005) recommends, we would be looking at how he uses language to achieve
particular purposes, and noticing that he has a “non-standard” way of achieving those
purposes, rather than describing him in terms of deficit or disorder.3

3

See Armstrong (2005a) for a discussion of the problematics of assigning categorical adjectives such as

normal and disordered, which are based on a medical model of normality/pathology.
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When describing typical uses of language and language development, I use the term with
‘normal’ or ‘typical’, in inverted commas. This is not only to delineate between the
various versions of language but also to denaturalise a particular usage and view of
language as the norm and to bring consciousness to what is a very normative construction
of language.
Following researchers in the field of AAC, (see, for example, Light et al 1985c; Iacono,
Mirenda & Beukelman 1993; Blischak & Lloyd 1996; Cumley & Swanson 1999), the
term ‘multimodal’ communication is used to describe Bodhi’s communication, as he uses
a variety of different modes of expression to communicate (see Appendix 1). This term is
used in other contexts to refer to the different modes of communication such as written,
and pictorial or visual (see, for example, Martin 2001), however it is entirely apt to
describe Bodhi’s communication as multimodal. In fact, speakers of course, are also
multimodal communicators, frequently using such things as their hands to gesture whilst
speaking (see, for example, Efron 1972). However, for non-speaking communicators, the
non-speaking modes of communication are often used as the primary rather than the
secondary means of communication (Shane & Cohen 1981). Therefore, in this thesis,
multimodal refers to the range of modes used instead of speech language.
One of the features of being a multimodal communicator who understands speech but
cannot communicate via speech is that it is often necessary for the communication
partner to articulate the multimodal communicator’s move in words, in order to verify the
meanings being made by the multimodal communicator. In order to account for this
translation, as it were, from multimodal communication into speech, the term
‘transmodal’ is used to describe the communication environment Bodhi functions within.
This will be explicated and exemplified fully in Chapters 6 onwards.
Words such as ‘conversation’ (“an informal interchange of thoughts by spoken words”
Macquarie 1997, p.477) and ‘talk’ (“to speak or converse” Macquarie 1997, p.2159) are
used in this thesis to describe interactions between Bodhi and those he is communicating
with, although the literal definitions state that this involves the spoken word and Bodhi’s
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contributions mostly occur in modes of expression other than words. In order to define
the notion of conversation, I turn to the work of the ethnomethodologists Sacks,
Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), who provided a description of conversation that is built
on the organisation of conversational turns. This is a useful framework for the current
study in that it does not focus on the content of the move, and can therefore encompass
both speech and non-speech language in its view of conversation. The features of Sacks
et al’s (1974) description of conversation are listed below, however, in order to account
for the multimodality of Bodhi’s communication, I have added the word communicating
to all Sack’s et al’s (1974) usages of the word “talk/s” or “talking”:
1. Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs;
2. Overwhelmingly, one party talks/communicates at a time;
3. Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief;
4. Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no overlap are common.
Together with transitions charaterized by a slight gap or slight overlap, they make
up the vast majority of transitions;
5. Turn order is not fixed, but varies;
6. Turn size is not fixed but varies;
7. Length of conversation is not specified in advance;
8. What parties say/communicate is not specified in advance;
9. Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance;
10. Number of parties can vary;
11. Talk/communication can be continuous or discontinuous;
12. Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker/communicator
may select a next speaker (as when s/he addresses a question to another party) or
parties may self-select in starting to talk;
13. Various ‘turn-constuctional units’ are employed; e.g. turns can be projectedly
‘one word long’, or they can be sentential in length;
14. Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors and violations; e.g., if
two parties find themselves talking/communicating at the same time, one of them
will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble. (p696)
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It will be shown in this thesis, that what occurs between Bodhi and his communication
partners conforms to the above list of conversational features, although he contributes
through multimodal means. So whilst communication with Bodhi may produce an
unusual kind of conversation, it is conversation nevertheless.
1.4

A short biography of Bodhi

By way of familiarising the reader with Bodhi as a person, and bringing to life the reality
of who Bodhi is, a short recount of Bodhi’s life follows, focusing particularly on the
aspects that have impacted on his development and communication.
Bodhi Dreyfus-Ballesi was born at home, at 2am on Wednesday March 15, 1995,
amongst friends and candlelight. This very peaceful beginning to his life became, over
the course of that year, much more turbulent. He had feeding and sleeping problems and
numerous illnesses including gastrointestinal reflux, measles, impetigo and bronchiolitis,
resulting in hospitalisation. He missed all his developmental milestones and behaved
unusually for a baby of his age, looking constantly at his hands as he turned them around
and around, for example. We were referred to a pediatrician, who ordered a battery of
tests, however, nothing unusual was found. Just after his first birthday, Bodhi started
having small epilepsy seizures (absences) that progressed from five to up to thirty a day.
We were referred for another round of tests, including an electroencephalogram and
telemetry, that looked at the seizure activity in his brain. I shall never forget the words the
epilepsy specialist said to us when we went to receive the results: “I hate to be a
harbinger of doom and gloom but…” and then he proceeded to tell us that we had a very
serious epilepsy problem on our hands which, in his experience, probably meant Bodhi
was going to have some kind of significant developmental delay, for life. We began
epilepsy treatment and a rather intensive program of physiotherapy to help Bodhi learn to
crawl and walk – which he finally did, getting independent on his feet at 22 months of
age. At some point early in his second year of life it became fairly obvious that he was
not making the kinds of noises that other children of that age make, so we began speech
therapy as well. The speech therapy did not help. No matter how many times over the
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course of the next year or two that the speech therapist tried to make Bodhi sign for
things that he wanted, such as a cup for ‘drink’ (made by curling your hand, as if around
a cup, and bringing it to your mouth), he would not even try. He made some progress
with a few basic words such as ‘Dad’ (pronounced /dQd/ and ‘Mum’ (pronounced /bup/),
which he would say either once or over and over in a string, but his speech never
progressed beyond one word or sound at a time. He nevertheless made lots of non-word
sounds, mostly rather loudly, or sometimes in a singsong voice.
By the time he was able to attend preschool, he needed his own teacher’s aide as he did
not or could not do any of the things the other children were doing. Firstly, he did not
keep still and therefore could not engage in any activities that required sitting and paying
attention, and secondly he could not engage with any of the other kinds of activities,
being nowhere near the developmental level of the other children. My partner and
Bodhi’s father, Mark, was requested by the preschool to build all kinds of safeguards and
barriers such as a lockable lid for the fish tank, to prevent Bodhi from plunging his arms
in and swishing them around; and a gate for the bathroom, as by the age of three Bodhi
had already began his love affair with flushing toilets. His delight at finding the preschool
had a bathroom with five toilets in a row that he could flush one after the other was
overwhelming. He would have spent his whole day in there, but unfortunately for him,
the preschool staff had other ideas and Bodhi was only allowed in the bathroom when it
was time to wash his hands (still being in nappies he did not use the toilet, except for
flushing).
By the time he was about four, he was making the sound /i/ most of the times he wanted
to communicate. He still said ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’ and some other word approximations
filled out his repertoire, such as /ç/ for ball, /gUg/ for dog, a high pitched /aU/ for cat and a
high pitched /U:/ for owl. Strangely, some words he seemed to have mastered, he stopped
saying, as if he had forgotten how. My mother reports that she used to see Bodhi
watching our mouths as we spoke, as if wondering how to do it. When I asked the
specialist if he thought Bodhi would ever talk, he replied that he didn’t know, but thought
that if he wasn’t doing it by five or six years of age, it was highly unlikely he ever would.
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Bodhi reached the age of five having made no more progress with his speech, while his
epilepsy progressed into full-blown seizures (tonic clonic). His challenging behaviour
also escalated, and by the time he started at our local special school for children with
intellectual disabilities, he was more than a handful. He did not seem to understand what
to do nor how to behave in life. He was constantly destructive, for example tipping chairs
over, and laughing when they banged onto the floor, then waiting for us to pick them up
in order to tip them over again (the chairs eventually broke); flushing the toilet
incessantly (if we let him); snatching peoples’ glasses off their faces; banging things and
throwing things. Most of his toys were broken as he hurled them off the balcony to the
cement driveway down below, as soon as we left him alone with them. We also could not
go almost anywhere as a family for any length of time, other than however long it took
Bodhi to get bored and destructive. The only houses we could visit were those where
there was at least one toilet, and preferably stairs as well. Then Bodhi would busy himself
making a repetitive little route from one toilet to the next, for a good flush or two, via the
stairs, until either we tried to stop him or he got bored.
Occasionally Bodhi did less destructive things, such as going to the drawer in the kitchen
that contains the utensils such as whisks, ladles and spatulas, and one by one, bring them
out for one of us to name. After we had named whatever he brought out, he would put it
back and bring the next thing, till he had gone through almost the whole drawer, and
many things more than once. His interest in the names of things extended to an interest in
the names of people, meaning that at the time of writing and for the past few years,
wherever we go, Bodhi wants to know the name of everyone present – even in the
supermarket queue! He asks this by tapping the person and looking at me whilst saying
/i/, which he only ceases once I have asked the surprised person their name and told it to
him.
At school, he also caused havoc. A walk to the library, which usually took five minutes,
could take an hour as Bodhi would attempt to outrun the teacher to get to every toilet on
the way for a bit of flushing. When she prevented him from going in to flush, he would
lie on the floor and have a tantrum for about ten minutes. The he’d jump up and try to
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beat her to the next one and the same thing would happen all over again. Bodhi began
banging his head on windows, kicking doors, running non-stop – onto the road and into
any body of water. If we accidentally left the bathroom door open after his bath and did
not pull out the plug to let the water drain out, he would go back in and get into the bath,
often fully clothed. If we left the washing up halfway through in order to attend to
something else, such as answer the phone, he would come and immerse as much of
himself in the sink as possible. He was disruptive, demanding and noisy in just about
every situation in his life.
Then, the speech therapist from the school recommended I attend a workshop being given
by a visiting Canadian academic, Dr Pat Mirenda, on the intersections between
challenging behaviour and communication for people with disabilities. Dr Mirenda’s
presentation showed extensive data on improvements in the behaviour of people with
disabilities after the provision of augmentative and alternative communication aids. It
became evident at this point that in order for Bodhi to settle, we would have to attend to
and provide for his communication needs. Thus, began my journey into the world of
Augmentative and Alternative Communication (AAC), the field that both provides for
and researches into the communication of people who cannot use speech to communicate.
With the help of one of Bodhi’s teachers and the school speech therapist, I began to
provide pictorial communication resources for Bodhi to use. Unlike some children with
disabilities who take a long time to work out how to use these resources, Bodhi instantly
grasped that if he pointed to a picture, he would be able to tell us what he wanted, and
therefore get what he wanted. It quickly became evident that providing enough of the
right sort of pictures was going to be an ongoing process. It involved having free access
to a digital camera, a computer program specifically designed for pictorial
communication, such as Boardmaker ™, a colour printer and a laminator, and rolls of
sticky backed Velcro so we could attach pictures to a board and Bodhi could go and get
the pictures and bring them to us to tell us something. It also became evident that even
with all this equipment, it was going to be hard to keep up with Bodhi’s needs for
different pictures and different combinations of pictures. Not only did he need different
kinds of pictures for different settings, but, as he is fond of water, he would often wet and
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ruin the pictures, or we’d lose them, meaning I’d have to make them all over again. (See
Appendix 2 for a small selection of Boardmaker™ pictorials that Bodhi uses).
The most useful AAC resource for Bodhi seemed to be a stack of laminated individual
pictures, about two centimetres square, that were put onto a key ring so he could flip
through them to find the picture that he wanted. In these sets I tried to include all the
things Bodhi seemed to like to talk about, such as where he was going and what he was
doing. Also, as Bodhi always wanted to know who he was going to be seeing and when, I
took photos of everyone in his life, and made a book of removable pictures of those
people. As time went on, we began to try to make sure that Bodhi had his pictures
wherever he went. It felt a bit like an abuse of his right to communicate if we forgot, as
this meant he was unable to convey to people what he wanted. And, as time went on, his
behaviour slowly began to improve.
Sometime in the first year of providing pictures for Bodhi I attended a communications
expo at his school that specifically focused on how to provide communication resources
for people with disabilities who had communication impairments. I was asked to have a
stall where I displayed all the resources I’d made for Bodhi so other parents could come
and get some ideas. When a new speech therapist passed my stall, she pointed out that
while I was doing was well providing many pictures for Bodhi to communicate with, I
was only giving him the opportunity to ask for things and not the opportunity to comment
on things. In other words, she thought the pictures only enabled him to realise one speech
function: demand for goods-&-services. Interestingly enough, while in theory she may
have been right, and certainly Bodhi’s communication partners often responded as if he
was only asking for things, Bodhi actually used (and still uses) the same resources to both
ask for things and to comment on them. This is of course problematic, as it makes it very
hard for the communication partner to distinguish between a demand and a gift of either
information or goods-&-services. Nevertheless, the comment by the speech therapist
stimulated me to think that even with all my linguistic training, I had been providing
resources for Bodhi based on what I perceived to be a needs basis, as far as I could
ascertain what his needs were, in conjunction with the support of a speech therapist, but I
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hadn’t been thinking along any linguistic lines in the process. I began to think that
bringing a theoretical linguistic perspective to Bodhi’s communication could possibly
improve both my ability to think about and provide resources for him, and also possibly
help the communication partners in understanding him better. Hence, the motivation for
this study arose.
1.5

Research questions for this thesis

The research questions in this thesis, therefore, stem from the need to help improve
Bodhi’s communication. This led to a need to describe his communication and meaning
making abilities, which in turn led to a need to find a language theory and a research
methodology that would be adequate for the description of person who makes meaning
using nonverbal multimodal communication rather than speech.
This thesis therefore poses research questions that aim to not only explore the range of
Bodhi’s meaning making abilities, but at the same time explore how he is a different
meaner – how his meaning making occurs in ways that are different from the ways
speakers and people without intellectual disabilities make meaning. The research
questions are listed and then discussed in detail below:
1) What meanings does Bodhi make?
2) What resources is he using to make those meanings?
3) What kinds of discourse roles does Bodhi take up?
4) Is Bodhi drawing on the same underlying system of language that speakers
use, and if not what does his system look like?

1)

What meanings does Bodhi make?

This question was designed to be able to examine the meanings Bodhi makes in terms of
the Systemic Functional notion of the three metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal and
textual. That is, it focuses on the meanings Bodhi makes within each of his
conversational turns. It aims to lay bare what meanings are realised when there are very
limited options, which are due to two factors: Bodhi’s lack of speech language and his
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severe intellectual disability. This kind of description of the meaning making abilities of a
non-verbal multimodal communicator has not been undertaken either in the field of the
SFL nor within the field of AAC.
2)

What resources is he using to make those meanings?

This question was formulated to allow for an examination of the modes of expression that
Bodhi uses instead of speech. Whilst a small number of studies within the field of AAC
described the modes of communication used by their subjects, none of them
systematically examined which modes corresponded to which meanings. Further, whilst
many people within AAC studies use sound as one of their modes of communication,
there have been no studies to date that systematically examine the kinds of sounds that
are used to see if tonal differences realise different speech functions the way they do in
English. This question is answered in a way that allows for a detailed and systematic
examination of Bodhi’s modes of expression in order to show how he realises semantic
options that are typically realised using speech.
3)

What kind of discourse roles does Bodhi take up?

This question was designed to explore the kind of communicator Bodhi is dialogistically.
It examines meanings made at the level of discourse semantics – that is, it examines what
occurs across the conversational turns, as opposed to within them. Examining what
occurs across the turns can account for the role of the communication partner, which has
been identified by a number of researchers within the field of AAC and speech pathology
as being crucial to the examination of the communication of people who mean
differently.
4)

Is Bodhi drawing on the same underlying system of language that speakers use,

and if not what does his system look like?
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, SF theory views language as being
constituted by systems of meaning making potential, systems of choice that speakers
select from both consciously and unconsciously in every act of speaking. This question is
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designed to explore whether Bodhi draws on the same network of systems that are
available to speakers.
1.6

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured to introduce certain areas of research that are of particular
relevance to this study, followed by outlines of the theoretical framework and
methodology used in the study. It then reports on the application of the theory to the data,
discussing issues arising from this at the end of each chapter.
Specifically, the following chapter, Chapter 2, contextualises the study in relation to
research in two fields: Augmentative and Alternative Communication (AAC) and
Systemic Functional (SF) theory. Chapter 3 is a theoretical chapter, describing the
architecture of the Systemic Functional model of language, with particular reference to
aspects of the theory that are used within this study. Chapter 4 is a methods chapter,
outlining the decisions made and the problems encountered in the collection and analysis
of data. Chapter 5 describes the modes of expression that Bodhi uses to communicate.
Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 are results chapters, and each of these also contains has some
theoretical discussion that explains the constructs used for the analysis. The first three of
these, chapters 6, 7 and 8, address Bodhi’s meaning making from the perspective of what
occurs within his turns of communication. Each of these chapters examines a particular
type of metafunctional meaning, ideational, interpersonal and textual, as outlined in
Chapter 3. Chapter 9 addresses Bodhi’s communication from the perspective of what
occurs across the communication turns, that is to say, it examines how Bodhi navigates
the communication environment in conjunction with his communication partners.
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis with a discussion that draws together the issues raised in
the previous chapters, and looks ahead to areas of future research.
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 2
MEANING MAKING WITH A DIFFERENCE: A REVIEW OF THE
RELEVANT LITERATURE

____________________________________________________________________
2.0

Introduction

This chapter reviews literature from two key fields that inform the study. The first is the
field of Augmentative and Alternative communication (AAC), which, as mentioned in
Chapter 1, both provides communication resources for people with communication
disorders, and also conducts research into the communication of this diverse group of
people. The second field is Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which is a social
theory of language and meaning making that has also been applied to a diverse range of
human (and some non-human primate) activities. In some senses, this study proposes a
marriage of the two fields of AAC and SFL for reasons outlined as follows.
The child who constitutes the focus of this study, Bodhi, as described in Chapter 1, makes
meaning in ways that are different from most other non-infant humans. One consequence
of this is that as a subject of research, he also presents as somewhat different from the
many other people, both children and adults, who have been the subjects of studies of
people with communicative disorders. Further, whilst the field of AAC has proved very
useful in developing the understandings drawn on in this study, it is a field that has few
studies that systematically describe in detail the meaning making abilities of people with
communication disorders. Hence, it became clear very early in the development of this
project that it would be necessary to propose a theoretical framework and a methodology
that were different from others that had been proposed in the field of the study of people
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with intellectual disabilities and communication disorders. For reasons that have been
alluded to in Chapter 1, the perspective and methodology adopted in this study uses
Systemic Functional (SF) theory, though it is informed by several other traditions of
language research.
This chapter begins with an account of studies of communicative disorders of the kind
undertaken by speech pathologists and researchers within the field of AAC. This is a
particular branch within the field of speech pathology that works to support people with
often quite severe communication disorders through the provision of modes of
communication other than speech. AAC is a large field with an extensive body of
research that by and large draws on traditions other than SF theory. All other areas of
research that are reviewed in this chapter fall within the SF tradition, although they have
been applied to a wide variety of human endeavours, both within language and in areas
other than language. The first of the SF-based studies to be reviewed covers the work
done on the language development of “normal” or typically developing young children.
While comparisons of typically developing children and those with intellectual
disabilities need to be treated with caution, studies of “normal” child language
development are nevertheless important because they provide some measure against
which the development of a child with a disability may be considered. Moreover, since
SF theory addresses semiosis or meaning making behaviours generally, these studies
provide a basis for reviewing the achievements in meaning making of even a severely
intellectually disabled child.
A second area of research in the SF tradition relevant to this study is the work done by a
relatively small group of Australian speech pathologists who research and write about
communication disorders. This work is particularly significant for two reasons: firstly, it
has taken SF theory into the realm of speech pathology and language disorder; and
secondly, although unlike Bodhi, the subjects of this particular group of studies had
speech as their main form of communication, essentially, the researchers involved have
paved the way for the use of SF theory in the description and understanding of the
meaning making of people with all kinds of communication disorders. This thesis
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therefore builds on or extends this body of work by using SF theory to study a person
with a communication disorder who does not have speech as his main form of
communication.
A third area of SF-based research that is drawn on in this study is work that has
demonstrated the usefulness of SF theory in the analysis of modes of communication
other than language, spoken or written. As mentioned in Chapter 1, these include for
example Martinec’s (1998, 2000) study of gestures and McInnes’ (1998) study of
performance texts and body language.
Johnston’s (1992, 1996) SF-based work on Australian Sign Language (Auslan) is
particularly significant to my study because of its contribution that extends the SF
perspective to account for non-speech language.
A fourth area of SF-based research relevant to the current study is work using SF theory
to study the communication abilities of non-human primates, bonobos, (pan paniscus) in
captivity and their carers (Benson, Fries, Greaves, Iwamoto, Savage-Rumbaugh &
Taglialatela 2002). This work is relevant to the current study for a number of reasons: it
uses SF theory to study non-speech communication, although it is the communication of
bonobos; and it uses the SF based analysis to argue for a broader approach to the
definition of language.
The final body of SF-based literature and research to be reviewed is one branch of the
work on conversation analysis, starting with the early work of the Birmingham School
(see, for example, Sinclair & Coulthard 1975) and continued by Martin (1985, 1992),
Ventola (1987, 1988), Thwaite (1994) and Eggins and Slade (1997). This relevance of
this body of research to my study is that it examines conversations in different contexts
from multiple perspectives. In particular, it is the above clause perspective, the focus on
conversational moves, that is of relevance to my study, as the notion of move is able to be
constituted by both speech and non-speech contributions, and is therefore suitable to the
multimodal context.
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2.1

Augmentative and Alternative Communication (AAC) literature

This section begins with a brief overview of the field of Augmentative and Alternative
Communication (AAC), followed by a review of the relevant studies within that field.
Given that AAC has a substantial body of research, this section is limited to those studies
that have direct bearing on the current study.
Augmentative and alternative communication covers a range of communication aids and
systems including visual or pictorial communication systems, voice output devices, sign
language and gestures. As Reichle, Beukelman and Light (2002) state:
Augmentative and Alternative Communication (AAC) is an area of study
that examines methods to supplement or replace spoken communication.
Both gesture (example: natural gestures, sign systems, sign language) and
graphics (example: traditional orthography, photographs, line drawings)
may either supplement speech or act as a primary communicative mode. In
addition, gesture or graphic mode communication can play an important
role in producing and/or comprehending speech. (pxxi)
In terms of its purpose, the field of AAC aims to improve the lives of people with
communication disorders. It is based on the premise that all human beings, regardless of
their ability or disability, have a need and a right to communicate (Mirenda & Iacono
1990; Light 1997). AAC was developed in an attempt to give people with communication
disorders, a ‘voice’, or a means of expression that would allow them to make a wider
variety of meanings other than those previously available to them. As Mirenda and
Iacono (1990, p.3) state: “all people, no matter how severe their level of disability, can
and frequently do attempt to communicate with others throughout their lives.”
Up until the early seventies, there was a considerable body of research into various
aspects of language in the lives of intellectually disabled people that primarily focused on
the development and production of oral skills (Wheldall 1976; Hodges & Deitch 1978).
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But as the success of these efforts was limited, researchers and therapists began to
acknowledge that, as for non-disabled people, learning language for people with
intellectual disabilities involved much more than learning to speak (Mittler 1976).
As a result, there was a move towards nonverbal ‘training’, using augmentative and
alternative communication strategies that were initially successfully used with primates.
Hodges and Deitch (1978) found that an alternative communication system called
Premack’s system (plastic shapes that represent words, and were developed and used
successfully by Premack with an ape named Sarah), was able to be used to teach some
words to a number of people with intellectual disabilities. While the number of words
learned was small, the goal was not to see how many words could be learned, but whether
words could be learned at all.
As the field of AAC expanded, research findings showed that many people, both adults
and children, with all kinds of disabilities could both learn to communicate and benefit
from access to an augmentative and alternative communication system (see for example
Carr & Durand 1985; Reichle & Yoder 1985; Romski & Sevcik 1988a; Robinson &
Owens Jr 1995; Blischak & Lloyd 1996; Beukelman & Mirenda 1998). As people with
disabilities often have communication disorders, they also often utilise behaviour as an
alternative method of communication (Mirenda & Iacono 1990; Robinson & Owens
1995). Communicative behaviours can be very challenging, and have been a major
problem for people with intellectual disabilities and their carers, as has been the case with
Bodhi. While AAC systems can never replicate speech, they have nevertheless presented
some people with disabilities with a more transparent and appropriate form of
communication.
Much of the research into AAC has been conducted to either verify the benefits of AAC
in the lives of people with an intellectual disability, such as the work of Carr and Durand
(1985), Mirenda (1997) and Robinson and Owens (1995), Romski and Sevcik (1989), to
name a few; or to test whether people with severe intellectual and physical (multiple)
disabilities can actually make sense of the symbolic potential of a visual augmented
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communication system (see Hodges & Deitch 1978; Romski, Sevcik & Pate 1988b).
Relatively few studies within this field have had as their aim a detailed mapping of their
subjects’ communication as it occurs naturally within their environments. Consequently,
there are only a small number of studies within the field of AAC that are in any way
similar to the present study. This will be explored further. Firstly, at the risk of
oversimplification, the field of AAC is primarily made up of speech pathology clinicians
and researchers, whose aim is to improve the communication abilities of a very broad
range of people: from children through to adults; from people with little or no intellectual
disability to people with severe and profound intellectual disability; from those with a
profound physical disability to those with a minor physical disability, or people with a
multiple and complex disability; and finally, from people with a congenital disability to
those with an acquired disability. As a result, not only are many of the subjects of AAC
research completely different to Bodhi, but as mentioned above, much of the research
focuses on speech pathology type AAC interventions and whether these interventions
have improved the communication abilities or made a difference to the lives of the people
they were designed for.
Secondly, a significant proportion of AAC studies focus on people with physical
disabilities, such as those with cerebral palsy: people who are wheelchair bound and
whose primary or secondary obstacle to effective communication is severe physical
impairments. In contrast, the subject of this study, Bodhi, is a very active (and
interactive) physically able person whose primary disability manifests intellectually,
although this intellectual disability also has physical ramifications, such as very poor
motor skills. Nevertheless, the obstacles to be surmounted for Bodhi to be able to
communicate are often quite different in nature from the obstacles a person with a
physical disability has to contend with.
Thirdly, as stated above, there do not seem to be many studies within AAC whose main
aim has been a detailed mapping and analysis of someone’s communication in a manner
that provides a kind of snapshot or slice of life in the way this study has aimed to do.
Perhaps this is in part to do with the different aims of the funded doctoral student who is
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both a linguistic researcher and mother of the subject with unlimited access to the subject,
and a detailed linguistic theory to apply to the description, compared to the speech
pathology researcher who has limited time, funds and access to subjects. However, this
may also in part be to do with the fact that whilst AAC researchers have articulated the
need to find an appropriate theory for the description and analysis of multimodal AAC
(Bedrosian 1997), they do not have one cohesive theory that affords the kind of close
linguistic analysis that has been undertaken in this study. Nevertheless, and taking all
these factors into account, there are a small number of AAC studies that are of
significance to the current study, and, as a way of sorting through this large body of
research, I have divided them according to three broad criteria, although there are some
that fall into more than one. These criteria are:
1.

Studies where the subject or subjects of the study are similar to Bodhi in terms
of their level of intellectual disability and/or the type of disability they have;

2.

Relevance of type of methodology;

3.

Relevance of theoretical framework.

The reasons for these divisions will become evident as they are discussed in turn in the
following section.
2.1.1. Studies where subjects are similar to Bodhi in terms of their level of
intellectual disability and/or the type of disability they have;
As already mentioned, within AAC research there are many studies of people, both
children and adults, with physical disabilities (see for example Light, Collier & Parnes
1985a; Light, Collier & Parnes 1985b; Light et al. 1985c; Goossens 1989; Letto,
Bedrosian & Skarakis-Doyle 1994; Blischak & Lloyd 1996; Olsson 2004; Downing
2005; Lilienfeld & Alant 2005; Rackensperger, Krezman McNaughton, Williams &
D’Silva 2005, to name but a few). Furthermore, most of these studies seem to be
clustered around two groupings of people roughly based on intellectual ability: those with
no or little intellectual disability and those with profound or severe intellectual disability.
In contrast to this, studies of able-bodied children with severe intellectual disabilities, like
Bodhi, seem to be almost completely absent from this body of research. While there are
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some studies about AAC and children with autism, (who, like Bodhi, are able-bodied),
these are not so relevant because the issues around engagement and communication are
completely different for children with autism than they are for Bodhi. It seems that one of
the primary aims of the research into AAC and children with autism is to increase their
engagement (see, for example, Johnston, Nelson, Evans & Palazolo 2003; Sonnenmeier,
McSheehan & Jorgensen 2005). Increasing engagement was not an issue in the present
study because, as can be seen in the data, Bodhi regularly and spontaneously engages
with other people. There are, however, a small number of studies headed by Durand
(1991, 1993 etc) that contain participants that had intellectual disabilities (again, usually
autism) but no physical disabilities. However, these studies are not descriptive of the
communication abilities of the subjects and focus instead on the elimination of
challenging behaviours through the provision of appropriate communication resources.
Chan and Iacono’s (2001) longitudinal study on the role of gestures in the emergent
language of children with Down’s Syndrome, was also on able-bodied children however
its aim was the development of a profile for children with Down’s Syndrome, and not
other disabilities.
Nevertheless, while there seems to be a lack of subjects similar in profile to Bodhi in the
AAC literature, there are certain findings arising from the studies of communication of
people with different disabilities from Bodhi that are pertinent to this study. For example,
most AAC studies, regardless of the type of disability of the non-speaking person, found
that the non-speakers do not initiate nearly as much as their speaking communication
partners, who invariably dominate the conversation (Harris 1982; Beukelman & Yorkston
1982; Light et al 1985a). Further, these communication partner-dominated conversations
are typically found to be constituted by yes/no question and answer routines, with the
speaking partner doing the asking and the non-speaking partner providing the answer
upon request (Harris 1982; Calculator & Luchko 1983; Light et al 1985b). Many studies
have also found that even in situations where some non-speaking people had access to
communication devices, they often preferred to use other modes to communicate
(Beukelman & Yorkston 1980; Harris 1982; Calculator & Luchko 1983; Light et al
1985c). Non-speaking children, in particular, seemed to opt for modes that were the
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fastest rather than the most intelligible (Harris 1982). Finally, studies that examined the
role of the communication partner found that the communication partner had a particular
effect on the nature of the interaction with the non-speaking person (Beukelman &
Yorkston 1980; Calculator & Dollaghan 1982; Romski, Sevcik, Reumann & Pate 1989).
The relevance of these findings to the current study is that they raise the question of
whether the above findings were true of interactions with Bodhi, and thus helped shape
my research questions.
2.1.2 Relevance of the methodology to this project
There are many different types of study conducted in AAC research. For the purposes of
this review, the focus is on case studies and studies that observed authentic and naturally
occurring conversations, rather than artificially designed ones. The lack of research based
on naturally occurring conversations and the prevalence of artificially designed
interactions as the basis for research is a shortcoming within this field, one that is even
articulated within the field itself (Blischak & Lloyd 1996).
Whilst there are a number of case studies in the AAC literature, their relevance is
generally limited due to either the fact that the subjects of these studies presented as
completely different subjects to Bodhi, or the studies were predominantly focused on the
effectiveness of communication interventions. For example, Locke and Mirenda (1988)
studied a computer supported communication approach for a child with severe
communication, visual and cognitive impairments; Goossens’ (1989) conducted a study
of the effect of augmentative communication training for a child with cerebral palsy;
Pecyna (1988) studied the effects of training in a graphic symbol system on a severely
“handicapped” preschool child; and Durand and Carr (1991) studied the effects of
communication interventions on the challenging behaviour of three boys with a
developmental disability and autism.
One of the more relevant studies is Blischak and Lloyd’s (1996), which chronicles the
development of a multimodal AAC system used by Cathy, a physically active 38 year-old
woman who has a hearing impairment, an intellectual disability and a physical disability.
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Although the concerns of this study were partly about the way in which Cathy’s hearing
impairment limited or complicated her ability to engage in interactions with people
around her, it was still relevant to the current study in its choice of relatively naturalistic
data samples and its attempted description and analysis of Cathy’s communication. I say
‘relatively naturalistic’ because the clinic supervisor was under instruction to have a
conversation with Cathy, and the researchers remark that “the limited communication
samples collected in conversations with the clinic supervisor may reflect what is optimal
for Cathy, rather than typical, and should be interpreted with caution” (p.44). However,
the study does go into some detail about how Cathy communicates, both in terms of the
“communicative functions” (Light 1989) she is able to express and the modes of
communication she uses in order to do so, as well as the types of speech function of her
moves, such as yes/no responses to questions. However, even with some level of detail,
this study fails to go beyond “the preliminary analysis of modes and message ratio”
(p.45), meaning that it counted which modes were used and how often, which the authors
themselves express as a shortcoming. In other words, it did not examine the meanings
Cathy was making.
The other most relevant case studies by Light, Collier and Parnes (1985a, 1985b, 1985c)
will be reviewed in the section below as their relevance lies more in the area of
theoretical framework.
2.1.3. Relevance of the theoretical framework
Within the field of AAC, there has been much discussion about the applicability of
various language models to language disorders. While some researchers (such as Gerber
and Kraat, 1992) argue for a developmental model, other researchers have used a variety
of approaches, including a system theory framework (Olsson 2004); a functional model
(Light et al. 1985a, and elsewhere; Romski et al. 1989; Mar 1999); a Vygotskian model
(Letto et al 1994); and an activity based communication analysis (Ferm, Ahlsen &
Bjorck-Akesson 2005). However, none of these models really allows for the analysis of
how a person actually realises meaning, although the study by Light, Collier and Parnes
(1985a, b & c), which is reviewed last, goes some way in this direction.
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There is general consensus in the field of AAC that while a developmental model of
language is not always applicable, it is a good place to start, especially if the child has
close to normal language abilities (Gerber & Kraat 1992). However, Gerber and Kraat
(1992) also point out that the further the child gets from the normal path of language
development, the more the clinician or researcher needs to change the model to suit the
child’s situation. They state that in cases where a child’s language profile is so divergent
from normal, the functional needs of the child rather than the norms of language
development need to be considered when attempting to apply a language model. Olsson
(2004) applies a system theory framework to analyse the communication of a child with
severe multiple disabilities, who was functioning at a pre-symbolic level. In her paper,
she argues that as the child had such a restricted ability to communicate, a system theory
perspective allowed for a view of the process of communication that accounted for all the
behaviours the child was able to produce, in conjunction with the contributions of the
caregiver. However, as the author herself states, the concepts of the system theory she
used seem most applicable to the communicative interactions of someone with severe and
multiple disabilities, where turns are not able to be easily identified and the process of the
interaction is almost completely controlled by the caregiver who “takes the responsibility
to move the process forward by interpreting the behaviours of the child as if the child had
a clear intention” (Olsson 2004, p.237).
As one of the researchers at the forefront of the field of AAC, Light (1989) proposes a
model of language that looks at the functions of language as a means to analyse
communication. Called communicative competence, the focus is on:
a) the functionality of communication;
b) the adequacy of communication; and
c) a sufficiency of knowledge, judgement and skill of the communicator.
This theory has been widely taken up as a useful way of addressing a person’s
communication needs (Beukelman & Mirenda 1992) and has built on Light’s earlier work
(1988) which proposes a model of the social purposes of communication, separating
language into four distinct categories: the expression of needs and wants, the transfer of
27

information, the establishment of social closeness and the behaviours of social etiquette.
Mar’s (1999) study applies Light’s model of communicative competence by attempting
to establish profiles of communicative competence. Observing 103 people with severe
and profound intellectual disabilities, Mar conducted a systematic analysis of their
communication behaviours according to specific and detailed criteria, such as the
subjects’ use of symbols; the intentionality or deliberateness of their moves; the social
reciprocity abilities of the subjects; and the complexity of their moves. Within each of
these categories there was a fine breakdown of the levels of ability so that Mar could
establish a profile for each person. Whilst this study is detailed in its analysis, and allows
for an examination of the level of communicative competence that a person has, it does
not examine the kinds of meanings the subjects were making. Instead, it sought to
“characterise broad patterns and sequences of communicative competence” (Mar 1999,
p.82).
Romski et al’s (1989) study of the extant communication patterns of nine children with a
moderate or severe intellectual disability also used a model of communication functions,
mapping the modes the children used and correlating them with nine communication
functions, such as requesting, questioning, greeting, affirming and negating. This study
goes some way towards describing its subjects’ communication abilities and had
interesting findings, such as that although the children had no formal communication
system, they were all successful communicators within a familiar environment. However,
it does not look in detail at either the vocalisations nor the meanings the children make.
Many AAC researchers identify as a problem the inability of standard language models to
adequately address the issues of augmentative and alternative communication and
frequently call for new models which will comprehensively be able to provide a detailed
analysis of the communication of people with language disorders (Light 1988; Gerber &
Kraat 1992; Bedrosian 1997). Specifically, Bedrosian (1997) argues that a language
methodology for AAC would need to:
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1. account for all the components, both linguistic and non-linguistic, of multimodal
communication;
2. be able to identify exactly what a multimodal unit of language consists of;
3. consider the partner’s communicative attempts as part of the meaning making
process;
4. be able to be sensitive to the unique patterns of multimodal communicators’
communication.
However, it seems that the field of AAC has not found a theory that can do this. Instead,
where AAC researchers have recorded and analysed the communication of augmentative
communicators, they seem predominantly occupied with various types of counting. For
instance, in their application of a Vygotskian developmental theory to the language
acquisition of a young child with cerebral palsy, Letto et al (1994) focus on counting the
changes in the frequency of the child’s interactions over time and under instruction. Their
aim was to improve the child’s communication abilities by getting the child to both
communicate functionally and to initiate communication. The researchers used the
Vygotskian theory to focus on the child’s progression through the Zone of Proximal
Development, not to study and analyse the actual meanings the child was making.
It seems to me that in order to improve an augmented communicator’s communication
abilities, a detailed mapping of their current communication would be a prerequisite.
While Letto et al’s (1994) study accounts for the developmental and communicative level
of the child who is their research subject, there is little description of the child’s actual
meaning making abilities (however, it must be noted that this child was at the very early
stages of communication and development).
Blischak and Lloyd’s (1996) study, discussed above, does begin to map the
communication their subject Cathy, but there is still no detailed analysis of her
communication other than the identification of yes/no questions and answers.
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Ferm et al’s (2005) study of the communication at mealtime between a six year old girl
with cerebral palsy and complex communication needs, and her caregiver uses the
principles of a theory called activity based communication analysis. Whilst Ferm et al’s
study uses this theory to highlight certain features of the interaction, such as who initiates
when, and in which situations (which they called topics) within the mealtime activity, it
does only slightly more than count instances. Whilst the researchers claim they will
examine the meaning making that occurs, they focus more on the discourse structures and
surrounding contextual features than on any meaning making within the turns of
communication. This is not to say that it is not useful to focus on the level of
communication above the turn. Indeed, by examining topic change and topic
development, this study was able to show how conversations with nonverbal people are
often restricted to the “here-and-now”. When focusing on the meaning that occurred
within the turns, they analysed the child’s contributions as “tokens, types and meanings”
(p.24). From the perspective taken in this thesis, the first two of these contributions can
be categorised as modes of expression, the third being the semantics. However, the study
seemed only to count the contributions and ascertain how they fell into the categories,
rather than examine the kinds of meaning being made.
The importance of conducting research into the actual meanings being made by
successful users of AAC systems has been highlighted by AAC researchers, such as Light
(1988), Mirenda and Iacono (1990) and Blischak and Lloyd (1996). Light et al’s (1985a,
1985b & 1985c) into the communication of eight congenitally non-speaking physically
disabled children and their mothers, more reflects concerns to capture different aspects of
communication, such as meaning making. Light’s three articles on the different aspects of
this one study are not only virtually the only published AAC study that goes into the kind
of detail that a Systemic Functional analysis affords, but also raise a number of issues that
are relevant to the present study. Further, unlike many AAC studies, Light et al’s study
seemed to be trying to illustrate and identify what the children could do with
communication, not just what they couldn’t do and how an intervention might remedy
that. Although it identified problem areas for the children, Light et al’s (1985a, b & c)
study seems to be based on more than a deficit model. Where Blischak and Lloyd’s
30

(1996) study only goes as far as message to mode ratios (which modes were used and
how often), this study looks in much more detail and engages different aspects of theory
from a range of theoretical perspectives that are similar to the ones I use in this thesis. I
will therefore discuss this study in detail at this point.
2.1.3.1 Light, Collier and Parnes (1985a, b & c) study
The subjects for this study were eight boys with physical disabilities, aged between four
to six years. They did not, however, have intellectual disabilities. Although the data were
collected in a clinic, the researchers attempted to make it as naturalistic as possible, by
providing the same kinds of toys the children had at home and recording a twenty minute
free play session between the children and their primary caregiver. Caregivers were asked
to interact, play and converse with the children in the way they typically would at home.
Whilst the subjects were not similar to Bodhi in that they had severe physical disabilities
and no intellectual disabilities, and the data were only partly naturalistic, the theoretical
framework on which this study was based is similar to a Systemic Functional (SF) model.
The data were analysed across three variables:
1. Discourse patterns, defined as the flow of conversation between the participants,
(and roughly corresponds with discourse semantics);
2. Communicative function, defined as the communicative intent expressed by the
participant, (and roughly corresponding with Speech function); and
3. Modes of communication, defined as the means of message transmission (and
corresponds with the expression plane in SF terms4).
Specifically, the researchers were examining the data to see:
•

What kind of positions the child was able to take up in the conversation, e.g.
whether the child had a turn in the interaction, either as initiator or as responder;
whether the child was able to continue the flow of discourse or not; and which
kinds of moves the child responded to and with what modes.

4

The above three bracketed points will be discussed in detail in the Chapter 2.
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•

What kinds of communicative functions the child was able to express, and
whether there was a difference in what the child could produce when they were
with their primary caregiver compared to when they were with a (familiar)
clinician.

•

What modes the child’s turn consisted of, and which modes were used to express
which discourse roles and communicative functions. The modes they noted and
analysed were: vocalisation or speech; eye gaze; facial expression; gestures (such
as pointing or head shaking); actions (such as touching, reaching for things) and
communication board output (that is, use of an AAC resource).

This study also problematised the definition and identification of the “communicative
turn” within the non-speech context, because of what they claim (and other research
supports, such as Harris 1982) typically occurs when one person is a non-speaking
communicator: that is, the speaking partner dominates the interaction and the nonspeaking partner’s turn may go unnoticed; or they may not be given enough time to
respond. As a result, the researchers came up with different definitions of the
communicative turn. They started by using a definition from a study by Kaye & Charney
(1980) of typically developing children and their mothers, whereby a communicative turn
was defined as being a long enough pause in which someone might or might not take the
floor. Light et al built on this, expanding the notion of the turn from not just whether
there is a time space within the conversation, but whether there is the “presence of
intentional behaviours directed towards the partner” (Light et al 1985b, p.100).
In terms of the first variable, “discourse patterns”, the results confirmed previous
research, showing that, in general, the interactions between the speakers and the nonspeaking communicators were highly asymmetrical, with the caregivers producing more
than twice the number of communicative turns than the children. The caregivers
controlled the focus of the conversations, with the children being much less successful in
eliciting responses from the caregivers when they, the children, had initiated the topic
than when they were responding to an established topic. The caregivers talked a lot,
seeming to treat silence as a communication breakdown and generally not leaving a silent
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space of more than one or two seconds. The children had difficulty establishing a new
topic, as there was not much time and space to do so.
Of further interest is that the children in this study seldom cued their partners to continue
the interaction, whereas the caregivers cued the children over 60 percent of the time.
Additionally, the caregivers issued many replays (moves that repeat or rephrase a
previous move) when they did not get a response or the response they wanted, whereas
the children did not issue replays at all. All these findings contributed to the forming of
my research questions, as my hunch was that interactions with Bodhi did not exactly
follow these types of patterns.
The second part of Light, Collier and Parnes’ research (1985b) is about the variety of
communicative functions that the non-speaking pre-schoolers were able to produce. Of
relevance are the twelve different categories of communicative function that were
developed during the analysis process:
1. Social conventions: greetings, closings, social routines.
2. Requests for objects or actions: requests for objects or activities present or absent,
requests for physical assistance.
3. Requests for information: requests for information previously known or unknown
to the speaker, requests for information by offering a yes/no choice.
4. Requests for clarification: expressions of noncomprehension, requests for
confirmation of symbols choices, specific requests for clarification.
5. Requests for attention: requests for the partner’s attention to an object, action or
self.
6. Confirmations and denials: affirmative or negative responses to yes/no questions
or to the partner’s attention to an object, action or self.
7. Provisions of information: comments on objects, events or persons present or
removed in time and space.
8. Provisions of clarification: provisions of clarification by repeating the message,
by changing the mode and/or content of the message, self initiated or solicited.
33

9. Expressions of self: Expressions of protest, humour, positive and negative
emotional states.
10. Elicited imitations: turns produced in response to a specific directive from the
partner (e.g. “show me the symbol for computer”) or turns whose sole function is
to voice the gloss (i.e. the word) associated with a symbol selected by the nonspeaking partner.
11. Conversational fillers or self-talk: turns which carry no specific propositional
content or illocutionary force directed towards the partner (e.g., “um” used as a
place or turn holding device; “vroom” used as a vocal marker while engaged in
play activities not involving the partner or directed towards the partner).
12. Unintelligible utterances: turns that are unintelligible as to their propositional
content or illocutionary force to both partner and coder.
These communicative functions are constituted by a mixture of aspects of linguistic
theory, for example speech function and exchange structure as well as including other
functions that pertain to nonverbal multimodal communication, such as self-talk and
unintelligible utterances.
Whilst the division of non-speech communication into these different functions may be a
pragmatic and a useful way for a therapist to see in which areas of communication a nonspeaking person is functioning (or not), to date, there are no studies in the AAC literature
that have applied them in conjunction with Light et al’s discourse patterns and modes of
communication. In other words, other than this original set of studies, there are no studies
that have systematically investigated communication from this range of levels, looking at
the modes of expression a person uses and correlating them with the communicative
functions and discourse patterns.
A key point of interest from Light et al’s study is their demonstration of the
conversational asymmetry (Kaye & Charney 1980) that often occurs in interactions with
non-speakers. Specifically, for example, the children typically encoded only one
communicative function per turn, whereas the communication partners mostly encoded
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more than one function per turn, producing in total as many as three times the number of
communicative functions as the children. The findings also showed that the children did
not request any information from their caregiver; that they mostly responded with
confirmations or denials, or provided specific information requested by the caregiver; and
that they only occasionally asked for objects or for actions to be performed. Of most
interest is that while around ten percent of the children’s moves were unintelligible, they
only provided clarification in five percent of their moves, and it was the caregivers who
took responsibility for repairing the conversation. The study also showed a difference
between what the children did with caregivers compared to what they did with the
clinician, that is, the caregivers constrained their communicative functions by taking
responsibility for driving the conversation and doing such things as asking questions that
they, the caregivers, already knew the answers to. This was particularly relevant to the
present study as I was interested to examine the kinds of conversational moves Bodhi
makes and whether different communication partners impact upon his communication,
and if so, how.
The third part of Light, Collier and Parnes’ (1985c) study describes in detail the modes of
communication the children used, specifically aiming to investigate whether the
propositional content of the message being communicated affected the choice of modes
that the children communicated with. This is the only study within the field of AAC that,
not only examines which modes of communication non-speaking people use, but also
looks at the interrelationships between the modes used and the communicative functions
and discourse roles expressed by those modes. What the researchers found was that most
of these children were truly multimodal communicators, predominantly using
vocalisation, gesture and communication boards. However, the study also showed that
although the children all had access to and were used to using an augmentative
communication board, over 80 percent of all their communication was in modes other
than the communication board. Additionally, the study found that more than a quarter of
all the children’s turns were unintelligible in intent, both to the communication partner
and the researcher.
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Whilst Light et al’s research covers similar ground to the current study in its approach to
description and analysis, one of its shortcomings is that it does not examine the
vocalisations made by the children in any detail, even when one of the children used
vocalisation in at least three-quarters of his turns. It seems that if a child is using nonspeech vocalisations to such an extent, it would be useful to examine the vocalisations
more closely to see if they are different in different contexts, i.e. if the child uses one type
of sound to accomplish one or some communicative functions, and another type to
accomplish another. Clearly that was beyond the scope of this otherwise detailed study.
Finally, whilst this study comes closest to the type of investigation I have attempted in
this thesis, in that it correlates the modes used with the functions and roles expressed by
those modes, it does not do a systematic mapping of the communication abilities of the
children. It was either beyond the scope of the study or beyond the scope of the
theoretical framework that was used for the study.
Similar to Light et al’s (1985a, b & c) research, Harris’s (1982) study of the
communication practices of three non-speaking physically handicapped children who
used an AAC device in their classroom also examined the data from three angles: the
conversational structure, including turns and unit types within turns; communicative
functions, such as “instruction, description/statement, question, response, communicative
‘fill’ and praise or reinforcement” (p.29); and modes of communication, which she calls
turn forms, including vocalisations, gesture, eye point or head shake. Harris used the
conversational turn as the basic unit of analysis, as her interest lay in describing the
process of interaction between teachers and her three subjects. In order to be able to see
who initiated and who responded, turn units were divided into initiations and responses.
The findings were mostly consistent with other AAC studies, i.e. that the speakers (in this
case, the teachers) dominated the interactions, often not giving the children enough time
to answer and filling up the conversational space; and that the children used the easiest
modes of communication rather than the most effective modes. However, what stands out
most about this study is Harris’ identification of the importance of the communication
partner’s verbal articulation of the child’s move. Specifically, Harris notes how in an
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interaction that the non-speaking child has initiated, it is the subsequent move of the
speaker that provides the communicative function and expression (in words) of the
multimodal move of the child. She provides this example:
S (child): (gestures and points to the door and vocalises)
T (adult): You want to go out?
S: (nods head “Yes”)
T: (takes child out)
(p.34)
However, what Harris fails to notice is the significance of the joint negotiation of
meaning that is occurring. That is to say, the child has made a nonverbal move that is
unclear, and with help or work from the communication partner, the meaning of that
move is jointly negotiated via a confirmation request from the communication partner. It
is not simply that the child has not expressed a communicative function, it is just that it is
undifferentiated and therefore ambiguous. But through the communication partner’s
articulation of the child’s move, the meaning of the move is identified. Researchers such
as Bedrosian (1997) and Olsson (2004) have pointed out that it is imperative that the
efforts of the communication partner be taken into account when analysing nonverbal
multimodal communication. The question then becomes how the contributions of the
communication partner should be accounted for in the analysis of nonverbal multimodal
communication – a question that this study attempts to grapple with.
Secondly, Harris’ treatment of the above example also raises the issue about the
difficulties a non-speaking person has in conveying meanings they have no way of
expressing. That is to say, in the given example, the child clearly has control of the
semantic plane in that they mean that they want to go out. They just do not have a
lexicogrammar with which to express the meanings they are trying to make.
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2.1.4 Summary
There are a number of issues raised in the AAC literature that were relevant to my own
study and influenced my research questions. These include:
1. The prevailing finding that most non-speaking individuals did not initiate nearly
as many interactions as speakers, and also were predominantly not interacted with
in ways that allowed or afforded them the opportunity to do much more than
answer yes/no questions.
2. That the unit of analysis was an issue to be examined in nonverbal multimodal
communication.
3. The observation that the communication abilities of non-speaking people are
affected by the context in which they are produced. This includes the demands
and agenda of the social situation, to the more specific contextual features such as
whether there are communication aids present or not.
4. That whilst non-speakers frequently use vocalisations to communicate, no study
has examined the types of sounds used, in order to see whether different types of
sounds realise different functions.
5. That an examination of the communication partner’s contribution to the
communication process should be undertaken in any analysis of nonverbal
multimodal communication.
At this point I now move to the field of SFL, and the work that has been done within that
field that is of significance to this study. It might seem like a long bow to draw in moving
so quickly from AAC to SFL, but I reiterate here the point that AAC researchers have
identified the lack of a comprehensive research framework that can account for all the
components of multimodal communication. As will be illustrated below, SF theory has
been shown to be a useful theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of
human (and some non-human) interactions. It is this feature that draws together the two
fields as it were: one looking for a theory, the other offering a set of theoretical tools for
the analysis of communication. The following section therefore reviews the relevant work
with the SF model of language.
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2.2

Studies from the Systemic Functional tradition

The SF model of language and meaning making has been applied to many varieties of
human interaction. Initially developed by Halliday on the Chinese language, it has been
used to describe numerous other languages, including English. It has also been used to
analyse movement, gesture, music, art, sign language, child language development and
language disorder, as well as non-human primate communication. A number of these
applications are significant for this study and will be reviewed below.
2.2.1 SF accounts of child language development
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, whilst not necessarily being the way to
account for the nonverbal multimodal communication of a child with a severe intellectual
disability, SF studies of child language development do provide some basis for the
consideration of the language development of a child with a communication disorder.
There are three key longitudinal case studies of child language development that use
Systemic Functional theory: Michael Halliday’s seminal work (1975) of the development
of language in his son Nigel, which painted a complex and systematic picture of the
ontogenesis of language; Clare Painter’s (1984) study of the language development of her
son Hal from the age of nine months to two years, which both validated and extended
Halliday’s language development theory; and Jane Torr’s (1997) study of the language
development of her second child Anna, which examined whether the presence of an older
sibling had any effect on the language development of a subsequent child. In all of these
studies, the researcher was the parent of the child under study. In addition to these
studies, both Halliday and Painter have written extensively on the subject of child
language development, further expanding the understanding and contributions to the field
of child language development from a Systemic Functional perspective (see for example
Halliday 1979, 1981, 1983, 1984; Painter 1989, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2004).
Halliday, Painter and Torr’s studies showed how normally developing children, in
interaction with the significant others in their lives, and motivated by the desire to get
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their ever increasing needs met, move through various stages of development in the
learning of their mother tongue. These are linguistic case studies that have as their
primary focus the development of semiosis from a linguistic perspective. As Matthiessen
(2004, p.48) explains, the ontogenetic model “represents an explicit and detailed model
of how semiotic complexity can develop from a single primary semiotic system to a
complex higher order one”. However, if there is some kind of obstacle to the
development of the linguistic tools of semiosis, in other words speech, as there is with
Bodhi, one must instead make use of other resources such as gesture or signing to get
one’s needs met, and development may not follow the same normative trajectory. The
studies of Halliday, Painter and Torr are therefore useful only to a point. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to examine in detail the developmental stages they identify for two reasons at
least: firstly, it seems logical to think that if Bodhi has not developed speech language, he
must be at some earlier stage of development. Secondly, Bodhi’s communication is
constituted by a range of semiotic complexity that includes features of both a simple
primary semiotic system and of a more complex higher order one. This point will be
further taken up below as well as in the discussion at the end of the thesis.
In his 1975 study, Halliday identifies three distinct stages of language development or
systems that his child progressed through. The first stage, termed ‘protolanguage’,
typically begins around the age of nine months and continues for approximately six
months. It is a two-tiered system, consisting of just the content and expression planes.
Unlike adult language, it does not have an intermediate level or stratum of
lexicogrammar. An instance of communication from this system would therefore contain
just meaning and sound. Halliday divides protolanguage into six microfunctions, which
will be discussed briefly in turn.
1. The

INSTRUMENTAL

function. This is the ‘I want’ function of language, where

language serves to help the child gain possession of something or have some
service performed for them. In this function, it does not seem to matter who
performs the required task, just that it gets done.
2. The

REGULATORY

function. This is the “do as I tell you function” (p.19) of

language, where language serves to control the behaviour of others. Halliday
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states that unlike with the instrumental function, here the focus is on a particular
individual carrying out the required task.
3. The INTERACTIONAL function. This is what Halliday calls the “me and you” (p.19)
function of language, where language serves to promote interaction between the
child and significant others. This function includes such meanings as greetings
and names.
4. The

PERSONAL

function. Halliday calls this the “here I come” (p.20) function of

language, where the child expresses their own uniqueness and separation from
their environment through the expression of personal feelings.
5. The

HEURISTIC

function. This is the “tell me why” function of language, where

language is used to explore the environment, initially to categorise objects in the
physical world, but eventually developing into a whole range of questions.
6. The

IMAGINATIVE

function. This is what Halliday calls the “let’s pretend”

function of language, where language is used by the child to create his/her own
imaginative world. Halliday notes that at first this function is constituted by pure
sound, but later develops into a world of pretending, make believe and story
telling.
Halliday (1975) states that while in this early stage of language, the sounds and meanings
are not imitations of adult language, but rather “spontaneous creations in the glossogenic
process” (p.24), the adult system still exerts an influence over the child’s meaning
making system since everything the child utters is interpreted by those around him/her in
terms of their own semantic systems. Further, Halliday states that although the child does
not have any structures with which to express his/her meanings, at this very early stage
the child does have a language as they still have a system of potential meanings, or as
Halliday explains, “options in the environment of other options” (p.26).
Three features of the protolanguage phase are outlined by Painter (1989):
•

The child is restricted to conversing about the here-and-now context as by not
having a language they have no means to bring into the conversation things that
are not co-present in the immediate environment.
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•

The sounds produced are novel and not imitations of the adult language. Each
sound is also specific to its function. Painter uses the example of a peg. Having
the word peg allows you to use it in any context. Within protolanguage, the
sounding of peg would be uttered differently for different functions.

•

Interactions occur in pairs where either the child initiates and the adult responds,
or vice versa, and the response cannot be or is not used as a starting point for a
new conversational departure.

The limitations of this kind of system are reason why the child might be motivated to
move on to the next phase of language, as the protolanguage is very restricted in what it
can achieve for them.

The second stage of language is termed the ‘transition’ phase by Halliday. Lasting about
six months, the studied children reached this stage between the ages of one and a half and
two years. What marks the transition phase as different from the protolanguage phase is
that the child’s use of language evolves into two macrofunctions: the first is where
language is used for the purpose of learning and organising experience, which Painter
(1984 & 1989) has shown starts off as naming things. Halliday terms this the

MATHETIC

function, arising from the personal and heuristic functions of protolanguage, and does
therefore not necessarily require a response from a communication partner. The second is
where language is used to act on the world by way of demanding a response from
someone. This is called the

PRAGMATIC

function, arising from the instrumental and

regulatory functions of protolanguage, with the interactional function making a
contribution to both the mathetic and the pragmatic macrofunction. The difference
between these two functions is described by Halliday (1975) as:
the distinction … between language as learning and language as doing; between
separating the self from the environment, thus identifying the one and interpreting
the other, and interacting with the environment so as to intrude on the things and
people in it, manipulating them and expressing attitudes towards them (p.55).
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Halliday describes the difference in realisation of these two functions as tonal – his son
Nigel uttered all pragmatic functions with a rising tone and all mathetic functions with a
falling tone:
The rising tone meant in effect that some form of response was required, a
response either in the form of action or, after a time, and increasingly
throughout this period, a verbal response. The falling tone meant that no
response was required, and the utterance was, as it were, self-sufficient (p.27).
From her study, Painter (1984) did not identify such distinct tonal differences, with her
son Hal using both level and rising tones for the pragmatic, whilst adopting “a more
exclamative rise-fall contour” (1984, p.252) for the mathetic. Torr found that her
daughter Anna did not use tone to distinguish the two macrofunctions, but rather voice
quality, using a tone akin to whining, to demand a response. Regardless of how the
macrofunctions are realised phonologically, their use allows an expansion of the child’s
meaning potential to the possibility of eventually encoding the two types of meaning
simultaneously in the one utterance: experiential and interpersonal. Children are thus on
the way to developing the adult system.
Further, the transition phase is where the child makes the “crucial discovery” that s/he
can use language to both observe and interact with the environment at the same time
(Halliday 1975, p.57).
There are two major features of the transition phase. There is the development of
wordings and structures, a lexicogrammar, where the child begins to make utterances
increasingly based on the adult system of language. Painter (1989) points out that this
begins with the naming of things, and that this naming allows the child to both share their
meanings with a wider variety of people, and also move beyond communicating only
about that which is located in the here-and-now. Halliday (1975) shows that this is also a
step towards the adult system as it marks the insertion, as it were, of a level between
content (or semantics) and expression (or phonology). As the word lexicogrammar
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implies, it is the development of both the lexis and the grammar that builds the child’s
two-tiered system into the fully-fledged three-tiered system of the adult language.
The second major development of the transition period is the child’s realisation that there
are communication or social roles that they, and others, take up when participating in
language. They learn to respond to a variety of moves in a variety of ways, which builds
to the final feature of the transition period, the ability to use language to inform. Halliday
(1975) states that using language to communicate something to someone who did not
share the experience is a highly complex function as it is one that is defined by language
itself, requiring a narrative mode rather than simple observation and recall. It is also
contingent on the previous development as it is only when the child realises that language
can accomplish different things and that people take up different roles that s/he can
understand that language can be used to convey linguistic matter, information, rather than
just to accomplish things that exist outside of language, such as the getting of food or
toys. As Halliday (1975) explains:
the child learns dialogue; he learns to adopt, accept and assign linguistic
roles, and thus to measure linguistic success in linguistic terms. From now
on, success consists no longer simply in obtaining the desired material
object or piece of behaviour, but rather in playing one’s part; in freely
accepting the roles that one is assigned, and getting others to accept those
that one has assigned to them (p.51).
Painter (1989) develops the theory by outlining features of the pragmatic function in the
transition phase of language, all relating to the child making some change in their world
using language:
Pragmatic function is the use of language to make an effect on the world –
to intrude, to change the situation in some way, which usually involves
interacting with others. So the development within the pragmatic function is
largely concerned with the nature of interactional roles (p.37):
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Painter (1989) also outlines features of the mathetic function in the transition phase of
language, all relating to the interpretation of experience:
•

The development of an understanding that speech may be an appropriate
response to a request for some action or thing.

•

The generalising of experience, where the child is able to label actual things in
the real world and compare them to symbolic ones, such as pictures in books.

•

The building up of lexical items into taxonomic sets with hyponymic or
meronymic relations, where the child realises and expresses that things are the
same or different, or part of a set.

•

The verbal interpretation by the child of events in their world as they unfold,
where the child produces a kind of “running-commentary” (Painter 1989, p.45).

•

The development of linguistic structure, where the child adds to his/her meaning
potential by adding classifications to his/her original labels, such as from ‘dog’ to
‘big dog’; or by adding a Process to his/her original labels, such as ‘pat dog’,
configuring what is argued to be the nucleus of the clause in SF terms, Process
plus Medium (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004).

When the child reaches the end of the transition phase, s/he has moved into the adult
language, the mother tongue, having built up a system that is both multistratal, with
content, form and expression, and multifunctional, with ideational, interpersonal and
textual metafunctions. That is to say, this stage finishes when the child has mastered the
adult language system and can then continue to master the adult language. Naming it “the
explosion into grammar” (1992a, p.23), Halliday (1975) explains:
…the child has learned how to mean, in the sense that he has mastered the adult
language. He has mastered a system that is multifunctional and multistratal. The
system has a massive potential; in fact it is open-ended, in that it can create
indefinitely many meanings and indefinitely many sentences and clauses and
phrases and words for the expression of these meanings. The child will spend the
rest of his life exploring the potential of this system; having learnt how to walk,
he can now start going places. Language can now serve him as an effective means
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of cultural transmission, as a means whereby in the ordinary everyday interaction
in which he himself takes part, the essential meanings of the culture can be
transmitted to him. The culture itself is a semiotic system, a system of meanings
or information that is encoded in the behaviour potential of the members,
including their verbal potential – that is, their linguistic system. (p.35-36)
Whilst none of these three studies are labelled by their authors, nor by others, as studies
of ‘normal’ language development, considering the focus of this thesis, it is both
appropriate and significant for them to be labelled as such, as the children in these studies
are ‘typically’ or ‘normally’ developing children, whereas Bodhi is not. All three studies
show how it is under the pressure, as it were, of the social and linguistic environments of
which they are a part that the children move forward in their development of language.
As Painter has shown, using the language system changes it. Whilst all three studies show
differences in the process of the children’s language development, they still follow a
“typical” ontogenetic trajectory, that is to say, all the children learn to be accomplished
speakers of their mother tongue as there are no obstacles, such as intellectual disability or
communication disorder, in their path. This has not been the case with Bodhi, who has, as
it were, some large obstacle that has prevented him from learning to speak. In order to
mean, he has therefore had to develop, use and rely on other non-speech modes of
communication in order to get his needs met.5 Further, some of Bodhi’s needs are quite
sophisticated in the sense that they have moved beyond the first stage of language where
the needs are only about getting ‘things’, such as toys and food, and getting ‘things’ done,

5

It is pointed out within the field of AAC (see for example Gerber and Kraat 1992) that

theories of normal language development do not pay enough attention to non-linguistic
forms of communication beyond the earliest stages of language development. Indeed,
Halliday (1975) notes how Nigel’s first meaning system at around the age of nine months
consisted of five elements, of which three were realised as gestures, but that as Nigel’s
speech language developed, the gestures dropped out, disappearing completely by the age
of twelve months. Following this, the focus is, of course, on Nigel’s linguistic
development.
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such as having his tummy tickled. Matthiessen (2004) points out that the only commodity
exchanged during the protolanguage stage is goods-&-services, whereas Bodhi’s needs
also involve the exchange of information, where he assigns roles to both himself and
others as giver and receiver of information.
Therefore, whilst these studies are of relevance to the present study as they map out the
path of ‘normal’ language development, in some senses, their use is limited here as Bodhi
has never been on a ‘normal’ developmental trajectory. The concerns of this study are
how one expresses meanings when one doesn’t develop the along the typical pathways of
language development, and what meanings one is able to express. In other words, what
happens when you don’t have the resources of speech?
This thesis does not attempt to answer these questions in general terms but specifically in
the case of one individual. As can be seen from the data, Bodhi expresses meaning in
ways that are different from speakers of English, that is to say - he has developed a
multimodal semiosis. This thesis therefore proposes a view of Bodhi as a different
meaner rather than an infant meaner. Rather than use Halliday’s model of child language
development and try to plot Bodhi’s output onto a developmental continuum, it seems
more relevant to use Halliday’s model of semiosis, which has already been applied to
areas other than speech, and use it to describe Bodhi’s multimodal semiosis. Further, this
is supported from the field of AAC, where questions are raised about whether it is at all
useful to place “language disordered” children on a normal developmental continuum
when they usually also have uneven developmental profiles (Gerber & Kraat 1992). This
is not to say that the developmental trajectory as described and explicated by Halliday,
Painter and Torr is not useful to this study, particularly as Bodhi’s communication is
marked by peaks and troughs in terms of complexity, with parts of Bodhi’s
communication seeming to be akin to the simpler features of earlier stages of language
development whilst other parts seems to be akin to the more elaborated and
multifunctional later stages of language development. Additionally, through the
application of SF theory to Bodhi’s communication, I am almost forced to engage with
the ontogenetic studies because Bodhi’s output is similar to an infant’s. However, this is
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not the only view taken here, as will be further explicated later in the thesis. Thus, the
findings of this thesis are also interpreted in the light of these studies at various points in
the thesis.
2.2.2 SF theory in the field of speech pathology
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, SF theory and analysis have already been
applied to areas of language disorder in the field of speech pathology, where
researcher/clinicians have been using various aspects of the theory to study the
communication of their clients. This group of researchers have shown that the SF model
is both useful and helpful as it is able to both illuminate and describe features of language
disorder that have not been possible with other language theories, as well as point to
avenues of remediation.
In particular, there are two areas of language disorder where the SF model has been
applied more than any other area: aphasia (see Armstrong 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001;
Ferguson 1992a, 1998a, 1998b); and traumatic brain injury (see Togher 1998a, 1998b,
2000, 2001; Togher, Hand & Code 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b; Togher & Hand
1998; Togher, McDonald, Code & Grant 2004). However, it is not so much the areas of
language disorder that are of relevance to this study as much as it is the aspects of SF
theory that have been used to study these disorders, and the usefulness of the findings.
This section will give a brief overview of these findings, of the aspects of SF theory used
by the researchers and of why the SF model is deemed a useful theory for the study of
language disorder.
Armstrong’s extensive work on the communication of people with aphasia has tended to
focus on the ideational metafunction and cohesion (see, for example, 1992 for clause
complex relations; 1991, 1993, 1995 for cohesion; and 2001 for transitivity). Within
these studies, Armstrong has highlighted the usefulness of the SF framework in the
context of language disorder/difference as it allows the researcher/clinician to not just
count instances of an aphasic speaker’s language features but to look at the way they
convey meaning to their listeners in real life situations (Armstrong 1991). She has
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highlighted the fact that the SF model is more than a deficit model, and therefore useful
in illuminating what people with language disorders can do, as well as what they can’t
do. The focus then becomes how functional the person’s communication is rather than
how correct it is. These are crucial distinctions for this thesis. If a deficit model was
employed to examine Bodhi’s communication, one would only see how much he can’t
do, not what he can do and in what ways. As Armstrong (2005, p.139) points out, it is
more a case of acknowledging and accounting for different ways of communicating with
“the focus being on how and what resources are used, rather than breakdowns in rules per
se”.
In addition to the above studies, Armstrong and her colleagues have also published on the
application of SF theory to a variety of language disorders/differences (see, for example
Armstrong 1993, 2005a; and Armstrong et al. 2005) in an attempt to convince the
discipline of speech pathology to adopt SF theory as a method for the description,
analysis and treatment of communication disorders.
Ferguson’s (1992a, 1992b, 1994) work on aphasia also examines aspects of cohesion,
such as collocation. For example, her (1992b) study points to the significant role of
collocation in assisting the communication partner to successfully guess what the person
with the language disorder/difference is trying to say. Ferguson (1992b) states:
…listeners help build the overall coherence of conversation by the interactional
receptive strategy of supplying words. To supply words, the listener uses the
preceding text and by supplying words, the listener contributes to the further
development of the conversation (p 305).
As such, she specifically highlights the importance of accounting for the communication
partner’s contribution to the success of communication with the person with the language
disorder/difference, through the joint negotiation of meaning. Ferguson (1994, p.153)
goes as far as saying that the contributions of the “normal” communication partner must
be seen as part of the “compensatory repertoire” of the person with aphasia. In her study,
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Ferguson shows how the efforts of the communication partner in “supplying words and
speaking for” (Armstrong et al. 2005) the person with the communication problem was
not only common but also crucial in maintaining the conversation across all the three
metafunctional variables of field, tenor and mode. This has implications for this study,
because, as will be seen in later chapters, the communication partner plays a major role in
helping Bodhi to successfully make meaning.
In the area of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), Leanne Togher and her colleagues have used
various aspects of SF theory to study the communication of people with TBI. These have
included Mood and Modality analysis (Togher et al. 1996; Togher & Hand 1998);
Exchange Structure Analysis (Togher et al. 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a; Togher 2000);
and Generic Structure Potential (Togher et al. 1997b; Togher & Hand 1999b). The focus
of these studies has been partly to ascertain how TBI subjects perform in comparison to
‘normal’ speakers on a variety of tasks, and to identify exactly which parts of their
interactions are problematic (Togher et al. 1997b; Togher & Hand 1998). Further,
Togher’s (2000) study, Togher and Hand’s (1999b) study and Togher, Hand and Code’s
(1996) study show how the roles that the TBI subjects were assigned and the different
communication partners they interacted with affected their communication abilities. This
again highlights the very significant factor of the importance of the communication
partner in contributing to the success (or failure!) of the exchanges of people with
communication disorders/differences6.
Other than the finding that different communication partners affect the interactions, the
significance of the studies using the SF model with TBI for this study is not so much in
6

Other studies using SF theory with language disorder/difference in adults include Mortensen’s (1992)

study on the discourse of a woman with Alzheimer’s disease using Transitivity analysis; Mortensen’s
(2005) companion study of the personal letters written by people with aphasia, TBI and a control group,
using generic structure analysis and semantic move analysis; and Spencer et al’s (2005) work using
Modality, Theme and Transitivity analysis to examine the impact of stuttering on the language use of two
adult stutterers, pre- and post-treatment.
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the area of findings, but in the use of SF theory and methodology, in particular Exchange
Structure Analysis, for the study of language disorder/difference.
The SF work within speech pathology reviewed thus far has focused entirely on the
communication of adults. In terms of the study of communication disorders/differences in
children, there are a number of studies which have used SF theory: Fine (1994) and Fine
Bartolucci, Szatmari and Ginsberg (1994) look at cohesion in the language of children
with autism and Asperger’s syndrome; Rigadeau-McKenna (2005) examines the use of
clause complexes in children who have a language impairment as a result of brain injury;
Mathers (2001 & 2005) uses transitivity, lexical density and grammatical intricacy to
study the language of children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; Thomson
(2005) used Theme analysis to study narrative texts in 25 children with Specific
Language Impairment; and Liles, Duffy, Merritt and Purcell (1995) examine at cohesion
in the language of children with a Language Disorder. Whilst all these studies reported
useful findings in the application of SF theory and whilst they demonstrate its use across
a range of language disorders/differences, all the children in these studies have speech as
their main form of communication. There are no studies to date using SF theory to
examine the communication of non-speaking children.
Bodhi’s communication presents a different form of communication for investigators to
research. Thus some of the kinds of analyses used in the above studies are simply not
possible in this study. For example, Armstrong (1992) uses the logical metafunction to
examine the inter-clause complexing of a man with aphasia. It is simply not possible to
apply this kind of analysis to Bodhi’s moves as he does not communicate in clause
complexes. As will be shown further on in this thesis, Bodhi’s moves consist of single
units of meaning only.
Nevertheless, this body of research does highlight the reasons why SF theory is
appropriate for the study of language disorder/difference as it allows for a broader and
richer perspective that is multilayered. Specifically, as summed up in their joint article,
Armstrong et al (2005) say that an SF perspective allows for:
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•

a view of language that is contextualised rather than the more traditional
decontextualised view that is usually taken up by speech pathologists;

•

an examination of language as it is used in everyday contexts;

•

an exploration of how a disorder “manifests itself in discourse, rather than restrict
examination to the formal aspects of clause or sentence level”(p.384);

•

a view of language disorder that has multiple perspectives;

•

a focus on not only the limitations but also the strengths and resources that
language disordered speakers use to communicate;

•

a view of language as a meaning potential;

•

a certain amount of prediction on the part of the analyst of the particular
difficulties that different language disordered speakers might have across different
situations;

•

an examination of the “co-construction of discourse between conversational
partners and the way this is managed by speakers” (p.386), which is referred to as
the ‘joint negotiation of meaning’ in this thesis. This is possible because of the
SF’s model focus on both co-text and context (including shared knowledge);

•

an acknowledgement of the importance of the cohesive resource of collocation in
partners’ ability to predict language-disordered speakers’ meanings.

Togher (2000) also points out that the application of SF theory in the field of speech
pathology is in its infancy, and that there is room for further research. Given that the
communication of children with intellectual disabilities comes under the speech
pathology domain, there is clearly an opening in this area which could possibly contribute
both to the field of speech pathology and also to the field of SF theory.
2.2.3

Systemics and other modes of communication

SF theory has been used to describe various semiotic systems other than language. These
include visual images (Kress & van Leeuwen 1990), where Halliday’s metafunctional
view of semiosis is used to construct a theory of visual literacy; body movement
(McInnes 1998), where bodies and space are seen as meaning making systems separate
from yet used in conjunction with language; gestures (Martinec 1998, 2000), where
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bodies and actions are systematically analysed according to Halliday’s metafunctions;
and space (Stenglin 2004), where three dimensional space is also theorised in terms of
Halliday’s three metafunctions. What is significant about these studies for this thesis is
the fact that they have used Halliday’s model of semiosis to describe semiotic systems
other than language. As McInnes (1998) states, analyses of other modes of semiosis
contribute to the broadening of the SF perspective on communication to include “ways of
describing, analysing and critiquing semiotic practices which rely on resources other than
language” (p.5). However, there seems to be a difference between these studies and my
own in that they describe phenomena that they theorise about from within the
metafunctional model. This study, however, does not fit neatly into the model because
Bodhi’s communication traverses a range of developmental levels – some moves are like
protolanguage, some are like transition moves and some are like those of an adult.
Further, given that Bodhi’s idiolect traverses this range of levels, it was not sufficient to
describe his meaning making using only the tools offered by the constructs of the proto or
transition phase of language. I have therefore had to stretch the model to fit a way of
communicating that seems to at least partially sit outside it. In some senses, the current
study has more in common with Johnston’s studies of Auslan, reviewed below, as he has
had to take into account features that sit outside spoken languages.
2.2.4 SF theory and Auslan
This section will show how Johnston’s (1992, 1996) SF-based studies of Auslan
(Australian Sign Language) have particular insights that help inform thinking about nonspeech languages. With its ability to recognise multiple simultaneous encodings of
meanings, SF theory is, according to Johnston (1996, p.4), the theory that best articulates
the kind of “plurifunctional perspective” that is needed for examining sign languages.

53

Whilst the object of Johnston’s (1992, 1996) studies is, in a sense, completely different to
the object of this study, in that Auslan is mono-modal7 as it is sign only, the way Johnston
frames non-speech language is applicable to the current study. For example, Johnston
(1992, 1996) makes the point that as sign languages occupy the visual-gestural rather
than the auditory medium, they have a clear preference for encoding many meanings
simultaneously, using the dimension of space as well as time. This contrasts with spoken
languages,

which,

while

simultaneously

encoding

three

levels

of

meanings

metafunctionally, tend to exploit a more sequential unfolding of meanings in time only.
As he says:
Space is a resource unique to sign languages and has a rich potential for
encoding various types of meanings when combined with the general
resources of wave, field and particle8. However, the very availability of
space as a substance or vehicle of linguistic expression is also a function
of the fact that sign languages are quintessentially face-to-face languages:
a fact that may influence, and even constrain, the linguistic system in other
ways (Johnston 1992, p.1).
Whilst Bodhi does not use sign exclusively, his communication is also a face-to-face
language that uses the visual-gestural medium, so the notions of the use of space and
simultaneous encoding as resources for or dimensions of meaning is an important
consideration for the current study. Even if Bodhi does not make use of space in the same
way Auslan signers do, the notion of ‘extra dimensions’ stimulates a consideration of the

7

Whilst I say that sign language is mono-modal, Johnston breaks it down into the

components of location, movement, orientation, hand shape and facial expression,
however these are all identified as components of ‘signed’ language.
8

Wave, field and particle are terms originally used by Pike and reinterpreted by Halliday

into the three metafunctions. According to Halliday (1979), particle corresponds to the
experiential metafunction, field corresponds to the interpersonal metafunction and wave
corresponds to the textual metafunction.
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possibility of how other dimensions might come into play in non-verbal multimodal forms
of communication such as that used by Bodhi. The importance of these considerations lie
in the fact that they alert the researcher not to become too over-focused on, or limited by,
the parameters of speech language as identical to those of non-speech language.
Johnston also contributes to a discussion on language typology by stating that sign
languages are more like topic prominent languages, such as Chinese, than subject
prominent languages like English. Whilst this will not be discussed in any detail here,
where Bodhi sits within a typological picture or spectrum, such as whether it is possible to
fit his language/communication into an already existing type or whether it is a type all of
its own, is taken up at the end of this thesis.
Other points of significance from Johnston’s (1992, 1996) works are his observation that,
unlike communication between speakers of language, there is no cultural expectation
amongst Auslan signers (users) to be completely explicit and unambiguous in their signing;
meaning is arrived at by a spiralling down from the signing of a general idea to the details
that the signer wants to provide about that idea. In a sense, as will be shown in this thesis,
Bodhi communicates in this manner, in most cases giving the communication partner a
general idea about what he is communicating about and then working together with the
communication partner to target more specifically his meaning.
Johnston (1996) also points out that the Auslan community is embedded within the larger,
hearing (in Bodhi’s case, speaking) linguistic community, where meaning must be
negotiated across the two systems, with the Auslan meaning generally needing to be
filtered, as it were, through words. Non-signers are generally not privy to the meanings of
Auslan, however, given the need to operate within the larger community, Auslan signers
themselves need to negotiate both linguistic terrains. Bodhi must also negotiate two
linguistic terrains: his own multimodal one and the larger speaking one in which he is
embedded. This throws up interesting questions about the circuitry of a communication
system embedded within a larger linguistic community, and how that affects the
communication possibilities of the multimodal communicator like Bodhi, whose
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communication must be filtered, as it were, through words. This also relates directly to the
role of the communication partners. They are not within Bodhi’s communication
community – in fact no one is – yet they are an integral part of his meaning making
process. This transmodality, as it were, whereby one sets of modes of communication need
to be transferred across another as part of the communication process, might, or even must,
have some bearing on the communication, even if it is only to exert constant pressure to
adopt aspects of the host language, as Johnston (1996) notes occurs with Auslan.
Whilst all these insights into Auslan can help shed light on the study of Bodhi’s
communication, there are also limitations to their applicability due to the differences
between Bodhi’s communication and Auslan. These differences include Auslan’s status as
a fully functioning language in its own right, with the bulk of the signers being fully
intellectually-abled people (Johnston 1992). Signers are not (generally/necessarily) people
with communication disorders/differences in the strict sense of the term, they are just nonhearing and using a totally different language: a non-speech language. Unlike Bodhi, they
are not using a language that is always filtered through spoken English, they are using a
language that is a language in its own right, and unless they are trying to communicate
with a speaker, they have their own community of signers (Klima & Bellugi 1979).
To continue this point, Johnston (1992) also notes that Auslan signers primarily
communicate with each other, whereas researchers (such as Light 1988) have found that
people with communication disorders who use multimodal communication systems
generally communicate with non-disabled speaking communication partners. The
comparison would be more akin to an Auslan signer having to sign to a non-signer all the
time. This affects the communication environment in that Bodhi does not have a
community of users of his own language. His language is always filtered through speech. It
is perhaps this factor that differentiates his communication from all others and provides it
with an extra dimension to consider, as is pointed out in both the AAC literature and the
aphasia literature reviewed above: the efforts of the communication partner in the
contribution to the meaning making of a person with a language disorder/difference can
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not be, indeed must not be, ignored nor underestimated. It must be factored in as a
dimension of the communication. The question is, then, how it is to be factored in.
In summary, it is not so much how Johnston applies SF theory to his object of study,
Auslan, but more how he broadens the perspective or view on non-speech language in his
observations and considerations of it. His contribution is to engage the researcher in
broader questions of how one might think about and typologise non-speech language, and
how particular aspects of the linguistic environment and particular features of the nonspeech language might affect the way we view, analyse and discuss non-speech languages.

2.2.5 SF theory and the study of the communication of bonobos (pan paniscus)
There have been many studies of the language and communication abilities of non-human
primates that attempt to ascertain whether they have symbolic language (see for example
Premack 1971; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh, Williams & Furuichi 1996;
Savage-Rumbaugh, Shankar & Talbot 1998; Savage-Rumbaugh & Fields 2000). In
particular, a group of researchers have used SF theory to describe the non-speech
language of a particular group of bonobos (see Benson et al. 2002; Benson, Greaves,
O’Donnell & Taglialatela 2005a; Benson, Greaves, Savage-Rumbaugh, Taglialatela &
Thibault 2005b; Benson, Debashish, Greaves, Lukas, Savage-Rumbaugh & Taglialatela
2005c). Additionally, Benson et al’s (2005c) study is the only one that has conducted an
examination of the sounds made by a nonverbal being using the same computer software
that was used in this study. However, the purposes of those studies are completely
different to this one in that they use the SF analyses as evidence for the argument that the
non-human primates under study are not only capable of symbolic language, but also that
the primate in Benson et al’s (2005c) study produces sounds that are a dialect of English.
These studies are trying to narrow the gap, as it were, that supposedly separates humans
from other primates: the gap of symbolic language. The current study does not need to
prove that Bodhi has human-like qualities of symbolic language in quite the same way,
although it does seek to explore his meaning making. In support of this, Cleirigh (2006)
states:
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The development of meaning potential in each individual depends on interactants
assuming that the individual is capable of becoming a semiotic being. Typically,
the approach taken towards other species is virtually to defy them to prove they
are semiotic beings. In contrast, Benson et al take the social theory of ontogenesis
seriously: they provide the social environment that ontogenesis requires, and
assume that Kanzi and friends are semiotic beings. (They also acknowledge the
continuum between language as a social semiotic system and the semiotic systems
of other species, which is consistent with Darwinian biology, rather than
religiously clinging to the Cartesian dogma of human as an entirely different
type.) (personal communication: 2006)
Thus the relevance of these studies to my own is in the fact that they successfully used
various aspects of SF theory to study a non-speech language. These areas include
metafunctional analysis, conversational analysis based on Eggins and Slade (1997) move
network, and sound analysis linking tonal sounds to different speech functions, as noted
above. The relevance of this work is not so much in the area of the research findings.
However, a further issue of interest arising from Benson et al’s (2002, 2005a, b & c)
research is the notion of a continuum or cline of semiosis, where different moves and
modes of communication have varying degrees of semiotic complexity. Where Bodhi’s
communication might sit along this kind of continuum will be taken up in subsequent
chapters.
2.3

Conclusion

This chapter has located the current study within two specific fields: AAC and SF theory.
From the research within AAC, it is evident that there are few studies that systematically
map the meaning making of nonverbal multimodal communicators. Further, there are
none that examine the sounds of nonverbal multimodal communicators, although many of
the subjects of AAC studies use sound as one of their modes of expression, and
differences in tone map very distinct meanings in spoken English. Within SF theory, this
thesis follows in the footsteps of two groups of researchers: the first is the Australian
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speech pathologists using the theory to analyse the communication of people with
communication disorders/differences. This group of researchers has demonstrated the
applicability of SF theory to language disorder, and this thesis expands their work by
extending the application of SF theory to the domain of nonverbal multimodal
communication. The second is those using the theory to describe semiotic systems other
than language. Whilst there are other bodies of research that inform this study, such as
those using Exchange Structure Analysis to describe spoken language, they are discussed
in the specific chapters. The following chapter describes relevant aspects of the SF model
of language.
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 3
THE SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF LANGUAGE AND SEMIOSIS –
FROM A DIFFERENT MEANER PERSPECTIVE

______________________________________________________________________________________

“…it is also a valid goal to explore the relevance of grammatics to
semiotic systems other than language, and even to systems of other
types”. (Halliday 1996, p.32)
3.0

Introduction

This chapter locates the thesis theoretically within the field of Systemic Functional (SF)
theory. As language and meaning making are very complex, the theory that describes
them is equally complex (Halliday 1996; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004). Given this
complexity, there are numerous points of entry for the task of explaining the theory. As
the object of study for this thesis is nonverbal multimodal communication and not speech
language, the point of departure taken for explaining the SF theoretical framework is the
social semiotic perspective: Halliday’s notion that language is a form of social behaviour
(Halliday 1978). It is what we do with language, what we use it for, that is the starting
point for this chapter.
3.1

Language and multimodal social behaviour

Viewing language as a form of social behaviour enables us to locate it in the context of
other forms of social behaviour, which for the purposes of this thesis, is a useful place to
start. This view is a functional view, observing that we use language to interact with each
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other in order to function in a social world, e.g. to regulate the behaviour of others, to get
things done, to impart information, to share our lives with each other etc, or as Halliday
(1984) puts it, to exchange “social meanings” (p.12). As shown in the AAC research,
even people without language seek to function in a social world and affect the behaviour
of those around them, using gesture, non-speech sounds and behaviours – whatever
resources they have at their disposal. Having been generated on ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ uses
of language, SF theory takes a perspective that is skewed towards normative uses of
language. However, as McInnes (1998) points out, this can be restrictive when applied to
other semiotic systems. Thus whilst this section explains the relevant aspects of Systemic
Functional theory, the lens needs to be refocused from one that views language as the
dominant form of human semiosis or meaning making, to a reconstrual of language as
one form of semiosis. It is a theory of semiosis that is described here, of which language
forms one part, albeit the dominant one.
In clustering language and non-language semiotic systems together, we can view the
theory in the light of semiotic systems in general. Halliday (1973) characterises semiotic
systems as “meaning potentials” (p.29) or “options in the environment of other options”
(1975, p.26). However, it is not just the meaning potential that constitutes a semiotic
system, but also the bringing into being of that system through an act of meaning: “a
semiotic system is a meaning potential together with its instantiation in acts of meaning”
(Halliday 1996, p.4). Building on Saussure’s notion of langue and parole (in Bally and
Sechehaye 1966), where langue referred to the underlying system of language, and
parole to the actual instance of language, Halliday’s notion of meaning potential as
system and instantiation as an “act of meaning” (Halliday 1996, p.30) unites langue and
parole into one phenomenon, seen from two different vantage points. As Halliday (1996,
p.29) explains: “instantiation is the relationship between the system and the instance; the
instance is said to instantiate the system”. In this sense, meaning making is constituted by
both the product and the process, where the instance of meaning making is a product, as
in the case of output that can be recorded and studied. As Halliday and Hasan (1985)
explain, meaning making is also a continuous process of choices that are “ a movement
through the network of meaning potential, with each set of choices constituting the
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environment for a further set” (p.10). This holds for multimodal communication as well.
For example, Bodhi engages in acts of meaning, which are instances of meaning
expressed through multimodal semiosis. He makes choices within an environment of
other choices. In doing so, he instantiates his system of meaning potential – only without
speech language.
This study views Bodhi’s communication from the perspective of both the instance and
the system. From the instance perspective, examining Bodhi’s meanings as they occur in
each instance of communication, and from the system perspective, examining the
meaning making system that is formed by the patterning of instances.
3.2

Text as an instance of communication

SF theory takes a social-semiotic perspective of text, viewing it as any instance of a
social exchange of meanings, which are typically realised as wordings, or, as Halliday
and Hasan (1976, p.1) state, a text is a unit of “language in use”. It is not a grammatical
unit and it is not defined by size. It is seen not as a unit of form, but as a unit of meaning.
The focus then is on the making of meaning rather than on the forming of structures. As
Halliday and Hasan (1985) write:
The important thing about the nature of a text is that, although when
we write it down it looks as though it is made of words and sentences,
it is really made of meanings. Of course the meanings have to be
expressed or coded, in words and structures…it has to be coded in
something in order to be communicated; but as a thing itself, a text is
essentially a semantic unit. (p.10)
As the focus of the theory is on text as semantic units, the corollary to this is that other
forms of meaning making can constitute texts. Halliday (1984) confirms this, stating that
when we consider language “as a form of the exchange of social meanings, we are
looking at it as a semiotic process, and therefore as one that is in principle capable of
being realised through systems other than language”. (p.12). In other words, text is a
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social exchange, an exchange of meanings between people that typically takes the form
of language, although it can also take place via modes of expression other than language.
When language is the primary focus, however, many modes of expression such as gesture
are often downgraded in importance. In order to accommodate a multimodal semiosis,
these other modes of expression need to be viewed with renewed interest. The notion of
text can therefore be expanded to mean any instance of communication constituted by
any meaningful configuration of a variety of modes of expression. In this study, text is
therefore seen as a broader artifact, including whatever modes of expression are used in
the act of meaning. This has ramifications for data collection and analysis as it is
insufficient to only use an audio tape recorder for recording data when much of the
meaning making is conducted in the visual-gestural medium. This also affects the data
analysis, as there is no system of wordings to analyse as the realisation of meanings.
3.3

Stratification

Halliday uses the term lexicogrammar for the wordings in language, because the
wordings include both the vocabulary or lexis and the grammar. Lexis and grammar are
therefore seen as two different aspects of the one phenomenon, or, as Halliday (1985a,
p.15) states, they are “merely different ends of the same continuum – they are the same
phenomenon as seen from opposite perspectives”.
As the lexicogrammar, on the one hand, expresses meanings and on the other hand is
itself expressed as sounds, SF theory stratifies language into three systems: meanings
(semantics), wordings (lexicogrammar) and soundings (phonology). The notion of
stratification came from Hjelmslev (1961), who initially stratified language into two
strata: content and expression. Halliday expanded on this, further stratifying the content
plane into the two separate systems of semantics and lexicogrammar. The semantic
system is what the speaker can mean, that is, the meaning potential, and the
lexicogrammatical system is what a speaker can say (Halliday 1978, p.39). Together, the
strata of semantics and lexicogrammar form the content plane, and the stratum of
phonology forms the expression plane. These strata are related to each other through a
relationship of realisation, where elements in one stratum express elements in another
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(Halliday 1979). That is to say, semantics are realised by lexicogrammar, which is
realised by phonology (graphology in writing), or as Halliday (1992a) later explains,
meanings are realised by the realisation of wordings in sound. This can be configured as
in Figure 3.1 below, where the circles show that all three levels have the same
fundamental principles of organisation: “each level is a network of interrelated options,
either in meaning, wording or sounding, which are realised as structures, based on the
principle of rank” (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999, p.4).

Please see print copy for Figure 3.1

Figure 3.1 The tri-stratal system of language (after Halliday and Matthiessen 1999)
The tri-stratal configuration is said to be representative of the adult system of language.
In contrast to this, a child’s protolanguage, as discussed in the previous chapter, has only
two strata: content and expression. What remains to be explored in this thesis is whether
Bodhi’s multimodal semiosis has three strata or two, or some combination of both. In
other words, does Bodhi have an intermediate stratum or layer of grammar, between his
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meanings and his expressions? And if he does, is this grammar like the adult system of
speech language? Whilst I didn’t set out to try to locate Bodhi’s communication on a
developmental trajectory, as alluded to earlier, one by-product of mapping his meaning
making using SF theory is locating it in terms of a stratal model.
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, language can be viewed from a variety of
perspectives. This is made possible by the stratified model where to view language from
a semantic perspective one is said to be viewing it ‘from above’, taking account of
function; to view language from a phonological perspective is to view it ‘from below’,
taking account of soundings and intonation; and to view it ‘from roundabout’ is to view it
in terms of the forms and other categories that organise the system of language, and how
these relate to one another, or as Halliday (1996, p.26) says “from the standpoint of the
lexicogrammar itself”. Called the “trinocular” perspective (Halliday 1996, p.16), what is
of most importance for the study of nonverbal multimodal communication is Halliday’s
(1996) point that to explore a semiotic system like language, we must consider the
underlying function, the internal organisation and the outward appearance, in order to see
how experience is transformed into meaning. The current study views Bodhi’s
communication from these three perspectives: from above, taking into account the
function and meaning of Bodhi’s moves; from below, taking into account the modes of
expression that he uses to express his meanings; and from round about, taking into
account the internal organisation of his expressed meanings.
3.4

The paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of language

At this point I return to the organisation of the lexicogrammar, which is the only stratum
that is internal to language itself, realising semantics on the one hand and being realised
by phonology/graphology on the other, or, as Halliday and Matthiessen (1997, p.41) say,
“interfacing with both semantics and phonology”. SF theory views the lexicogrammar as
being organised along two axes, the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic (Halliday and
Matthiessen 1997). Paradigmatically the lexicogrammar is organised into systems that are
ordered in terms of delicacy. Halliday (1996, p.10) explains this organisation: “a
grammar is represented paradigmatically as a network of given alternatives (a “system
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network”). Martin (1992) describes this from another standpoint, saying that system
networks represent language as a set of resources rather than a set of rules, showing
choices within the lexicogrammar. In terms of delicacy, systems are ordered from left to
right. For example, within the system of Mood, there is the choice between indicative and
imperative: within indicative, there is the choice between declarative and interrogative:
within interrogative there is the choice between a yes/no question and a WH-question.
Each choice is a choice in terms of delicacy. This can be represented as a system network
as follows:

Please see print copy for Figure 3.2

Figure 3.2

Basic options in the mood system (Halliday 1973)

Paradigmatic choices are instantiated through a process of realisation. That is to say, a
particular paradigmatic choice is realised using a particular form in the language. This
realisation can be represented notionally with diagonally slanting arrows.
declarative
indicative
+Subject +Finite

Subject^Finite

yes/no

interrogative

Finite^Subject

imperative

“WH”
Wh^Finite

Figure 3.3

Basic options in the mood system with realisations in the grammar

Syntagmatically, the lexicogrammar is organised into structures of actual realisations of
paradigmatic choices. This knitting together of the wordings into a linear order forms the
syntagm. While the syntagmatic axis is clearly important in any analysis of language, it is
the paradigmatic axis, that is the systems of language, which are given priority in SF
theory (Halliday 1985a; Martin 1992). For the purposes of this study, both the
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paradigmatic and the syntagmatic are examined. A multimodal semiotic may be able to
realise meanings, however, the syntagmatic mode will be different. That is to say, the
meanings may be the same, but the expressions of those meanings will be realised
differently. This articulates the issue at the heart of one of the research questions in this
study: whether or how Bodhi is able to realise meanings without the structures of the
lexicogrammar. This study will show that there are still structures that are manifested in
Bodhi’s multimodal expressions of meanings, but to what extent they form a linguistic
semiotic system is debatable.
3.5

Rank

The lexicogrammar is also organised into a hierarchy of units along a scale of rank.
According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), the clause is the “primary channel of
grammatical energy” (p.31), or the “central processing unit in the lexicogrammar” (p.10),
making the clause the highest unit within the rank scale. Beneath the clause are the ranks
of phrase, group, word and morpheme. Each rank is made up of one or more units from
the rank below. Together with the axial organisation as described above, rank forms the
“general inter-stratal principles of organisation that are manifested in the different stratal
environments of language in context” (Halliday and Matthiessen 1997, p.41). Halliday
configures this as follows:

Please see print copy for Figure 3.4

Figure 3.4

Units on the rank scale (Halliday 1961, p.253)

Thus the clause is the basic unit of analysis of language within SF theory. However, this
is problematic for this study, as Bodhi mostly does not communicate in words, groups nor
clauses. In order to establish a unit of analysis for multimodal communication, I have had
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to take a sideways leap up out of the levels below clause into conversation analysis,
adopting the notion of move as the basic unit of analysis. That is to say, Bodhi’s
conversational turns are constituted by moves rather than clauses, and whilst I propose no
unit of analysis below the move, Bodhi’s moves can still be analysed in terms of the
meanings they express.
3.6

Metafunction

SF theory provides a framework for exploring how a semiotic system such as language
creates and expresses meaning. It views language as being organised functionally. As
Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) explain:
systemic analysis shows that functionality is intrinsic to language:
that is to say, the entire architecture of language is arranged along
functional lines. Language is as it is because of the functions in which
it has evolved in the human species. (p.31)
This functional organisation begins from the earliest stages of ontogenesis. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, Halliday (1975) divides an infant’s protolanguage into six
MICROFUNCTIONS,

where each instance of communication conveys a single meaning

based on the function the child is enacting. The next phase of language development, the
transition phase, sees the microfunctions evolve into two broader

MACROFUNCTIONS,

where each instance of communication conveys two meanings simultaneously:
experiential meanings – meanings about representing the world; and interpersonal
meanings – meanings that involve the roles that they assign and take up in the process of
communicating. Halliday (1992a) describes this stage in terms of being able to mean in
acts that embody both reflection and action as sets of options. The final stage of language
development sees the macrofunctions evolve into three

METAFUNCTIONS,

adding the

textual dimension, the organising principle of language to the system. Halliday (1977)
explains the effect of the textual metafunction:
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Language can effectively express ideational and interpersonal
meanings only because it can create text. Text is language in
operation; and the textual component embodies the semantic systems
by means of which text is created. (p.178)
Thus the lexicogrammar has evolved functionally to realise meaning potential, and is
classified according to how we use language (Halliday 1979). Further, Halliday (1992a)
describes this shift vividly:
What has made this possible is what I called just now the ‘explosion
into grammar’ – an explosion that bursts apart the two facets of the
protolinguistic sign. The result is a semiotic of a new kind: a
stratified, tristratal system in which meaning is ‘twice cooked’, thus
incorporating a stratum of ‘pure’ content form. (p.23)
This stratum of ‘pure’ content form is what Halliday (1992a) calls a semiotic space, a
purely symbolic mode of being between the two interfaces of meaning and expression.
This purely symbolic mode is the lexicogrammar and it is organised functionally into the
three metafunctions of

IDEATIONAL, INTERPERSONAL

and

TEXTUAL.

The ideational and

the interpersonal relate to phenomena outside of language. The textual is intrinsic to
language itself. These will be explored in more detail below.
The

IDEATIONAL

metafunction functions to represent the world, both the external world

around us and the internal world inside us. It is “the semantic system as expression of
experience” (Halliday 1979, p.59). The ideational metafunction has two subcategories of
the experiential and the logical. The experiential is concerned with the linguistic coding
of experience, where we represent the world in terms of the happenings that occur, the
people and objects that take part in them, and circumstantial elements such as places,
times, ways and manners in which they happen. Experiential meanings occur as
particulate structures: “a configuration, or constellation of discrete elements, each of
which makes its own distinctive contribution to the whole” (Halliday 1979, p.64). This
configuration or constellation forms the clause structure. Clauses can chain together to
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form complexes. Orthographically, a clause complex corresponds to a sentence, however
a single clause can also form a sentence. Clauses within a clause complex are connected
to each other in particular ways, and it is the logical part of the ideational metafunction
that explores these relations in terms of interdependency and semantic function.
However, given that Bodhi generally expresses only one move per turn, the logical part
of the ideational metafunction will not be explored further.
The

INTERPERSONAL

metafunction serves to enact our social roles and our roles in

interaction, giving the speaker’s perspective on things. As Halliday (1979) explains:
Here the semantic system expresses the speaker’s intrusion in the
speech event: his attitudes, evaluations and judgements; his
expectations and demands; and the nature of the exchange as he is
setting it up – the role that he is taking on himself in the
communication process, and the role, or rather the role choice, that he
is assigning to the hearer (p.60).
Interpersonal meanings are prosodic in nature as they are distributed continuously
throughout language in a melodic kind of way. Interpersonal meanings can be expressed
through a number of different structural devices including the system of Mood, modality,
tone and key, intensity and other attitudinal meanings (Halliday 1979).
The TEXTUAL metafunction is the organising function of language. It orders and therefore
enables the ideational and the interpersonal meanings to be formed into coherent text,
relating the parts of the text to each other. It is structured in a wave-like manner
according to two peaks of prominence. The initial peak of prominence typically occurs at
the beginning of a clause, identifying what the speaker is on about. This initial peak is
called Theme, with the rest being Rheme. The second peak typically occurs at the end of
the clause, providing the focus of information, and generally concords with tonic
prominence. This next peak is called New, and orients the listener to attend to the new
information being provided. Halliday (1979) states that these two types of prominence
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are independent of each other but function to build the texture of a text and give
periodicity to the discourse. Additionally, the system of COHESION also functions to
provide texture. This will be discussed at length in Chapter 8.
The existence of the three metafunctions occurring simultaneously in language means
that three kinds of meanings can be made simultaneously. This is what distinguishes the
adult system of language from the child’s system. The ideational meanings are the
representation of the internal and external world; the interpersonal meanings are about the
interactants in the text; and textual meanings are about how the text is ordered and given
texture. When this thesis asks the question: “What meanings is Bodhi making?” it refers
to the metafunctional meanings as outlined above. This thesis therefore uses the notion of
the metafunctions to describe and analyse Bodhi’s communication: from the standpoint
of the instance, to see what kinds of meanings Bodhi is making in his instances of
communication; and from the standpoint of the system, to see what kind of meaning
making system Bodhi is drawing from when he communicates. Further, in speech
language, the three metafunctions are realised through different grammatical systems: the
ideational is realised through the system of Transitivity, as well as nominal group
structures within clauses, and through the systems of dependency and logico-semantic
relations between clauses; the interpersonal is realised through the system of Mood; and
the textual is realised through the systems of Theme and Information Focus. However, as
there is no lexicogrammar in Bodhi’s communication, he does not realise meanings in the
same way. The task of this study has been to explore and map exactly how Bodhi realises
the semantic stratum without a readily recognisable lexicogrammar.
In addition to examining Bodhi’s meaning making within his turns of communication,
this study also examines Bodhi’s dialogic abilities, in terms of his ability to navigate the
conversational environment. That is to say, in addition to a metafunctional analysis, SF
theory offers the perspective of language as an exchange of meanings to account for the
dialogic nature of communication. This is discussed below.
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3.7

Language as exchange

In his 1984 article (and elsewhere e.g. 1985, 2004), Halliday describes dialogue as a
process of specific exchange: of either goods-&-services or of information, where
speakers take up roles as either givers or demanders. In casual conversation, as described
by Eggins and Slade (1997), what is exchanged is mostly information. In other contexts,
such as service encounters, as described by Ventola (1987), goods-&-services are just as
likely to be exchanged. Further, speakers have the option to initiate dialogue or to
respond to it. These options, for a ‘move’ in dialogue, give rise to a network of choices,
as depicted by Halliday (1984). This can be seen in Figure 3.5 below.

Please see print copy for Figure 3.5

Figure 3.5 – The system of dialogue (adapted from Halliday 1984)
The combination of the commodity that is being exchanged (goods-&-services or
information) with the role that is assigned (giving or demanding) gives rise to the four
basic speech functions of offer, statement, command and question. This can be depicted
as follows:
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Please see print copy for Table 3.6

Table 3.6 – Giving or demanding, goods- & services or information (from Halliday and
Matthiessen 2004, p.50)
These options show the paradigmatic system of choices within a move. For example,
communicators choose whether they want to give or demand information or goods-&services.
Eggins and Slade (1997) have extended the speech function network in their analyses of
casual conversation, in order to capture “the more subtle speech functions of casual
conversation” (p.191). Whilst Eggins and Slade acknowledge that important evidence can
be provided through an analysis of Halliday’s speech functions, they maintain that it does
not illuminate the types of responses and types of initiations that are created and
maintained in casual conversation.
The choice between a speech function that is an initiating move and a responding move
can be captured via a further development of Halliday’s speech functions: Exchange
Structure Analysis. Given the importance of the communication partner in interactions
with people with communication disorders, and given that people with communication
disorders are reported to not initiate much communication, a model that focuses on the
dialogic nature of multimodal communication was needed. This study has utilised
Exchange Structure Analysis for this purpose.
3.8

Exchange Structure Analysis

Exchange Structure Analysis (ESA), which was developed in what Martin (1992) calls
the Birmingham school, expands meaning making in dialogue to a level above the clause.
ESA comes from the work of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) who in their study of
classroom discourse, offered the exchange as the unit of analysis above the move.
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However, it is in a collection of works edited by Coulthard and Montgomery (1981) that
the model of exchange that was widely taken up is fleshed out.
An extension of the above work on the exchange is Berry’s (1981a, 1981b, 1981c) work,
which was originally developed from an analysis of television quiz shows. Called the
Nottingham model by Thwaite (1994), Berry’s extension of the exchange model is the
one that has been taken up more than any other by systemic accounts of conversation
analysis. Whilst only the interpersonal component of her model is used by other linguists,
Berry’s model is multifunctional, using all three metafunctions to characterise types of
exchanges.
Berry’s model has been built on by both Martin (1992) and Ventola (1987, 1988). Martin
extends the model to include new dynamic moves, as well as to expand the entry point to
an exchange with such attending moves as calling and greeting (with their corresponding
response possibilities); Martin (1992) proposes a ranked model of conversational
structure that includes three networks:
FUNCTION

at the rank of move, and

NEGOTIATION

MOOD

at the rank of exchange,

SPEECH

at the rank of clause. This shows the links

between the notion of speech function and exchange, and is presented by Martin (1992)
as follows:

Please see print copy for Figure 3.7

Figure 3.7 Resources for dialogue (by strata and rank) (Martin 1992, p.50)
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Ventola’s (1987) extension of the exchange structure model arises from her PhD study of
service encounters. Ventola expanded the model in a number of significant ways. Of
most relevance to my study is the distinguishing between types of service within the
goods-&-services category. This is discussed in detail further on in the thesis in Chapters
6 and 9. Further, but whilst not of much significance to this thesis, Ventola’s (1988)
contribution of what structural slot can fill a move in an exchange is important as it
expands the model of exchange to include the clause complex. She argues for the
application of Halliday’s logicosemantic clause complexing network to account for
moves of more than one clause within an exchange. This builds on what can be identified
as a move within an exchange.
Exchange Structure has been successfully used in various contexts, often to interrogate
and lay bare unequal power relations. For example, as described in Chapter 2, Togher and
colleagues used Exchange Structure in the 1990s to examine the discourse abilities of
people with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Their findings showed that people with TBI
fulfilled more or less powerful roles within exchanges depending on the identity of the
communication partner. Perret (1990) expanded Exchange Structure to examine the way
native and non-native speakers of English answer questions, finding that there were clear
differences between them. Thwaite (1994) used Exchange Structure to investigate the talk
of Australian males and females, and found that there were differences in the way males
and females conduct themselves within a conversation environment. For example, she
found that the females in her study displayed “what could be thought of as more
responsibility for the continuity of the discourse” (Thwaite 1994, p.298), whilst males
tended to have a greater range of conversational behaviour.
Whilst the current study was not initially seeking to uncover power relations within
Bodhi’s interactions, the findings from AAC studies that show nonverbal communicators
to be relatively passive and powerless in the conversation process meant that a theory like
Exchange Structure could be useful in uncovering Bodhi’s abilities to navigate the
conversation environment. Therefore, the Exchange Structure model after Berry, Ventola
and Martin is taken as the point of departure in this thesis for the exploration of meaning
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that occurs across the conversational turns, that is, at the level of discourse semantics and
is explored in more detail in Chapter 9.
3.9

Phasal analysis

Interactions with Bodhi fall into what Eggins and Slade (1997) term “chat”. “Chat” is
analysable in terms of “microinteraction, describing the move-by-move unfolding of
talk” (p230). However, a move-by-move analysis did not capture the subtleties and shifts
that were occurring above the level of move and exchange. For example, in the process of
dividing the transcribed conversations into moves and exchanges, it became clear that
Bodhi communicated quite differently in different parts of the conversations: in some
sections Bodhi only demanded information, whereas in other sections he predominantly
gave it. In order to capture and account for these differences, an intermediate unit of
analysis between exchange and whole text was needed. There are a number of systemic
theorists who have offered an analytical unit that is intermediate between the text as a
whole and the clause. For example Cloran (1995) offered the Rhetorical Unit as a way of
segmenting texts into cohesive sequences that serve a particular rhetorical purpose.
However, this kind of analysis is grammatically based, relying on the identification of a
Subject and Finite within a clause, and was therefore not appropriate for use here. Whilst
a Rhetorical Unit analysis could have been applied to the communication partner’s
contributions, it did not seem to be adequate to only use the communication partner’s
efforts and not Bodhi’s as the guide for segmentation. Another intermediate unit, the
phase, was offered by Gregory (1985, 1988), in an attempt to describe “the linear or
dynamic progress of discourse” (Gregory 1985, p.18). This seemed a more appropriate
way of segmenting the data as it was able to use Bodhi’s moves as the guide for the phase
boundaries or shifts.
Gregory (1985) defines phasal analysis is a form of text segmentation that:
characterises those stretches of text in which there is a significant measure
of consistency in what is being selected ideationally, interpersonally, and
textually (p.127).
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According to Macken-Horarik (2003, p.289), a phase is a semantic rather than a formal
unit of analysis and it “enables us to ‘chunk’ text according to specifiable criteria”. The
“specifiable criteria” however, are not really specified by Gregory except to say that
shifts in one or more of the functional components distinguish one phase from the next.
Macken-Horarik (1997) used the concept of phase to segment high school texts into
chunks that were semantically related. She further suggests that shifts from one phase to
another occur when a change in the “experiential domain” (2003, p.289) occurs.
Linguists such as Martin and Rose (2003) have used phasal analysis in the identification
of different stages in school texts, primarily relying on shifts within the textual
meatfunction, that is, Theme. However, they explain that phases within texts are variable
and may be unique to a particular text, thus names given to different phases are notional.
McInnes’ (1998) made extensive of phasal analysis in his study of performance text, as it
proved “very useful in describing and interpreting the ways in which meaning is
constructed, accumulated, dispersed and negotiated” (p.84). This study uses phasal
analysis to divide the data into sections according to shifts in topic, which are tracked
through the shifts in move type and experiential focus. (See Appendix 5).
3.10

Conclusion

This chapter has located the study theoretically within the field of Systemic Functional
theory, showing that it is a powerful analytic tool for the description of not only
linguistically realised meaning making but multimodal realisations of meaning making as
well. The theoretical constructs of SF theory that have been discussed include:
1.

that language is one form of social behaviour, but there are other forms of
non-language semiosis, which can also be viewed as meaning potentials;

2.

that text is viewed as a semantic unit rather than a unit comprised of
structures, which can therefore be understood to mean any instance of
communication constituted by any meaningful configuration of a variety of
modes of expression;
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3.

that language is stratified in terms of its organisation and this stratification
allows us to view meaning making from a variety of standpoints;

4.

that language is also organised axially into paradigmatic systems of potential
choices and syntagmatic structures of ordered wordings. This configuration
allows for a recognition that there can be meaning making choices with
realisations in modes other than language.

5.

that the lexicogrammar is organised metafunctionally and makes three kinds
of meanings simultaneously. This organisation can be applied to meaning
making systems other than language (as evidenced by the work discussed the
literature review chapter of this thesis).

6.

That dialogue can be viewed as an exchange, and examining what goes on at
the level of exchange allows for an analysis of how people negotiate the
conversation environment.

The next chapter will locate the study methodologically, weaving theory and method
together, in order to show how the study was carried out.
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CHAPTER 4
MANIPULATING MEANING: METHODS OF MULTIMODAL DATA
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

______________________________________________________________________
4.0

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process undertaken in doing this study.
Structured mainly as a recount, this chapter will examine the decisions that were made
and the steps that were taken in the process of data collection and analysis. The chapter
includes discussions of my position as mother and researcher, the issues involved in data
analysis and collection, and an outline of the research design.
4.1

The position of the researcher

My dual positions as both researcher on this project and mother of its chief subject needs
addressing as, both as researcher and mother, I am a “socially located person” (Cameron,
Frazer, Harvey, Rampton & Richardson 1992). However, it is not new to be a parent
researcher, Piaget probably being one of the most well known in the broad field of
education. Further, as mentioned in Chapter 2, within the field of SF theory there are a
number of studies of children’s language undertaken by parents (see Halliday 1975;
Painter 1984; Derewianka 1995; Simpson 1997; Torr 1997). In acknowledging both
roles, I make my position clear: as a mother, my concern has been clearly stated, to help
improve Bodhi’s communication abilities. As a researcher, my concern is to collect
authentic data, analyse it systematically using the tools of SF theory, and interpret and
discuss the findings. Of course the two roles were not always inseparable, especially
when the data were being collected in our home and I was in the role as observer. Since I
am part of Bodhi’s life, and as I was aiming to capture naturally occurring interactions,
sometimes I was involved in them, even if I was not being the main communication
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partner. If I had refused to interact with Bodhi and the other communication partners it
would have made the interactions unnatural, particularly as Bodhi was not aware that I
was being researcher and not mother at the time. Further, as the abovementioned studies
have shown, it is possible to be both parent and observer/researcher, and in fact, this
position provides unique opportunities for data collection.
4.2

Research design

Given that the aim of this study is to describe in detail Bodhi’s meaning making, a
qualitative research methodology of the single case study was adopted. Case studies are
seen as a valuable research methodology because they allow for an in-depth and detailed
exploration of one particular case (Stake 2000). Additionally, within the field of AAC,
McEwen and Karlan (1990) have pointed out that case studies are a valuable resource
that can provide a wide range of useful information to researchers and clinicians within
the field.
4.3

Data collection

There were a variety of methods of data collection used for this study. These were based
on the data collection methods of other parent researchers within the field of SFL. These
were:
1. audio and video recordings;
2. written transcripts of the above recordings;
3. field notes and observations.
Each will be discussed in more detail below.

4.3.1 The story behind the data collection
Data collection was quite problematic for this study as Bodhi is very sensitive to changes
in his environment. In order to capture Bodhi’s typical interactions, the methods of data
collection had therefore to interfere with his environment as little as possible in any given
situation. This was not the only consideration that constrained or motivated the data
collection. Given the evidence within the AAC literature that shows that the
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communication of children with communication disorders is affected by variables within
the environment, such as different communication partners, and that children with
communication disorders are relatively passive within the communication process, part of
the aim of this study was to see whether this was the case with Bodhi. These
considerations motivated me to gather data from Bodhi in communication in a variety of
settings and with a variety of people. The aim was to gather what Halliday (1983, p.209)
calls “unelicited natural spontaneous speech”. I did not therefore set up any interactions,
but simply gave a cassette recorder to a number of Bodhi’s carers, asking them to turn it
on for the duration of their time with him. Over a period of about two months in
September and October 2002, I collected nine recordings with different communication
partners, both male and female, some friends, some family and some paid carers.
However, while transcribing the tapes, it became evident that tape recording alone did not
capture the modes in the visual-gestural medium that Bodhi was using. It seems obvious
in hindsight that I should have used film at the outset, as did other AAC researchers such
as Light et al (1985a, 1985b, 1985c), however, initially I felt I was following in the
tradition of the SF theorists (Halliday 1975; Painter 1984; Torr 1997) who studied their
own children’s language development. Whilst Halliday (1975) used only a notebook and
pencil for his observations, Painter (1984) and Torr (1997) used both tape recordings and
notes, and found those methods to be adequate. The tape recordings were not entirely
useless as since Bodhi invariably uses sound to initiate interactions, it was possible to
gauge a fair amount of what was happening from these data, particularly when examining
Bodhi’s initiations and communication partners’ responses. Some of this data was
therefore used in the study, to exemplify particular points.
Following the unsatisfactory results of the tape recordings I decided to film Bodhi in a
number of environments. This was not a simple matter as Bodhi is very active and does
not stay in one place, so unlike the studies of children with physical disabilities, that used
a fixed camera (see for example Light et al. 1985a, 1985b, 1985c), Bodhi had to be
followed by a person carrying a camera. Initially I planned to do the filming myself, but I
had to relinquish this idea; if I entered an environment with a camera that I was not
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usually a part of, he would want to interact with me. In the vain hope that a person
unknown to Bodhi would disrupt him less, I contracted an experienced camera operator
to do the filming. I arranged for two sites to be filmed, with the view to filming others as
well. The first was at Bodhi’s school during a highly structured class time called
‘morning circle’; the second was at the special needs school holiday program that Bodhi
attends, which, in contrast to the school environment, is completely unstructured.
Contrary to the experiences of other researchers filming children (see for example
Simpson 1997), who reported that the children being filmed ignored the camera after its
presence was explained, the person behind the camera presented enough of a disruption
to the environment and Bodhi was so interested in her that he continually left whatever
activity he was meant to be doing and approached her to investigate her presence and
interact with her. Given that I was aiming for data that captured Bodhi interacting with
people he is usually in the company of, I had to make a selection based this factor. How
he interacts with strangers was not the concern, therefore I did not use the films.
It seemed, then, that the best method of data collection would have to be totally
unobtrusive, so that Bodhi would not be disturbed in any way from his usual activities
and interactions. As the tape recorder method seemed to work, I decided to record Bodhi
in our home while I observed and remained in the background as far as was possible. An
appropriate situation arose when my mother came to stay, so I switched the tape on and
hovered in the background taking notes about what Bodhi was doing whilst she interacted
with him. This worked well as it was not unusual for me to be present in the home and
Bodhi was not distracted.
In order to see how Bodhi communicated with different communication partners, I had to
find another situation where he would be able to interact as per usual without disturbance.
I did not want to be present for all the data collection as Bodhi often defers to me to solve
his communication difficulties if I am present, and further, I also find it hard not to
interfere if he cannot get his meaning across to someone when I know what he’s trying to
say. Thus, I gave my partner Mark the tape recorder when he was embarking on a trip to
the chemist with Bodhi. As I was not present taking notes for this piece of data, Mark
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was instructed to make comments to the tape on Bodhi’s use of multimodal resources in
order to capture the modes of expression in the visual-gestural medium. His comments
are evident in the transcript. We also went over the tape together, to prompt Mark’s
memory of other things Bodhi had done. Whilst this is not a completely accurate way of
recording data, given the problems I had in collecting the data, I felt it had to do.
Consequently, there are instances in the pieces of data where it is unknown what Bodhi
was doing in the visual-gestural medium.
These interactions, one of Bodhi with his grandmother, and one of Bodhi with his father
form the main body of data. They are what I conducted quantitative counts of different
meaning types on. That is, they were used to count the number of turns, moves,
exchanges and meanings Bodhi made. The first transcript (T1) of Bodhi with his
grandmother lasts 12 minutes and is given the working name “Dodo” because that is what
her grandchildren call her. Bodhi has 101 turns in this transcript. The second transcript
(T2) of Bodhi with his father lasts 24 minutes and is called “Mark” (see Appendices 3a
and 3b). Bodhi has 76 turns in this transcript. This yielded 177 turns for Bodhi in total
which is exactly the same number of turns the speakers have (excluding instances where
they are chatting to people other than Bodhi. For example, in the Dodo transcript,
sometimes Dodo chatted to me, Mark or the other children. These instances were not
counted as being in dialogue with Bodhi).
In terms of the effects that different communication partners have on the interactions,
Bodhi’s grandmother Dodo, is not as familiar a communication partner as Mark; she does
not live locally and does not see Bodhi more than a few times a year. Bodhi’s father
Mark, on the other hand, is one of the two most familiar communication partners for
Bodhi, as he lives with Bodhi all the time. Analysing a data set from communication
partners with different levels of familiarity with Bodhi was somewhat achieved through
the use of these two transcripts, although this could be expanded.
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4.3.2 The context of the data
The Dodo transcript was collected from Bodhi’s interactions with his grandmother in our
home at breakfast time. The fact that she had come to stay for a couple of days was a
cause of great excitement for Bodhi. The interaction was recorded the morning after she
had arrived. Although most of the conversation occurs between Dodo and Bodhi, the rest
of the family is present (his younger and older brother, and both parents). All can be
heard in the recording, sometimes joining in the conversations with Bodhi, or having
their own conversations in the background.
The Mark transcript begins with Bodhi and Mark leaving the house to drive to the
chemist. There is a brief conversation between Bodhi and other members of the family in
the farewelling but after Mark and Bodhi leave the house, the conversation occurs
between just the two of them.
4.3.3 Observation data
The other data used for the study came from either tape recordings or my own written
observations while spending time with Bodhi. As per the observation work of Halliday
(1975), Painter (1984) Torr (1997), I took notes on Bodhi’s communication regularly
throughout the duration of the study. Because I was trying to capture the variety of
meanings Bodhi was making, I was particularly interested in instances of communication
that showed he was able to communicate in ways that were new and different from what
he had been doing thus far, and noted down some instances of this. I also included
observations from other people if they were able to give me the details about what Bodhi
was doing at the time. These observations were not used in the quantitative counts, but as
examples of Bodhi’s abilities (see Appendix 4).
4.4

Multimodal data transcription and analysis

Data transcription and analysis are complex practices involving decisions at every step of
the way. I took my lead from a variety of other researchers, such as Halliday (1985b) and
Simpson (1997), Ochs (1979) and Johnston (1996). Points to be aware of were:

84

•

that transcribing typical conversations can oversimplify interactions (Simpson
1997). This is particularly pertinent for multimodal interactions where what is to
be recorded as data is not just the spoken word but a variety of other modes of
expression.

•

that transcription can be a site for selective observation that reflects the
researcher’s theoretical goals and definitions, and where the researcher finds
what s/he is looking for (Ochs 1979).

•

that the process of transcription can cause a loss of meaning, but that if all the
details are included the transcript will become unreadable (Halliday 1985b).

•

that it is much harder to determine what constitutes language behaviour in sign
language(s) than it is in spoken language(s) (Johnston 1996). Whilst Johnston is
referring to signed languages as those used by people with hearing impairments,
this is applicable to Bodhi’s multimodal communication as well. Johnston (1991,
p.4) therefore suggests the adoption of “a rich transcription system” that takes
into account the “central importance of non-lexical, and so-called ‘nonlinguistic’, pantomimic bodily behaviour”.

As a solution, Simpson (1997) recommends foregrounding the process of transcription.
In this process, taking into account Johnston’s (1991) recommendations, I used as a
starting point the decisions that Light et al (1985c) made about noteworthy behaviours in
their study of the communication of children with physical disabilities. Light et al
recorded a number of communicative behaviours in the children. These are:
•

vocalisation or speech;

•

eye gaze;

•

facial expression;

•

gestures (such as pointing and head shaking);

•

actions (such as touching, reaching or holding objects);

•

and communication board output from such things as pictures, letters, numbers
and specific programs e.g. Blissymbols.

(Light et al. 1985c)
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My categorisation of Bodhi’s modes of expression is slightly different to Light et al’s.
Firstly, I have taken some of the modes to a further level of delicacy, dividing them into
more specific groupings. For example, it is not enough to have sound or vocalisation as a
single mode of expression, as Bodhi uses words and word approximations differently
from the way he uses sounds that are not word approximations. To keep them together
would miss much of the subtlety and delicacy of this part of his communicative
repertoire. Secondly, the children in Light et al’s study had physical disabilities and were
not ambulant, and this affected the modes they were able to use. For example, modes like
eye gaze took on a much more significant role as some of the children in Light et al’s
study used their eyes instead of their hands to point. In contrast, Bodhi does not have the
same motoric restrictions as those children, and certain modes such as the use of formal
gestured signs are present and take on more significance.
Some modes of expression were easy to recognise and define, such as sound, but there
were also less obvious and less intentional ones such as facial expression and eye gaze. I
decided to leave out facial expression as there were many stronger and more obvious
indications by Bodhi as to his state of mind, such as laughing when he was happy. Yet I
decided to include eye gaze not because Bodhi uses it for deixis the way some of the
children in Light et al’s study did, but because Bodhi’s eye gaze indicates who he is
directing his communication towards: that is to say, he invariably looks at who he is
communicating with. This directional gaze can be seen to be contributing to the
expression of interpersonal meaning in a vocative kind of way, in that it identifies the
communication partner.
In order to capture the detail, I listed the modes Bodhi uses in order of importance and/or
frequency, and then further subdivided the categories where Bodhi uses them differently.
Figure 5.1 or Appendix 1 shows Bodhi’s modes of expression. However these will not be
discussed in detail here, but at the beginning of the next chapter, when they are examined
in close detail.
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After working out what Bodhi was doing to communicate, I then had to have some way
of noting these down in a transcription that gave equal status to all the modes of
expression. As sound is one of the most frequently used modes, I listed it first. This
enabled me to write an easily readable transcript where most of the information about
Bodhi’s turns was contained on one line. As writing forces one to put down words in
linear order, this is how I had to record Bodhi’s modes, even though he expressed them
simultaneously. This can be seen in the example below:
MARK: (strums guitar)
BODHI: /i/ (pointing/touching Shooshi)
SHOOSHI: Do you want me to have a turn?
BODHI: (taps his chest = ‘yes’)
Simpson (1997), who studied her own children’s game playing, found that the analogy of
the play script best describes these kinds of transcripts. For the transcriptions of Bodhi’s
vocalisations, I used the International Phonetic Alphabet.
The level of phase was used to segment the data into sections to account for patterns of
exchange and move. The phases were each given notional names, according to what was
going on within each one. Within some of the phases, there were sub-phases, and these
were numbered with decimal points (see Appendix3). For example, in the Dodo
transcript, when Bodhi is eating breakfast, the phase is labeled “eating breakfast”.
However, within that phase there are 9 sub-phases that are components of the activity of
eating breakfast, such as “getting a drink” as opposed to “talking about eating breakfast”.
The phases and sub-phases were segmented according to changes that occurred in both
move type and topic of focus (experiential domain). For example, sub-phase 1.1 is
constituted by 12 exchanges that are about Bodhi having his epilepsy medication with his
breakfast. These exchanges predominantly begin with Bodhi initiating to get his
grandmother Dodo to give him another tablet. In contrast to this, sub-phase 1.2 is
constituted by two exchanges that Bodhi initiates to comment on what is happening.
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In order to examine how Bodhi functions in the process of conversation, that is the
conversational roles he is able to take up, the transcripts were divided into exchanges and
moves. The table below shows the number of phases, sub-phases, speaker turns and
exchanges in the two transcripts.

T1 - Dodo
Phases

T2 - Mark

Total

5

10

15

19

0

19

Speaker turns

232

170

402

Bodhi’s turns

101

76

177

Exchanges

80

64

144

Exchanges involving Bodhi

67

63

130

Sub-phases

Table 4

Transcript data counts

The moves and exchanges were counted quantitatively and discussed qualitatively. The
results of this are presented in Chapter 8.
In order to examine the meanings that Bodhi makes within his moves, a specific table
was devised for recording each of Bodhi’s moves. The table has columns that record:
•

the number of the turn;

•

the modes of expression used in that turn;

•

an interpretation of Bodhi’s modes in metafunctional terms; and

•

a gloss for Bodhi’s move.

This table is shown in Table 4.1 and its details explained below.
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B

INSTANCE

SYSTEM

Possible meanings
Mode of

Realisation

Experiential

Interpersonal

Textual

expression
Sounds
Tone
Gestures
Materials
Actions
Behaviours
Facial
expression
Eye gaze
GLOSS
Table 4.1

Instance Table

The top left-hand corner with the B (standing for “Bodhi”), records the number of the
turn in terms of where it is located in the transcript. The column below that lists all the
possible modes of expression. The next column, the instance column, records which
modes Bodhi actually uses in the instance of communication that is his turn. The
following three columns are for recording the metafunctional meanings associated with
the modes of expression. The bottom line “gloss” is where I wrote what it is I think Bodhi
has tried to communicate. While this is not always clear, as will be seen later in the
chapter, it plays an important part in deciphering Bodhi’s communication, as it is through
the gloss of Bodhi’s multimodal move that one is able to interpret it. Further, as Johnston
(1991) states, the gloss is a way of capturing the semantic content of a mode of
communication, even if imperfect. However, Johnston (1991) warns that:
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no matter how frequently one may remind the reader that the gloss is no
substitute for the sign, if there is nothing in the text that represents the sign
per se (be it picture or script) the glossing may take on a life of its own.
(p6)
Indeed, I had to be careful when using this table that while I often used the gloss as a
guide, I did not use it solely to determine the content of Bodhi’s move. In other words, I
had to be mindful not to analyse the gloss, rather than Bodhi’s move. It is important to
note here, however, that everything Bodhi does is, and has to be, interpreted in terms of
our own semantic system (Halliday 1975). In other words, we cannot make sense of his
moves unless we gloss them in our own terms.
This table was then inserted into the transcripts and filled in for each of Bodhi’s turns,
enabling me to both identify which modes of expression are being used in each turn and
to quantify them (see Appendix 6 and Chapter 5). The application of and findings from
the metafunctional analyses are discussed separately in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Table 4.2 below shows the instance table with one of Bodhi’s moves filled in.
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From Transcript 2 (Mark)

20B

INSTANCE

SYSTEM

Possible meanings
Mode of

Realisation

Experiential

Interpersonal

Textual

expression
Sounds

/i /i /i /

Giving info &

Tone

1 2 2 (similar

demanding

to 16B)

articulation

Gestures

pointing
(contact)

Materials

Attribute or
Range

New

steps

Actions
Behaviours
Facial
expression
Eye gaze

To Mark

Indicating who
Bodhi is talking to

GLOSS

Tell me those are the steps

Table 4.2

Instance table with Move 20 from Transcript 2

Table 4.2 shows Bodhi’s 20th move from the transcript with Mark. In this move Bodhi
has made three /i/ sounds or vocalisations with Tone 1 and Tone 2 while simultaneously
pointing to the steps and looking at Mark. The pointing to the steps expresses some
experiential meaning, identifying what Bodhi is communicating about (explored in detail
in Chapter 7); it also expresses some textual meaning in the form of New (discussed at
length in Chapter 8). The vocalisations indicate the speech function (explained in detail in
Chapter 6). Bodhi’s gaze at Mark indicates he is communicating with Mark, and finally,
the gloss is decided upon based on two factors: firstly, the communication partner’s
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response and Bodhi’s response to that (also discussed at length later in the thesis) and my
understanding of the move.
Where excerpts from the transcript data are included in the body of the thesis, they are
labelled to identify them. The label begins with a “T”, for ‘transcript’, followed by a
number which identifies which transcript the excerpt comes from. This is followed by
either an “E” and a number, which identifies the exchange number within the transcript,
or a turn number, if that particular piece of data wasn’t divided into exchanges. For
example: T2/E10, standing for Transcript 2, Exchange number 10. Excerpts from the
observation data are labeled with an ‘O’ and a number.
When conducting the metafunctional analyses, it became clear that Bodhi used sound
differently in different moves. In order to examine the sounds more closely, I recorded
each sound onto the computer as a sound byte, and then looked at these sounds using the
computer program Praat (http:/www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/). Praat is speech analysis
software that, among other things, allows the viewer to see the movements in the pitch of
sounds. Using Praat was a way of attempting to systematically identify the different
sounds Bodhi uses to determine whether they corresponded to different speech functions,
the way they typically do in spoken English (Halliday 1970, Tench 1996). However,
identification of the tone of Bodhi’s sounds was not always a straightforward matter as
some sounds were quite difficult to categorise. This was due to the brevity of sound
length, or the lack of obvious pitch movement. Where tones were unclear I have put a
question mark.
After analysing all of Bodhi’s moves, I put the analysis into a qualitative data
management package called Nvivo. This allowed me to conduct counts of the various
features I was coding for, as well as to correlate features with each other, and make
comparisons between the transcripts. I also tabulated the data using excel, to more easily
see the patterns of communication (See Appendix 5).
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4.5

Writing up the data

In order to reflect the different kinds of analysis used, I have divided the results into five
chapters. The path through the analysis follows the ‘trinocular’ perspective (Halliday
1996). Thus, the presentation of the data begins, in Chapter 5, with the view ‘from
below’, from the perspective of the expression plane. Chapter 5 therefore explores the
modes of expression that Bodhi uses to communicate. This chapter includes the results of
the analysis of Bodhi’s sounds and the ratios of the modes of expression, that is, how
often each mode is used, in terms of percentages. The following three chapters, 6, 7 and
8, explore Bodhi’s communication from the other two perspectives of the trinocular
vision: ‘from roundabout’ and ‘from above’ - that is, in terms of the standpoint of
grammar and meaning, using a metafunctional organisation to examine the meanings
Bodhi makes within the conversational turn. Chapter 6 explores the way Bodhi expresses
interpersonal meanings, focusing on speech functions. Chapter 7 concentrates on
ideational meanings, and Chapter 8 on textual meanings. The final results chapter,
Chapter 9, also explores Bodhi’s meanings ‘from above’, however it is from a discourse
semantic perspective, using the results from the Exchange Structure analyses to explore
the meanings that are made across the conversational turns.
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 5
BODHI’S MODES OF EXPRESSION

When we consider dialogue… as a form of the exchange of social
meanings, we are looking at it as a semiotic process, and therefore as
one that is in principle capable of being realised through systems other
than language. (Halliday 1984, p.12-13)
5.0

Introduction

This purpose of this chapter is to explore how Bodhi realises meanings. This exploration
is a precursor to the following four results chapters that examine what meanings Bodhi
makes. While this chapter is primarily descriptive in nature, in that it describes the
different modes of expression, counts were also conducted of the various modes using the
data from both the Mark and Dodo transcripts, in order to ascertain how prevalent
different modes of expression are.
5.1

Modes of expression

Bodhi uses a range of modes of expression to communicate. These have been clustered
into seven broad types based on the categories in Light et al’s (1985c) study:
vocalisations, gestures, materials, actions, behaviours and eye gaze. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, some of these have been subcategorised to account for different types
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of the one mode. However, before examining these modes of expression, three important
points need to be made.
The first point is that whilst I have separated the modes into individual categories, Bodhi
generally does not communicate using only one mode at one time, but combines different
modes in the one meaning-making move. For example he may vocalise whilst pointing to
something and looking at the communication partner.
The second point is that it was by no means a simple matter to decide what to include
from Bodhi’s behaviour as modes of expression. I had to decide where to draw the line.
As the field of AAC views almost all behaviour of non-speaking individuals as
communicative, it was tempting to include just about everything Bodhi does as a mode of
expression. However, there were a number of issues to consider. Firstly, there was the
issue of intentionality, that is to say, in order to qualify as a mode of expression, I initially
made the judgment that behaviours needed to be intentionally communicative on Bodhi’s
part. Unlike the children in Light et al’s (1985c) study who had significant physical
disabilities and seemed to be rather passive communicators, as stated, Bodhi is a very
physically active communicator. It followed that most of his modes of expression were
easily definable because, as can be seen in the data, he is constantly striving to make his
intentions known. However, there are some instances in the transcripts where what Bodhi
is doing seems more self-stimulatory than communicative, for example, clapping hands,
which Bodhi sometimes does when he’s happy, so I did not include them9. Initially, I also

9

Halliday (1985b) describes the difference between symbolic and non-symbolic acts.

Non-symbolic acts are where a person acts on the environment directly. Symbolic acts
are where a person acts on others in order to control the environment. Halliday provides
the example of getting an apple for oneself as opposed to asking someone else to the
apple. Cleirigh (forthcoming) furthers this distinction by dividing behaviour into three
groups: non-semiotic, non-linguistic semiotic and linguistic semiotic. The behaviours that
are analysed in this study belong to the latter two groups: that is they are behaviours that
are semiotic.
95

did not include expressions of affect such as laughter and crying because Light et al
(1985c) categorise these as communicative competences not modes of expression.
Expressions of affect, laughter and crying did not seem to have the same kind of
intentionality as certain other modes and don’t necessarily demand a response the way
other more obviously intentional moves did. However, as they are vocalised expressions
that convey happiness or sadness, and the communication partner often treats them as a
move, they have been included. In other words, because of their function as both an
indication of feeling and as a move in the conversation, they were included.
I also did not initially include eye gaze as Bodhi always looks at the person he is
communicating with. However, further consideration of this as conveying some
interpersonal meaning meant it was subsequently included. Thus, modes were included
based on two factors: Bodhi’s intent and the communication partner’s treatment of the
move.
It is likely that there is further room for refinement of the modes of expression. In
addition, what might be considered a mode of expression for one nonverbal multimodal
communicator might not necessarily be the case for another. As can be seen from the
many AAC studies, nonverbal multimodal communicators have different ways of
expressing themselves, which make it difficult to decide on their modes of expression in
advance. Other studies provide a guide, but even after close observation of the subject
under study, some of the boundaries between what is and what is not a mode of
expression remain somewhat imprecise and difficult to determine.
Whilst Light et al (1985c) go some way in using their categories to both record and
quantify subjects’ modes of expression, and to link these to different communicative
competences, they still do not to seem to get to the core of meaning making in their
study. Because I am interested in understanding the ways these modes of expression
contribute to meaning making, I needed to apply a semiotic lens to the framing of
Bodhi’s communication.
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One option is to frame the modes of expression (and indeed Bodhi’s whole meaning
making system) through the developmental lens. This would see his moves and modes of
expression delineated in terms of hierarchical ‘orders of meaning’. As noted in Chapter 2,
Halliday (1996) shows that the adult system of language is stratified as “a higher order
semiotic organised around a grammar” (p.7), whereas the first system of a typically
developing child’s language is a primary semiotic that has no grammar. Within Bodhi’s
communicative repertoire, there is no lexicogrammar, so there is much about his system
that renders it like a protolanguage, as will be evident from this thesis. His modes of
expression can therefore be organised into two types: those that are simple content
expression pairs where there is no intermediate stratum of meaning. These are nonlinguistic modes of expression such as actions and behaviours (the difference between
these two is explained in section 5.3.4 on actions). The second type is where there is
some kind of abstract layer sandwiched between the semantic and expression planes, as
Halliday (1996) describes: some kind of “abstract semiotic construct that emerges
between the content and expression levels of the original, sign-based primary semiotic
system” (p.6). These modes include the word approximations Bodhi utters, and the signs
he makes. Gestures lie towards the linguistic end in that they signify meaning the way
formal signs from sign language do. This can be depicted as follows, on what I have
called a cline of semiosis:
Figure 5.2

Cline of semiosis

non-linguistic semiosis
behaviours

actions

linguistic semiosis
gestures
pictorials

words and word approximations
sign language

At various points in the thesis, I have used this cline to provide a framework for
understanding, explaining and even classifying Bodhi’s modes of expression. Figure 5.1
below shows Bodhi’s modes of expression. These are not strictly organised according to
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the cline of semiosis, rather, according to what Bodhi uses most. These are organised
from top to bottom based on three factors:
1. the order that Light et al (1985c) uses;
2. the most salient part of Bodhi’s move;
3. the most linguistically semiotic.
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word
approximations,

vocalisations
sounds that are not
word approximations

eg /dQd/, /b√b/
(mum), /√/ (his
brothers),
/i/
/U/
/√/
laughter

expressions of affect
crying
distal
pointing
contact
gestures

sign language

‘toilet’ (index finger
to palm of other
hand)
‘yes’ (chest tap)
‘no’ (head shake)
‘goodbye’ (wave)
‘go away’ (wave)

objects
Modes of
expression

materials
photos
pictorials
picture symbols

actions

behaviours

getting something
going to something
leading someone somewhere
stamping
dropping to the floor
kicking doors
body banging doors
poking and pinching
tipping chairs over
to someone

eye gaze
to something

Figure 5.1 Bodhi’s modes of expression
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5.1.1 Vocalisations
The first mode of expression in Figure 5.1 is vocalisations, which is divided into three
subcategories: words or approximations of words10, sounds that Bodhi uses regularly but
which are not attempts to make words, and vocalisations of affect such as laughter and
crying. The second category of sounds have a different function from the first, as will be
shown later in the chapter.
The reason that I have called this category vocalisations rather than sounds, as Light et al
(1985c) do, is that I have chosen to include laughter and crying in it. The view taken here
is that laughter and crying have a function, as do the other modes of expression. Whilst
the function may not be able to be definable in exact terms the way speech functions of
other moves are, it is clear when Bodhi laughs that happiness is being communicated. As
mentioned, while Bodhi may not be intentionally communicating his happiness, from a
functional perspective, these moves express affect – which is firstly semiotic, and
secondly, the communication partner is often seen to respond to these moves.
Bodhi vocalises frequently in order to communicate. This can be seen by the number of
times Bodhi uses vocalisations in his communicative turns: out of the 177 communicative
turns across both the Dodo and Mark transcripts, 161 have a vocalisation (91%). In other
words, similar to speakers, vocalisation is one of the main ways Bodhi indicates he is
having a communicative turn.

10

I can hear the reader ask, at this point, why the title of the thesis includes “nonverbal”

as a classifier of Bodhi’s communication when I am saying here that he has words in his
communicative repertoire. By describing Bodhi as nonverbal, I remind the reader of
Light et al’s (1985c:128) definition of the term as speech that is inadequate to meet the
communication needs of the speaker. Further, the number of words Bodhi is able to
articulate clearly enough for a total stranger to understand is one: /d√d/, the rest are all
approximations, and you have to know about Bodhi and the context of his life to
understand, for example that /i-i /i-i /i-i / means escalators.
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Vocalisation is also used by Bodhi to get the communication partner’s attention. This is
evidenced by the number of times Bodhi vocalises to initiate interactions: out of Bodhi’s
83 initiating turns, all but five of these are vocalised (98%)11.
Words or word approximations
As Bodhi uses vocalisations in many different ways, it has been necessary to
subcategorise this mode in order to capture the differences. The first subcategory, which
is words or word approximations, is rather fluid and not fixed in number, because as time
has passed, Bodhi’s attempts and abilities to approximate words has changed. At the start
of this study, Bodhi was attempting to approximate some words that he was not using at
all at the time of writing. For example, he used to be able to say a version of his own
name that he would utter when looking at himself in the mirror, however at the time of
writing he seemed to have stopped doing this. Additionally, Bodhi’s attempts at word
approximations have expanded to the point where he now attempts to pronounce the
names of his favourite people using a range of basic vowel sounds. All Bodhi’s word
approximations are nouns and are used to label things, to ask the whereabouts of
someone or something, or to ask when he might see someone or go somewhere. For
example, when Bodhi sees a person or a photo of a person he knows and likes, he may
utter his word approximation for them, or, when he wants to know where a person is or
when he might see them, he says their name, or an approximation of their name. This can
be seen in the following example when Bodhi is asking about his Dad:
(T6/10/02 651-652)

11

A possible explanation for the few moves that don’t use vocalisation is that they come from the Mark

transcript, which is a dialogue, where Bodhi and Mark are travelling together in the car and there are no
other people around. Bodhi already has Mark’s attention and the two moves without vocalisation come in
the middle of a series of exchanges on the same topic. In contrast, the Dodo transcript is a multilogue with
four or five other people in the room, all having conversations. It is much harder for Bodhi to get the
communication partner’s attention in this context, and, as a result, all his 38 initiation moves contain
vocalisation.
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BODHI: /dQd/dQd/dQd/dQd/
SHOOSHI: Dad’s in the kitchen. Shall we go up and find him?
In terms of word approximations, Bodhi makes few vowel sounds and even less
consonant sounds. The consonant sounds he makes are /g/, /d/, /b/ and /m/. He can mostly
only utter one-syllable words, however, he often repeats them in a string as in /dQd /dQd
/dQd /dQd / in the above example. The only vowel sounds he makes are /i/, /u/ /Q/ and
/√/ and he uses these to utter all other vowel sounds. For example, words that have the
first vowel sound /e/ in them, such as ‘escalator’, are pronounced as the single vowel /i/;
words that have an ‘o’-type sound, such as ‘hot’ are uttered as /u/. Occasionally he will
combine two vowel syllables eg /i-√:/ (meaning car).

Vocalisations that are not word approximations
The second sub-category refers to vocalisations that are not approximations of words, but
are used regularly by Bodhi as part of his communicative repertoire. The main sound in
this group is /i/, which Bodhi uses very frequently, particularly when he is trying to
attract someone’s attention to ask or tell them something. There is a high incidence of the
sound /i/ in both the Dodo and Mark transcripts: out of the total of Bodhi’s 177 turns, he
uses the sound /i/ 108 times (61%). Further, if we look at initiations alone, Bodhi uses the
sound /i/ 72 out of 83 times (87%). In contrast, in response moves, Bodhi only uses the
sound /i/ 36 times, which is 38 percent of all his responses.
As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the sound /i/ generally functions as a marker
of interpersonal and textual meaning, signaling that Bodhi’s turn is beginning and that he
is demanding something. Whatever it is he is demanding, that is, the content or
experiential component of the demand, is generally expressed by pointing to an object or
in the direction of an object.
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When Bodhi initiates with a sound other than /i/, it is generally with a sound that also
carries part of the experiential meaning of his move (such as in the example used above
where he says /dQd /).

There are variations of the sound /i/ in the data, which are exemplified by instances in the
Dodo transcript when Bodhi is communicating while he has food in his mouth, and so in
order to hold the food in, he presses his tongue against the roof of his mouth while he’s
making the sound /i/. The resulting sound is more like an /nh/. The sound /nnh/ has
therefore been recorded as a subcategory of the sound /i/, called ‘closed-mouth /i/.
He also uses other sounds, although much less frequently. For example, he uses /U:/ to
tell that he’s hurt himself; and /√/√/ when he wants something in one room but no one is
there to hear him. For example, he frequently goes into the kitchen and stands beside the
fridge and yells /√/√/ so someone will open the fridge so he can get something out to eat
or drink.
Bodhi’s use of sound varies tonally depending on what he is trying to communicate. It
has therefore been important to subdivide the variations in tone in order to examine the
functions of Bodhi’s use of sound. Following is a discussion of Bodhi’s use of tone.
Tone (phonology)
In English, all natural speech (as opposed to computer generated speech) has intonation
patterns. Intonation patterns differ depending on what the speaker requires the words to
do, that is, depending on which speech function is being realised. For instance, yes/no
questions are generally asked or uttered with rising intonation, whilst statements are
generally spoken with falling intonation (Halliday 1994). The Hallidayan system of tones
was adopted for this study as it was seen to be adequate to show the variety of tonal
sounds in the typically developing children in Halliday’s (1975), Painter’s (1984) and
Torr’s (1997) studies.
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According to Halliday (1994), there are five different tone contours that stem from the
opposition of the falling and rising of polarity. Falling means that the polarity is known,
that is, the speaker knows what they are talking about. Rising means that the polarity is
unknown, that is, the speaker does not know and is asking. The first tone, Tone 1, is the
falling tone of an unmarked statement; Tone 2, is the rising tone of a yes-no question;
Tone 3 is an almost level tone with neither a distinct fall nor rise, which, according to
Halliday, means the speaker is undecided. Tone 4 is a combination of falling followed by
rising, where something seems certain but turns out not to be; and Tone 5 is a
combination of rising followed by falling where something seems uncertain but turns out
to be certain.
As mentioned, intonation is connected to speech function, which is connected to move
within an exchange. Table 5.1 shows the connections between moves, speech functions
and tones, as typically occurring in spoken English.

Please see print copy for Table 5.1

Table 5.1

Moves, speech functions and tones

(adapted from Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, p.142)
A further investigation of Bodhi’s use of sound reveals that he uses sound differently, and
with different tones, in different contexts. Table 5.2 below charts the different tones and
combinations12 of tones that Bodhi uses across the Dodo and Mark transcripts. From this
Table, it can be seen that Bodhi favours particular tones, such as Tone 2, which he uses
12

The tone combinations were allocated to the tone that occurred first in the combination.
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almost half of the times he communicates (47%), and much more with initiation moves
than with response moves.
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Tone 1 - exclusive
- combination

Transcript 1 – Dodo

Transcript 2 - Mark

initiation

response

initiation

response

3

8

5

2

6

2

3

0

TOTALS
Initiations
Responses

29 (22%)
17
12

Tone 2 - exclusive

18

11

20

3

6

1

3

0

- combination
TOTALS
Initiations
Responses

62 (47%)
47
15

Tone 3 - exclusive

2

5

2

3

4

0

2

0

- combination
TOTALS
Initiations
Responses

18 (14%)
10
8

Tone 4 - exclusive

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

- combination
TOTALS
Initiations
Responses

2 (.15%)
0
2

Tone 5 - exclusive

3

2

8

4

4

0

0

0

- combination
TOTALS
Initiations
Responses
Table 5.2

21 (16%)
15
6
Bodhi’s use of tones
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Tone 1
Tone 1 is used by Bodhi 29 times (22%). Seventeen of those are initiation moves and
twelve are responses. In other words, Bodhi uses Tone 1 just under a third of the times he
vocalises and he uses it slightly more for initiations than responses. As mentioned above,
Tone 1 is typically used by speakers to realise the declarative Mood, that is, to give
information. It shows that the speaker is certain of the content of their utterance. While it
is not clear what function the use of Tone 1 has in many instances, it was possible to
make a number of observations about Bodhi’s use of Tone 1. These include that:
i.

he generally uses it when he already has the communication partner’s attention;

ii.

he uses it to urge the communication partner to do something, somewhat similar
to a gentle imperative; and

iii.

he often uses it with only one short sound where he is not clearly identifying any
experiential matter with another mode; and finally,

iv.

that it is not a tone he uses to do the hard work, as it were, of communicating.
However, as with speakers of English, it seems to be used when Bodhi is sure
about what he is communicating. It is never used by Bodhi to ask a question.

Tone 2
Tone 2 is the most frequently used tone by Bodhi in these interactions, occurring 62 times
(47%) out of 132 tonal sounds. Further, Bodhi almost always uses Tone 2 with the sound
/i/ (52 out of 62 times). 76 percent of these are initiations and 24 percent are responses (of
which nearly half are reinitiations or replays). This means that 57 percent of initiations
that have sound are Tone 2. If the concordance in speech of the usage of Tone 2 with the
asking of polar questions holds for Bodhi’s communication, this would mean that all
these 47 times should be Bodhi asking a yes/no question (equivalent of polar
interrogative) but, in fact, while he does use this tone to ask yes/no questions, as indicated
by subsequent moves, this only accounts for 4 of the 47 instances. The other instances are
made up of demands for information, goods-&-services (which are of two different types
that will be explained in subsequent chapters); and provisions of information.
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Tone 3
Tone 3 occurs 18 times (14%) in the corpus. Ten of these instances are initiations and
eight are responses. This means that Bodhi uses Tone 3 fairly infrequently, both to
initiate and respond. Tone 3 seems to function in a number of ways. Firstly, as an
initiating move it occurs more often in combination with other tones which seem to be
the salient part of the sound. Secondly, as an initiating move on its own, it occurs a
number of times in the Dodo transcript as a gentle kind of imperative, when Bodhi is
trying to get Dodo to give him his medicine. When used in response moves, Tone 3
seems to often operate in conjunction with Bodhi responding to a polar question in the
affirmative. In other words, he sometimes uses it with the sign ‘yes’.
Tone 4
Tone 4 is the least used by Bodhi, occurring only twice in the corpus: once in
combination with Tone 2, to initiate, where the Tone 2 is the salient part; and once for a
response where the purpose and speech function are unclear. In other words, it can be
said that Bodhi rarely uses Tone 4 in this corpus.
Tone 5
Tone 5 is Bodhi’s second most frequently used tone. (It is not that dissimilar to Tone 2 as
it rises like Tone 2, but where Tone 2 continues to rise and ends on a rise, Tone 5 ends
with a fall). In the corpus, Tone 5 occurs 21 times (16% of all tonal sounds), 15 times
(71%) as initiation and 6 times (28%) as response. This means Tone 5 is used relatively
frequently to initiate exchanges. In many instances, Bodhi uses Tone 5 and Tone 2
interchangeably indicating that they have a similar function of initiating to give
information.
If the number of Tone 2 and Tone 5 sounds is combined, they account for 64 percent of
all Bodhi’s turns. In terms of initiation moves, if the number of Tone 2s and 5s are
combined they account for 71 percent of all initiations. In other words, Bodhi frequently
uses sounds with rising intonation to communicate, but particularly to initiate.
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In terms of responses, Bodhi uses a mixture of tones, although Tone 2 dominates,
accounting for 36 percent of responses. Most of these Tone 2 responses are not typical
response moves. Rather, they occur as replays of Bodhi’s initiating move, where the
communication partner has misunderstood Bodhi’s initiating move so he is replays it.
Tone 1 accounts for 29 percent Bodhi’s response moves, usually functioning as part of an
affirmative response to a question from the communication partner. Tone 3 sounds make
up 19 percent of response moves, as explained above and similar to Tone 1 responses,
function to respond in the affirmative to a communication partner’s move. If Tone 1 and
Tone 3 responses are combined, this accounts for 48 percent of response moves, showing
that Bodhi uses sounds with a falling tone to respond affirmatively to others’ moves.
Tone 5 sounds make up 14 percent or response moves. Some of these are replays of Tone
5 initiations, but their function is unclear.
To conclude this section on tones, Bodhi’s use of sounds with differing tones is fairly
systematic, predictable and meaningful. It is similar to the way speakers of English use
sounds of different tones, in that Bodhi uses particular tones for particular functions.
However some of his specific uses of tones are different from speakers’ usages. As tone
is linked to the realisation of different speech functions, the details of these differences in
tone usage and function will be explored in the next chapter, which is about speech
function.
Expressions of affect
The third category of vocalisations, expressions of affect, are divided into laughter and
crying. Whilst there are no instances of Bodhi crying in the corpus, of Bodhi’s 177 turns,
laughter occurs 33 times (19%). Most of these instances (67%) occur in the Dodo
transcript where Bodhi takes pleasure in spending intimate time with his grandmother.
5.1.2 Gesture
The second mode of expression, gesture, relates to communication that is intentionally
expressed with the body, or as Kendon (2004, p.15) describes it, “actions that have the
features of manifest deliberate expressiveness”. Studies of gesture have a long history,
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the earliest dating back to Classical and Mediaeval studies of Rhetoric (Kendon 1981).
However, much of the work on gesture examines it as an adjunctive component of
communication that is predominantly conducted via speech (see, for example, Efron
1972; Ekman & Friesen 1981; McNeill 1992; Kendon 2004). Where it has been studied
as more than an adjunct to speech has been in the areas of sign languages, such as the
work by Johnston (1992, 1996) mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Within the studies
of gesture that fall into the former group, there are numerous ways to categorise the types
of gesture people use. Of these categorisations, the early work by Efron (1972), who
compared the gestures of Eastern European Jewish migrants and Southern Italian
migrants in America in the 1930s, is useful because it distinguishes between gestures that
are produced with speech and those that can be produced without speech and have
meaning and function in their own right. Gestures produced with speech have been given
the name illustrators, whereas the gestures produced without speech have been termed
emblems (Ekman & Friesen 1981). In terms of further categorising Bodhi’s gestures,
Kendon (2004) advises that categories of gesture should not be universal; rather they
should be proposed according to the specificities of the particular study:
Given the nature of gesture as a form of human expression, we cannot
establish permanent categories that represent essentially different
forms of expressive behaviour. That is, we have to think of the
different gesture typologies that have been proposed as provisional
working instruments which may be useful within a certain research
perspective or interest but are not at all supposed to be as universal or
schemes that show, in a fashion that is independent of any particular
observer, or independent of any particular circumstance of interaction
or occasion of use, how the activities of gesture are organized (p.107).
Efron (1972) distinguishes between head, digital and ambulatory gestures (transfer of
motion from one arm to the other) and divides gestures into nine different types and
subtypes. Of these types and subtypes the only one that Bodhi enacts is the Deictic,
which functions to indicate a visually present object, usually by pointing. For the
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purposes of this study, I have subcategorised gesture into two groups: directional or
indexical gestures, after Efron’s deictic; and signs. This latter sub-category includes signs
from either Makaton13 sign language, Bodhi’s own idiosyncratic signs and movements
that are commonly used by speakers such as shaking the head to say ‘no’. Indexical
gestures fall into the category termed by Kendon (1981) as ‘everyday gestures’, and as
these generally convey only part of the information being communicated could also be
termed ‘illustrative’. The subcategory of sign falls into the more systematic category of
sign languages, however, some of these gestures still have features of illustrative gestures
and some of emblematic gestures. The division of gestures in this study is primarily along
SF lines: indexical gestures are defined as those conveying some aspect of experiential
meaning where the content is derived from outside Bodhi’s person, whereas the meaning
of signed gestures is experiential meaning contained within the sign itself.
I have further divided indexical gestures into the two different types of pointing that
Bodhi does. The first is where Bodhi points to something that is not within reach using an
outstretched arm with his palm facing downwards. The second is where Bodhi points to
something within reach, and for this he generally touches whatever it is he is pointing at.
These two types of pointing are classified by Brady, Mclean and Mclean (1995) as
‘distal’, referring to things that are more than six inches away, and ‘contact’, referring to
things that are touched. In their study of the gestures used by nonverbal people with
severe intellectual disabilities, Mclean, Mclean, Brady and Etter (1991) show that those
who use distal gestures produce moves with a declarative function whereas those who
only used contact gestures only produced requests for objects. They also showed that
distal gesture communicators initiated and repaired more communication than contact
gesture communicators. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, Bodhi fits the profile of

13

“Makaton is a unique language programme offering a structured, multi-modal approach

for the teaching of communication, language and literacy skills. Devised for children and
adults with a variety of communication and learning disabilities, Makaton is used
extensively throughout the UK and has been adapted for use in over 40 other countries.”
(www.makaton.org/). Bodhi’s use of Makaton is dealt with in the next chapter.
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the distal gesturer in that he regularly produces moves with a declarative function. Whilst
I have divided Bodhi’s pointing into these two types, ‘distal’ and ‘contact’, as he uses
them to express the same type of meanings, at this point they will be discussed together.
The indexical gesture of pointing is frequently used by Bodhi. Of his 177 turns, 51 have
pointing (29%). This may not seem a significant number, however, if we look at the
Dodo and Mark transcripts separately, the incidences of pointing are quite variable. In the
Dodo transcript, the number of instances of pointing is much higher (40%) than in the
Mark transcript (24%), reflecting the different contexts. Much of what Bodhi initiates
with Mark are asking particular kinds of questions, such as where they are going and
whether there will be toilets there. Bodhi does not use pointing to ask these questions as
he expresses ‘where’ by grabbing the communication partner’s arm whilst saying /i/, and
communicates ‘toilet’ via signing the sign for toilet whilst saying /i/. In contrast to this,
many of Bodhi’s initiations with Dodo are comments on or requests about things in the
surrounding environment. As Bodhi uses the gesture of pointing to indicate whatever it is
he is commenting on or requesting, there are many more instances of pointing in the
Dodo transcript.
Bodhi’s use of pointing to identify what he is talking about, and therefore realising some
component of experiential meaning will be demonstrated fully in Chapter 7. But to give
an example here, if he wants a drink, he will often point to the picture symbol for drink.
Or, if we are driving past the street where some friends live, he will point towards that
street to tell that he wants to communicate about someone who lives there. Distal
pointing is done with an outstretched arm and hand, and contact pointing is done with his
index finger. Distal and contact pointing are used by Bodhi for giving information and
demanding goods-&-services.
The second subcategory of gesture, signs, has never been a large part of Bodhi’s
communicative repertoire and he has never been interested in learning and using much
sign language. As a result, Bodhi only spontaneously uses five formal and consistent
signs: two are signs common to speakers - shaking the head for ‘no’ and waving for
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‘goodbye’; one is a Makaton sign, the sign for ‘toilet’; and two are idiosyncratic, tapping
his chest for ‘yes’, and waving his hand at the communication partner (coupled with a
particular facial demeanour) for ‘go away’. While various people including teachers and
speech pathologists have tried to teach Bodhi different signs over the years, he has shown
no interest or ability to learn them. Across the corpus, Bodhi uses signs in only 14 out of
his 177 turns (8%). However the incidences of signing differ across the transcripts. In the
Dodo transcript, Bodhi only signs once, but in the Mark transcript, he signs 13 times
(20%) (toilet seven times, and chest tap for ‘yes’ four times).
5.3.3 Materials
The third type of mode of expression, materials, is also split into two subcategories:
actual objects, and pictorials. The pictorials are further divided into two: photos, and
picture symbols from the computer program Boardmaker™, which is specifically
designed to provide a communication alternative for people who can’t speak.
Bodhi frequently uses actual objects for the purposes of communicating. Across both
transcripts, he uses objects 49 times (28%). For example, when he wants to talk about his
breakfast bowl, he contact points the bowl.
For pictorials, Bodhi uses both photos and picture symbols from Boardmaker™. The
photos we provide him with are mostly of friends and family, so he can talk about them
when they are not there. He often looks at photos of the people in his life, and asks when
he is going to see them, or asks us to tell him about them.
Whilst there is no evidence of this in the Dodo and Mark transcripts, picture symbols
from Boardmaker™ are often used by Bodhi to communicate. He carries a stack of them
on a key ring dangling from his clothes at all times and we have many on wallboards of
Boardmaker™ picture symbols around the house. They are used at his school and we try
to encourage the people who work with him in other settings to use them as well (see
Appendix 2 for examples). However, like the children in Light et al’s (1985a; 1985b;
1985c) study, Bodhi often resorts to the fastest way of communicating, rather than the
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most transparent, so he sometimes needs to be encouraged to use pictures. As mentioned
above, when what he is communicating about is both on a picture and co-present in the
environment, Bodhi will often point to the thing itself, rather than the pictorial
representation of that thing. At other times he uses them completely spontaneously and
frequently. For example, Bodhi regularly points to the symbol of ‘escalators’ to ask to be
taken to ride on them. Whilst there is not much evidence of Bodhi using Boardmaker™
picture symbols in the corpus, as time has gone on from the point when the data were
collected, Bodhi has become much more oriented to using pictures for communication.
5.3.4 Actions
The fourth type of mode of expression is actions, which include simple actions such as
stamping, and actions where Bodhi involves something or someone else, such as getting
something, e.g. a cup or the juice bottle when he wants a drink; or leading someone to the
location of the thing he is trying to communicate about, e.g. leading someone by the hand
to the computer to show that he wants to play on it. The difference between the category
of action and gesture is that the things categorised as gestures are quite specific, being
either indexical gestures or signs. Actions are more general and contain larger meanings.
Bodhi uses some actions quite frequently, for example, leading someone to something he
wants. At the time of writing a new action was being used: stamping one foot to express
that he wants something ‘now’. Across the two transcripts, Bodhi uses actions 23 times to
communicate (15%).
5.3.5 Behaviours
The fifth type of mode of expression is behaviours, which mainly refers to challenging
behaviours, such as dropping to the floor, pinching, poking, scratching, kicking and head
banging. In the field of AAC, almost all behaviour of people with communication
disorders, and particularly also with intellectual disabilities, is recognised as
communication (Durand & Berotti 1991; Durand & Carr 1991; Durand 1993).
Unfortunately for Bodhi and for us, Bodhi does resort to challenging behaviour as a
means of communication fairly regularly. However, over time, the behaviours have
changed and continue to change. At the beginning of this study, Bodhi was head-banging
windows and doors, and regularly and repeatedly turning lights on and off. These kinds
114

of behaviours were then replaced by grabbing and pulling at his younger brother, as they
get a more immediate and louder response when an adult comes running to find out why
his brother is screaming. In general, Bodhi’s challenging behaviours have decreased over
time, although he still occasionally bangs doors, tips chairs over and shrieks, among other
things. However, having said that challenging behaviour is part of his communicative
repertoire, when a communication partner is fully engaging with Bodhi, giving him the
attention he seems to desire, he is far less likely to exhibit challenging behaviour. This is
verified by the fact that in the interactions contained within the two transcripts, where
Bodhi is almost continually being fully attended to by the communication partner, there
are no instances of challenging behaviour as communication.
5.3.6 Eye gaze
The sixth mode of expression is eye gaze, and this refers to what or whom Bodhi is
looking at when he is communicating. This is an important part of Bodhi’s
communication because he almost always looks at the person he is trying to communicate
with. This can be useful in identifying who Bodhi is addressing within a group of people,
and therefore conveys some aspect of interpersonal meaning. For example, in the
supermarket queue, Bodhi will contact point another person in the queue while looking at
me, to ask me to tell him who that person is. The eye gaze is almost like an invisible link:
if he’s looking at someone whilst expressing other modes of communication, he is
communicating with that person. The eye gaze is apparent in all of Bodhi’s moves. It is a
mode that realises his communicative connection or intention with the communication
partner. This comes from my observations of him and is verified by the fact that across
the two transcripts, Bodhi looks at the communication partner almost every time he
communicates with them.14 In child language development studies, eye gaze is also noted
as a means of communicative intent. Painter (1984), for example, notes in her study of
her son’s language development that: “eye contact is probably the most readily observed
evidence of attending to another person” (p.53).

14

For all the turns where this was recorded, Bodhi looks at the communication partner.

There are a few instances where this information was not recorded.
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However, Bodhi does not only look at the communication partner when communicating.
He also looks at that which he is communicating about, switching his gaze from one to
the other. For example, he may lead the communication partner to a room where there is
a photo on the wall of someone he wants to see and once in the room he will look at the
photo and then back to the communication partner. The communication partner can see
what Bodhi is talking about by looking at him to see where he is looking.
5.3.7 Silence as a move
Whilst silence is not considered to be a move by some SF theorists (see Martin 1992),
Bodhi’s use of silence is important in that it seems to indicate that Bodhi is satisfied with
the communication partner’s response. For the communication partner, silence indicates
that they have understood Bodhi’s multimodal move and responded to it to Bodhi’s
satisfaction. In order to make this clear, compare the following two exchanges that
occurred very close in time and are a typical and regular type of exchange with Bodhi:
1. (O2 - Driving along the road)
BODHI: (distal points to friends’ street as we approach it) /i /i /
SHOOSHI: That’s where Rhett & Ruth live.
BODHI: (silence)
2. (O3 - Driving along the road)
BODHI: (distal points to friends’ street as we approach it) /i /i /
SHOOSHI: That’s where Rhett & Ruth live.
BODHI: (distal points to friends’ street again) /i /i /
SHOOSHI: Do you want to go and visit them?
BODHI: /i / (chest tap = ‘yes’)
SHOOSHI: ok. Let’s go and see if they’re home
BODHI: (silence)
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In both exchanges, Bodhi and I are driving down the road when we pass the street of
some very good friends. Bodhi points to their street and says /i/. I respond the same way
in both exchanges. In the first exchange, Bodhi is happy with my response (“That’s
where Rhett and Ruth live” which is an articulation of what I think he has communicated
multimodally), and he is therefore quiet after it. In other words, I respond as if Bodhi is
giving information about something, and requesting that I articulate that information for
him. In the second instance Bodhi is not happy with the same response and replays the
move. In my second response I reinterpret his move as a request for goods-&-services
(action), he then becomes quiet. While it may seem obvious that silence is a sign of
satisfaction, it is significant because, as mentioned above, Bodhi’s silence is one of the
ways the communication partner is able to gauge the success of the interaction.
5.2

Conclusion

This chapter explored Bodhi’s communication from the SF stratal perspective of the
expression plane. That is to say, it examined how Bodhi expresses meanings through a
variety of modes other than speech. It discussed the categorisation of each of these modes
into vocalisations, gestures, materials, actions, behaviours and eye gaze, and conducted
various counts to show the frequency that the different modes are used. It showed that, in
the corpus, Bodhi’s most frequent mode was vocalisation and that he used this in a
variety of ways with consistent tonal variation. By way of concluding this chapter, I
include two tables. The first, Table 5.3 shows the different modes of expression Bodhi
used with percentages of how often these modes occur in the Dodo and Mark transcripts.
It breaks the modes down to their most general levels only, just to give an overall idea of
the fact that Bodhi is a truly multimodal communicator, using a range of modes to
express himself. The second table, (5.4) shows how the modes of expression combine
together and how often they occur as combinations across the two transcripts.
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Mode of expression

Percentage of turns that contain mode

Vocalisations

91%

Gestures

29% (40% in Mark, 24% in Dodo)

Materials

28%

Actions

15%

Behaviours

-

Eye gaze

100%

Table 5.3

Frequency of Bodhi’s modes of expression

Modes of expression
gesture
gesture & material
gesture & vocalisation

Dodo
0
1 (.95%)
2 (1.9%)

Mark
0
0
5 (6.09%)

total
0
1 (.53%)
7 (3.74%)

gesture & vocal & material
vocalisation
vocalisation & laughter
vocalisation & unknown
vocalisation & unknown & laughter

33 (31.42%)
20 (19.04%)
2 (1.9%)
4 (3.8%)
1 (.95%)

11 (13.41%)
21 (25.6%)
0
3 (3.65%)
0

44 (23.52%)
41 (21.92%)
2 (1.06%)
7 (3.74%)
1 (.53%)

vocalisation & action
5 (4.76%)
vocalisation & action & material
5 (4.76%)
vocalisation & sign
1 (.95%)
action
11 (10.47%)
sign
1 (.95%)
laughter
19 (18.09%)
TOTALS
105
Table 5.4
Combinations of modes of expression

18 (21.95%)
0
9 (10.97%)
4 (4.87%)
5 (6.09%)
6 (7.31%)
82

23 (12.29%)
5 (2.67%)
10 (5.34%)
15 (8.02%)
6 (3.2%)
25 (13.36%)
187

The following chapters examine Bodhi’s communication from the perspective of the
content plane. That is to say, they will examine the meanings he makes with his modes of
expression.
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 6
THE DESCRIPTION OF BODHI’S SYSTEM WITHIN THE TURN
PART 1– THE INTERPERSONAL METAFUNCTION

______________________________________________________________________
6.0

Introduction

This chapter is the first of three chapters that examine the meanings Bodhi makes within
his conversational turn, using analyses from Halliday’s three metafunctions,
interpersonal, ideational and textual. As it is the interpersonal that drives communication
(Halliday 1993; Painter 2004), that is, the desire to interact with each other, the first of
these three chapters explores the interpersonal meanings Bodhi makes. Using the notion
of speech functions, the chapter examines how Bodhi realises the different functions
multimodally. In other words, it describes how Bodhi gives and demands information and
goods-&-services without speech language. The chapter begins with an explanation of the
interpersonal metafunction, followed by an account of Bodhi’s realisation of that
metafunction, showing how Bodhi’s realisation of interpersonal meanings is different
from speakers of English. Accommodating this difference has required some
modification to the speech function network. Whilst a speech function analysis is useful
for the moves Bodhi makes that have an easily discernible speech function, there are
many of his moves that do not. Therefore the chapter will finish with an examination of
moves without an easily discernible speech function, using the notion of a cline of
semiosis.
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6.1

The interpersonal metafunction

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the interpersonal metafunction refers to that part of language
that reflects the sociality of life, that is, the interactive part of language that serves to
enact our personal and social relationships with the other people in our lives (Halliday
1979). From this perspective, language is structured into propositions and proposals
whereby we “inform or question, give an order or make an offer, and express our
appraisal of and attitude towards whoever is we are addressing and what we are talking
about” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, p.29). This chapter deals only with the first half of
the interpersonal metafunction: speech function.
6.1.1 The grammatical system of Mood
When examining the interpersonal metafunction of “normal” English speech, Halliday
(1994) uses the grammatical system of Mood. The grammatical system of Mood reflects
the semantic function of the clause as an exchange of something, either goods-&-services
or information, and whether that something is being given or demanded. Combining the
above categories of giving and demanding with information and goods-&-services creates
the four different speech functions: giving information, expressed as a statement;
demanding information, expressed as a question; giving goods-&-services; expressed as
an offer; and demanding goods-&-services, which is expressed by a command. These
speech functions are, in turn, realised grammatically by the Mood types, declarative,
interrogative and imperative. In English, the Mood of a clause is determined by the
presence and order of the constituents Subject and Finite. The Subject, in Systemic
Functional terms, is the element that, in a declarative, can be picked up in pronoun form
in a tag question (Halliday 1994). For example, in “the cat chased the mouse”, the
appropriate tag would be “didn’t it?” where “it” refers back to the cat. The cat is therefore
the Subject of the clause. The Finite element is the auxiliary part of the verb. If there is
both a Subject and a Finite, the clause is said to be indicative. If the Subject precedes the
Finite, the clause selects for a declarative Mood, which realises the speech function of
statement. If the Finite precedes the Subject, the clause selects a polar (yes/no) question,
making interrogative Mood. If it is a WH-interrogative, the Subject precedes the Finite if
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the Subject is the WH-element. Where there is no Subject or Finite, just the rest of the
clause, the Residue, the clause selects an imperative Mood, which realises a command.
Examples of these are below:
Declarative Mood:
The cat

is

Subject

Finite

chasing the mouse
Residue

Mood

Interrogative Mood (polar):
Is

the cat

Finite

Subject

chasing the mouse?

Residue

Mood

Interrogative Mood (WH):
When

does

Subject

Finite

Mood

the cat chase the mouse
Residue

Imperative Mood:
Chase the mouse
Residue
From the above explanation and examples, it can be clearly seen that in order to
determine the Mood of a clause one must be able to identify the elements Subject and
Finite, to enable an examination of the order in which they occur, or if they occur at all.
This is a problem for the description of Bodhi’s communication for two reasons. Firstly,
there are almost no words in Bodhi’s moves; and secondly, Bodhi invariably
communicates all his modes simultaneously so there is no temporal ordering to the modes
of expression. This means there is no obvious Subject and Finite. As a result, the
realisations of the Mood system in English do not offer any clues as to Bodhi’s
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realisations of the different speech functions. However, as mentioned above, the system
of Mood is about the grammatical realisations of the semantic categories of speech
function: giving or demanding information or goods-&-services. As one of the aims of
this study is to determine what Bodhi can “do” with his communication, it is the semantic
level of speech function, the ‘from above’ perspective, that offers a way in to examining
Bodhi’s realisation of the interpersonal metafunction. The question then becomes not
what is the Mood of Bodhi’s turns, but how does Bodhi realise the semantic functions of
giving and demanding information and goods-&-services. Further, as each of these
speech functions invites a response, the question is also about how Bodhi responds to
others’ moves realising the various speech functions.
The next section explores speech functions according to whether they occur as initiations
or responses. Following that, the chapter will examine Bodhi’s realisation of each speech
function separately. The analysis for this section can be viewed in Appendix 5.
6.1.2 Bodhi’s expression of speech functions - initiations
In spoken English, different speech functions are often expressed tonally. For example,
and as mentioned in Chapter 5, a yes/no question is usually uttered with a rising tone,
whereas a statement is usually uttered with a falling tone (Halliday 1994). While Bodhi
does use different tones, they are not always so differentiated as to be attached to one
specific speech function. For example, he uses the same tones (and sound) to demand
information as he does to give it. This makes it difficult to distinguish between some of
the speech functions, both for the communication partner, and for the purposes of the
speech function analysis of this study. This is evidenced in the following examples.
(T2/E10)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing steps)
MARK: Those are steps. You’re going down the steps
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In this first example, Bodhi contact points (with a touch) the steps as he goes down them,
saying /i /i /i/ with Tone 2, to tell Mark that he is going down the steps. In this instance,
Tone 2 expresses the giving of information, that is, the speech function of statement.
In the second example below, Bodhi signs ‘toilet’ whilst concurrently saying /i /i /i / with
Tone 2, to ask Mark a polar question, that is, whether there are toilets at the places they
are going. In this instance, the /i/ sounds with Tone 2 express a demand for information.
(T2/E31)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (signs ‘toilet’)
MARK: No, there won’t be toilets. There’s no toilets. No toilet at the chemist and there’s
no toilets at the fish shop
So while Bodhi means different speech functions, he does not always express them
differently, and his speech function system is therefore less differentiated. The examples
above show that each time Bodhi initiates, he uses the sound /i/. It is this sound, due to its
prevalence, which works to call a communication partner to attend and respond to the
fact that he is communicating something, and that he is communicating about something.
The communication partner is asked to attend, and to notice both the speech function, as
well as the experiential content of the move. But the finer differentiation of the speech
functions is often indistinguishable and must be gleaned from other sources. These
include:
•

the immediate surrounding environment;

•

a prior knowledge of Bodhi and his life;

•

a shared understanding of the speech functions of language; and

•

Bodhi himself.

In the two examples above, as the communication partner is Bodhi’s father Mark, a
person with an intimate knowledge of both the way Bodhi communicates and what it is
he likes to communicate about, he has no difficulty in recognising that the same tone and
sound mean two different speech functions. It is both Mark’s knowledge of Bodhi, and
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his knowledge of various other features of the context that enable him to understand
Bodhi’s intentions, as well as a grasp on what speech functions are possible. In the first
example they are walking down the stairs and Mark knows that Bodhi likes to both label
the things he’s pointing to and comment on what he’s doing while he’s doing it, so he
responds accordingly. In the second example, Mark and Bodhi are going somewhere in
the car, and this exchange comes immediately after Bodhi has asked Mark where they are
going, and Mark knows that Bodhi loves flushing toilets when they go places. Not all
communication partners are this well informed, and sometimes, even the most well
informed communication partners can have trouble distinguishing the speech functions in
Bodhi’s undifferentiated realisations.
One of the main ways to identify which speech function Bodhi is expressing is from
Bodhi’s own responses in the third turn of the exchange because while the
communication partner does not necessarily know which speech function Bodhi is trying
to express, Bodhi himself knows. Therefore it is Bodhi, who, in his subsequent turns in
the exchange, clarifies for the communication partner the speech function of his move in
his previous turn. This occurs in a number of ways: either
•

Bodhi spontaneously corrects them himself because the communication partner
has misunderstood his move and responded to it as if it were something else; or

•

if the communication partner is aware that the speech function is ambiguous,
they check with him before proceeding to answer; or

•

they guess which speech function he is meaning, answer him and then ask him a
question that checks whether they have understood correctly.

These three cases can be seen in the following examples, where the first example shows
Bodhi spontaneously correcting the communication partner, Dodo, in his next or third
turn, by replaying the same move as his first turn. Dodo has misunderstood both the
speech function and content of his move, not initially realising that what Bodhi wants is
that she name the piece of the puzzle he is pointing to:
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(T1/E74)
Turn 1

BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (holding and contact pointing the blue truck piece of the
puzzle)

Turn 2

DODO: you show me where that one goes.

Turn 3

BODHI: /2 i / (continues to hold and point)

Turn 4

DODO: that’s the blue truck

Turn 5

BODHI: NV (puts piece in)

The second example shows the communication partner, Shooshi, checking with Bodhi on
what it is that he is trying to communicate, before she responds to his move, that is,
checking whether he is demanding the ‘service’ of playing the guitar. Again, it is in
Bodhi’s subsequent turns, the third and the fifth, that he makes clear what he was
communicating in the first turn, that is, that he was giving information, not demanding a
service:
(O4)
Turn 1

BODHI: /i /i / (contact points guitar picture)

Turn 2

SHOOSHI: Do you want me to play the guitar?

Turn 3

BODHI: (shakes head and then distal points towards the stereo)

Turn 4

SHOOSHI: (stops to listen and look) Oh. They’re playing guitar on the
music.

Turn 5

BODHI: (chest tap (= ‘yes’), and smiles)

The third example shows the communication partner, Mark, guessing what Bodhi is
meaning before he answers, then checking with Bodhi if he is correct. Here, Bodhi grabs
Mark’s sleeve and says /i / as they are driving along in the car. Mark interprets this as a
demand for information (wh-question) and, firstly provides that information, and then
checks with Bodhi whether he has got it right. Bodhi confirms in his next turn that Mark
is correct and taps his chest to say ‘yes’.
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(T2/E37)
Turn 1

BODHI: /2 i / (grabs sleeve)

Turn 2

MARK: yes. We’re going to the chemist shop and the fish shop. Is that
what you want to know?

Turn 3

BODHI: (taps chest = ‘yes’)

Turn 4

MARK: Yes. Good. (*He’s saying ‘yes’)

(*comment to the researcher)
From these examples it can be seen that Bodhi realises the different speech functions of
giving and demanding information and with the same sound and tone, that is, with the
sound /i/ and a rising tone. It can also be seen that it is often from the subsequent turns
that the communication partner can retrospectively identify Bodhi’s original speech
function. However, upon closer examination of the above examples, all the examples
with pointing are giving information, and those with sign are demanding a service. This is
not always the case.
6.1.3 Bodhi’s expression of speech functions - responses
In cases where it is not Bodhi who has initiated the exchange, it is much less clear what
speech function he is realising. This is the case in part because although he is responding
to someone else’s initiation, he is not the one intent on conveying something, rather it is
the communication partner, so his response is often something non-specifically
communicative, like laughter/giggle. Although the laughter/giggle conveys his happiness,
it does not have any analysable features according to SFL, other than “achieving serious
interpersonal work while not appearing to do anything except have fun” (Eggins & Slade
1997). Bodhi’s sense of pleasure can be seen in the following example where Dodo is
trying to share the armchair with him. His giggle conveys a general sense of satisfaction
or happiness with sharing intimate time and space with his grandmother, but it is difficult
to be more specific than that.
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(T1/E49)
DODO: Can I sit with you?
BODHI: (giggles)
DODO: can we sit together?
BODHI: (giggles)
DODO: Oh we both squeeze in together. That’s nice.
Nevertheless, even without being able to discern an exact speech function some
information is being conveyed here in the sense that Bodhi’s giggle is like a positive
comment on the situation, meaning that the communication partner is likely to continue
or repeat the action. This can be seen in Dodo’s third move, where she sits down with
him as a result of interpreting his giggle as an assent.
The process of discerning the speech function is almost like a process of elimination in
the sense that it is relatively easy to work out when Bodhi is demanding something as he
almost always uses the sound /i/ with a rising tone. As to exactly what he is demanding,
that is, whether it’s goods-&-services or information, is less clear but can generally be
worked out in conjunction with Bodhi, and from the information available in the
environment and the knowledge one has about Bodhi. However, a comprehensive
discussion of Bodhi’s realisation of speech functions is impossible without examining in
detail how Bodhi realises the different speech functions. The rest of this chapter explores
Bodhi’s realisation of the different speech functions, beginning with demand for goods&-services, because this is one of the very idiosyncratic areas of Bodhi’s communication,
and an understanding of this is crucial to understanding other features of his
communication.
6.1.4 Demanding goods-&-services
There are two kinds of goods-&-services that Bodhi demands. The first is the ordinary
type where Bodhi regularly demands goods and/or services, such as the provision of food
and drink. In this first type, Bodhi generally identifies what it is he is demanding by
pointing, and he alerts the communication partner by making a sound, such as /i /.
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For example, in the following exchange from the Dodo transcript, Bodhi is requesting
more juice by pointing at the juice bottle and saying /i /i / with an insistent Tone 5:
(T1/E28)
BODHI: /4 i /i / (contact pointing juice bottle)
DODO: but you had two drinks already
Bodhi also uses a flattish Tone 3 with sound and contact pointing to demand that Dodo
continue to help him put his epilepsy medication in his breakfast.
(T1/E7)
BODHI: /3 n /3 n /3 n / (pointing to medicine cup)
DODO: two more
In the Dodo transcript there are nine instances where Bodhi demands goods-&-services,
all to do with the provision of food, medication and drink. In the Mark transcript, there
are only a couple of instances of demands, and it is not entirely clear what Bodhi is
demanding, or whether he is demanding goods-&-services at all. This is most likely due
to the different contexts, the Dodo transcript occurring around breakfast where the
provision of food and drink is part of the context, whereas the Mark transcript is of a car
journey and provision of goods-&-services is not part of the context.
Demand for services – linguistic service
The second kind of goods-&-services Bodhi demands is somewhat similar to the
‘linguistic service’ identified by Ventola in her (1987) book on service encounters. It is
therefore necessary to discuss Ventola’s ‘linguistic service’ follows.
Ventola describes a linguistic service as where the giving and demanding of information
is treated as a particular kind of service, where information is provided (and in her
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examples, most often upon request). The example she provides to demonstrate this is a
brief interaction between passers-by in the street:
(1)
(2)

B: excuse me
What’s the time please?

(3)

A: two thirty (looking at watch)

(4)

B: okay
thanks

(Ventola 1987, p.115)
Ventola explains that move (2) what’s the time please seems to be a demand for
information, that is, a question realised by an WH-interrogative. Move (3) two thirty is a
typical elliptical response to a wh-question. However ok and thanks usually appear in
action oriented exchanges (demands for goods-&-services) rather than information
exchanges. Further please in (2) is more typical of a demand for goods-&-services as
well. Ventola suggests that this is quite typical of social interaction where the demanding
and giving of information is treated as a linguistic service and where the demand part
“Do me a service” is elided. In other words, what B is really saying in move (2) is Do me
a service; tell me the time please. However Ventola (1987) stresses that almost any
information exchange can be viewed as a linguistic service and that:
Sometimes it is very hard to tell whether what has been said is meant
as a linguistic service or simply as a piece of information. It is often
only by looking at what follows and by examining the context that
one can decide whether something constitutes a linguistic service or
not. (p.116)
With Bodhi’s communication, the case is more clear cut – that is, it is obvious when he is
requesting a linguistic service; the response of the communication partner and Bodhi’s
response to that response, shows whether Bodhi has demanded a linguistic service or not.
As Ventola (1987) indicates, the context and the response, “looking at what follows”
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(p.116), is crucial in determining whether something is a linguistic service or not. Ventola
(1987) provides some useful recognition criteria for linguistic services in spoken English,
which are the response moves that generally occur with goods-&-services exchanges
rather than information exchanges: the presence of please or thanks (in place of please) in
the demand moves, and okay or thanks in follow-up moves. For Bodhi, the recognition
criteria are the raised tone and his response to the communication partner’s response to
his original move. That is to say, if the communication partner has responded to his move
as if it were something other than a linguistic service and he is not happy with the
response and replays his move, then it is a linguistic service he is requesting. The
example used earlier from the Dodo transcript makes this clear:
(T1/E74)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (holding and pointing to piece of puzzle while looking at Dodo)
DODO: you show me where that one goes
BODHI: /2 i / (continues holding and pointing to piece of puzzle while looking at
Dodo)
DODO: that’s the blue truck
BODHI: (puts the piece in the puzzle)
In this exchange, Bodhi picks up the blue truck piece and points to it whilst saying /i/
with Tone 2. Dodo misses that he wants her to tell him in words what he has
communicated to her multimodally, that is, she misses that he is demanding the linguistic
service of articulation, and she responds instead with an imperative, telling him to put the
piece in the puzzle. Bodhi replays his initiating move, as a way of repairing the exchange
indicating that she has misunderstood his move. Dodo then responds as if Bodhi has
initiated a linguistic service of demand articulation and so articulates back to him the
name of the piece he is holding and pointing to. He then does not repeat his initiating
move but moves on and puts the piece in, indicating his satisfaction with her response.
There is a difference, however, in the type of linguistic service Ventola (1987) describes
and the sort Bodhi expresses: in all Ventola’s examples, when someone demands a
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linguistic service, they are also demanding a piece of information. In Ventola’s above
example of someone asking the time, that person is demanding information they do not
possess but desire to (i.e. the time). With Bodhi, while he is demanding a linguistic
service from the communication partner, it is for information that he is simultaneously
providing multimodally. In other words, instead of saying “tell me something I don’t
already know”, as the person in Ventola’s example does, it is as if Bodhi is saying “Tell
me in words what I am communicating multimodally.” This idiosyncratic move is closer
to a translation service, where one person provides the content of the word or words they
are requesting the translation of, except with Bodhi, the translation is not from one
language to another but from different modes within the one language into the mode of
speech. However, Bodhi’s demand for the linguistic service of articulation is also
different from a translation service because not only does he already know what he wants
the communication partner to say in words, but also it is only he that can verify if the
communication partner has provided the correct translation of his modes. With translation
from one language to another, any other speakers of the translated language can verify
the correctness of the translation. Bodhi’s often persistent desire for the communication
partner to articulate a particular thing can be seen in the following example where he is
pointing to his bowl and saying /i/ with Tone 5 while looking at Dodo in order to get her
to understand and say that he likes the bowl, not just that the bowl is lovely, or is his:
(T1/E19)
BODHI: /5 i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: that’s a lovely bowl isn’t it?
BODHI: /5 i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: that’s your bowl. yes
BODHI: /2 i-hi-hi /2 i-hi-hi /2 i-hi i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: yes, d’you like that bowl?
BODHI: I-h´ (giggly sound)
(Bodhi continues eating)
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From this example, it can also be seen that Bodhi is not entirely fixated on the speech
function with which the communication partner articulates the content, as long as there is
a match between the experiential meaning of what he was trying to convey and their
response. That is to say, Dodo articulated Bodhi’s liking of the bowl with an interrogative
that checks whether he likes it. She did not articulate the information back to him in the
declarative Mood.
A linguistic service exchange as outlined by Ventola has features of both an information
exchange, because it is information in the form of words that are being exchanged, and a
goods-&-services exchange, because a linguistic service is being provided. There has
been no SFL analysis to date that separates the linguistic service out from the general
category of goods-&-services, perhaps because it is realised in the same way
grammatically, or perhaps because it is implicit in the demand for information that a
person is requesting the service of telling, as it were. However, Ventola does recognise its
difference and changes her notation of A1 (Primary Actor) to signal linguistic service as
an action exchange: linguistic service, A1:LS K2 (Primary Actor: linguistic service
[Secondary Knower]15. But she does not incorporate linguistic service into the exchange
system network because she states it is very genre specific and argues that more work
needs to be done across various genres to see if there is enough evidence to justify
recoding. I argue here that Bodhi’s use of linguistic service is different from the one
Ventola outlines because it is not information he wants but articulation (or
transmodalisation). Further, Bodhi’s demand for the linguistic service of articulation
occurs quite frequently with many different communication partners across many
different settings and contexts, therefore deserves a greater degree of delicacy in analysis:
of the 75 instances across both the Dodo and Mark transcripts where it is possible to
clearly identify the speech function in Bodhi’s move, 69 percent are the demand for the
linguistic service of articulation. That is, between two thirds and three quarters of the
times Bodhi communicates, he is providing the information he wants articulated and
demanding the linguistic service of articulation simultaneously. This points to the

15

These labels will be explained in Chapter 8 on Exchange Structure.
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realisation of two speech functions simultaneously - giving information and demanding
goods-&-services: linguistic service: articulation.
The name given here to the move that realises two speech functions simultaneously is the
dual move. This kind of move is not unknown in the SF literature and has some similarity
to Halliday’s (1994) description of incongruent realisations of speech functions or Mood
metaphors, where one speech function type is used in place of another. Declaratives can
be used in place of modulated interrogatives in such utterances as “I’m thirsty”, when
what is really meant is “Could you get me a drink”. Halliday (1994, p.363) notes that the
speech functions just represent the “bare bones” and people use many rhetorical modes to
encode meaning. In a sense, Mood metaphor is similar to what Bodhi does, only the
difference is that in a Mood metaphor, the meaning of the congruent Mood is not the
meaning the listener is meant to respond to. For example, if a child says “I’m thirsty”, the
congruent reply to this would be something like “Oh are you?” However, the required
reply would be some kind of action of getting a drink or a verbal acknowledgement to get
a drink. In other words, while it is a declarative, the listener is meant to respond as if it is
an imperative, that is, the listener is meant to get the drink. It could be argued that
Bodhi’s dual move is the same as a Mood metaphor because with “I’m thirsty”, there is a
second clause elided and that is the request for the drink. So that “I’m thirsty” really
means “I’m thirsty, so can you get me a drink.” With Bodhi, the multimodal move really
means “this is what I’m telling you about, and now can you articulate it back to me.” So
perhaps the request for service is implied the same way it is with a Mood metaphor. On
the one hand, this could be the case, but on the other, relegating this move of Bodhi’s to
the category of a Mood metaphor does not quite capture the totality of what is going on in
Bodhi’s dual move of giving information and demanding articulation simultaneously.
Further, the use of the dual move shows a developmental leap (which occurred during
this study) from a time when Bodhi was only exchanging actual commodities (i.e. goods-
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&-services), to when Bodhi is now exchanging, and in particular, giving, information16.
But the communication partners were and sometimes still are, slow to catch on, as
evidenced by the following exchange with his teacher about the toilet. It takes the teacher
a while to understand that he doesn’t want to go to the toilet, but rather, he is telling her
something about the toilet.
(O5)
(Bodhi and his teacher are going for a walk around the playground at school. They pass
the way to the toilet where the door is ajar. Bodhi stops to tell the teacher something):
BODHI: (stops walking) /i / i / (signs ‘toilet’)
TEACHER: alright then. Off you go. Go to the toilet
BODHI: (stamps foot) /i / i / (signs ‘toilet’)
TEACHER: well go on. Go to the toilet
BODHI: (stamps foot) /i / i / (more insistently) (signs ‘toilet’)
TEACHER: (stops and looks at the toilet and sees someone in there) Oh! You’re telling me
you can see there’s someone on the toilet.
BODHI: (resumes walking)
In this exchange with his teacher, Bodhi is trying to tell his teacher that he can see
someone in the toilet by pointing towards the toilet and saying /i/i/. The teacher misreads

16

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halliday (1975) discusses the point in ontogenesis where

the child realises that s/he can demand more than actual commodity, and finds that
linguistic commodity, i.e. information is exchangeable too. Halliday (1975) shows that
the giving of information is the last of all the speech functions to develop in the
ontogenesis of language. A child masters demands for goods-&-services and information
first. At the time of taking data for this study, most communication partners were
responding to Bodhi’s initiations of giving information as if they were demands for
goods-&-services, but as is captured in the following pieces of data, Bodhi was in the
process of developing the higher order function of giving information.
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his move as a demand for action, to go to the toilet himself (which is quite a reasonable
assumption, given that he is obsessed with flushing toilets), and she responds with an
action style response “Alright then. Off you go…” Bodhi replays the same move, adding
the stamping of the foot for emphasis. She again misunderstands his move in the same
way. Finally, after a third go, the teacher realises she has misunderstood and looks to see
if there is something she is missing. She sees someone else in the toilet and guesses that
that must be what Bodhi is trying to tell her. In other words, she somehow realises he is
giving information, as well as demanding the linguistic service of articulation, and she
articulates back to him what she thinks he is trying to tell her. As she is right, he is happy
with her answer and shows this by continuing to walk.
Due to the prevalence of Bodhi’s demand for the linguistic service of articulation, I have
further expanded the system network of commodity, decoupling goods-&-services to
include both Ventola’s linguistic service of information and Bodhi’s linguistic service of
articulation as an extra level of delicacy. See Figure 6.1 below:

other
goods-&-services

information

commodity

linguistic service
information

Figure 6.1

articulation

Commodity branch of speech function network revised to include demand
for the linguistic services of information and articulation

Whether there is enough evidence to warrant this extra level of delicacy is not entirely
certain. It does provide another resource for the communication partner to ask themselves
when interacting with a multimodal communicator like Bodhi, who does not differentiate
between the speech functions, whether the multimodal communicator is asking for an
action service (i.e. to do something or to have something) or for a linguistic service (i.e.
to articulate something). I would venture to say that if the communication partner thought
about the move like this, there would be less misunderstanding and therefore less
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frustration on the part of the multimodal communicator. This can be seen in the example
recorded when driving past the street of our friends Rhett and Ruth:
(O3)
BODHI: /i /i / (distal points to Rhett & Ruth’s street as we approach it)
SHOOSHI: That’s where Rhett & Ruth live.
BODHI: /i /i / (continues to distal point to Rhett & Ruth’s street)
SHOOSHI: Do you want to go and visit them?
BODHI: /i / (chest tap = ‘yes’)
SHOOSHI: ok. Let’s go and see if they’re home
(BODHI: silence)
In this example, as I am already aware of Bodhi’s desire to give information about the
world around him, I treat the move firstly as a demand for the linguistic service of
articulation. When it is clear from Bodhi’s replay that that is not what he was wanting, I
then treat his move as a request for an action service and verify this by asking him to
confirm. He replies with a “yes”. So although we do spend time working through the
possibilities, there is no misunderstanding or frustration on Bodhi’s part. Compare this
with the example already shown above where Bodhi tries to tell his teacher that there’s
someone in the toilet.
In that example, the teacher has no idea that Bodhi is trying to give her information and it
takes him three goes plus extra insistence with foot stamping for her to understand that he
is not requesting to go to the toilet (demanding action). It is only after she looks at the
toilet and sees someone in there that she somehow realises he is trying to tell her
something about the toilet. Had she firstly been able to think that he might have been
trying to give her information and requesting articulation of that information, he may not
have become frustrated.
In terms of how this changes the analysis conducted in this study, it means that it is
possible to distinguish between typical demands for goods-&-services and special
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demands for goods-&-services, which are the linguistic service of articulation. This is
useful as they have quite different functions. While they are both demands on the
communication partner, the former is demanding something completely different to the
latter. The former is demanding actual physical action and an actual physical commodity
from the communication partner, whereas the latter is demanding verbalisation, that is
linguistic commodity: some things versus some words. This is quite a different function
to the demand for information that Halliday (1975) shows his son Nigel expressing in the
transition phase of language. In Nigel’s case, he desires information, whereas Bodhi
gives the information. Further, Bodhi intones these two categories quite differently from
each other. In the Dodo transcript, there are eight instances where Bodhi demands
ordinary goods-&-services, the provision of either medicine, or food and drink. In all
these instances at least one of the sounds in the move is uttered with a flat or falling tone,
either a Tone 3 or a Tone 1. This contrasts with the demand for the specialised service of
articulation, which occurs 33 times in the same transcript. In all of these instances, Bodhi
utters the sounds with a rising tone, either Tone 2 or Tone 5.
Realisation of demand for goods-&-services: linguistic service: articulation
As stated, Bodhi realises the move demand for goods-&-services: linguistic service:
articulation using sound, most often /i/, with a rising tone such as a Tone 2 or 5. The
experiential content of the move is typically realised by pointing to something.
6.1.5 Giving information
Giving information enables us to comment on the world around us. It is a powerful
position to take up as it is based on a presumption that the speaker has something to say
(Togher 2001). Bodhi takes up this position regularly, utilising the speech function of
giving information in two ways. The first and most common is when he initiates an
exchange to tell the communication partner something about the world around him. The
example below of playing in the garden demonstrates this. Here, the accompanying
actions and conversation have been about going up and down the ladder and it is a
neighbour, Taylor’s, turn. Bodhi has pointed to Taylor as he climbs the ladder to tell that
Taylor is climbing the ladder.

137

(O6/T3)
BODHI: /gi / (pointing to Taylor as he climbs the ladder)
SHOOSHI: Yeah, Taylor’s going up the ladder.
This kind of exchange occurs quite frequently depending on the context. For example, in
the Dodo transcript where he is sharing time with his grandmother who he does not see
very often, he regularly gives information to tell her things: a total of 53 percent of his
initiations are giving information. This figure contrasts with the Mark transcript where
Bodhi is more intent on finding out where they are going and what they are doing. Here,
he initiates to give information only 27 percent of the time. However, the fact that he
gives information regularly sits in direct contrast to many studies of children with
moderate to severe developmental disabilities that report low frequencies of moves that
give information (see, for example, Cirrin & Rowland 1985; Wetherby, Yonclas & Bryan
1989).
The second, much less frequent way Bodhi gives information is when the communication
partner asks him something, such as a polar question, often to confirm that they have
understood him correctly, and he responds by giving information. For example, when we
are at home taking turns playing the guitar, and it is my turn, Bodhi points at Taylor to
indicate he wants Taylor to have a turn:
(O7/T3)
BODHI: /i /i /i / (pointing at Taylor)
SHOOSHI: you want Taylor to have a turn?
BODHI: (taps chest = ‘yes’)
SHOOSHI: Here you go Taylor (gives the guitar to Taylor)
But it is the first type of giving information that is of most interest both because of the
prevalence of its occurrence and also because it occurs with the linguistic service of
articulation as discussed above. To recap, when Bodhi realises the speech function of
138

giving information, especially in an initiation or replay move, it is almost always coupled
with the demand for the linguistic service of articulation. There is much more to be said
about the different ways Bodhi gives information, but as these more relate to different
kinds of moves, they will be examined more closely in Chapter 9 on Exchange Structure.
6.1.6 Demanding information
Bodhi’s vocalised expression of demand for information is fairly undifferentiated from
the speech function of giving information. That is, he often uses the same tones to
express both. This was shown in two examples in the section on giving information.
Generally, the tone he uses to demand information is a rising tone, such as Tone 2. As
Halliday (1994) divides demanding information into two types, polar interrogatives and
wh-interrogatives, and Bodhi’s realisation of these two types of demanding information is
different, they will be addressed separately.
Polar questions
Bodhi often asks polar questions, seeking to find things out about his life and the
immediate future. This can be seen in the Mark transcript when Mark and Bodhi are on
the way to the chemist, in the twelve times he asks Mark polar questions about the
journey and destination, such as where they are going and whether there will be toilets for
him to flush. For example:
(T2/E48)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (signs toilet)
MARK: Toilet um, yeah you can play, flush the toilet when you come home, when you go
home. Not at the chemist shop. There’s no toilet at the chemist.
But how does Mark know these are demands for information when they are expressed in
the same way as the giving of information? The answer again comes from both an
understanding of the immediate context, and of Bodhi’s likes and dislikes.
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Polar questions are generally delivered with a rising tone, most often Tone 2, with the
thing that Bodhi is asking about being identified deictically using sign, pictures, and
gestures, such as pointing. However, in all the polar questions in the Mark transcript,
Bodhi uses sign.
Wh-questions: where?
The things Bodhi most often asks for information about are circumstantial pieces of
information, such as where he is going and who with. The most common is whinterrogative is “where?” as he often wants to know where he is going. This is evidenced
by the twelve times he asks where they are going during his car trip with Mark:
(T2/E42)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (grabs Mark’s sleeve = ‘where are we going?’)
MARK: We’re going to Wollongong, to the chemist shop, to get your medicine
The sound /i/ is used with a rising Tone 2, but it is the action of grabbing Mark’s sleeve
that indicates that Bodhi wants to know where they are going.
Bodhi also asks where people are, as can be seen in the following example when he is at
home in the garden with me and he wants to know where his Dad is.
(O8/T3)
BODHI: /dQd /dQd /dQd /dQd /
SHOOSHI: Dad’s in the kitchen. Shall we go up and find him?
But again, it is an understanding of Bodhi that allows me to know that he is asking for
information as to the whereabouts of his father.
Wh-questions: who?
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Bodhi regularly asks who will be accompanying him on his various journeys. For
example, in the following exchange Bodhi and Mark are getting in the car to go to the
chemist when Bodhi asks whether the other members of the family are coming too:
(T2/E28-29)
BODHI: /1 dQd /3 dQd /2 dQd /2? dQd /
MARK: Yes, you’re going with Dad in the car.
BODHI: /2 b√b /2 b√b / (= Mum Mum)
MARK: Is Mum coming?
BODHI: /2 i-√h /(= his brother Davi)
MARK: No, Davi’s not coming. Mum’s not coming.
Bodhi expresses wh-questions with a rising tone, such as a Tone 2 or 5, and mostly with
the sound /i/, although if the question is about someone whose name he expresses
verbally, he says the person’s name with a rising tone instead of /i/, as in the examples
above.
6.1.7 Giving goods-&-services
Giving goods-&-services is typically realised in a number of ways. The modulated
interrogative, “would you like…” is one common way, but it can also be realised nonverbally by way of simply doing something, such as handing someone a drink. There is
no evidence of Bodhi giving goods-&-services in this data set, although I do have the
occasional piece of anecdotal evidence from everyday life of Bodhi giving his brother a
toy. Speculation as to why Bodhi doesn’t make offers is dealt with in Chapter 9.
6.1.8 Bodhi’s speech function network
From the descriptions provided in this chapter, it can be said that in this data set, Bodhi’s
realisation of the different speech functions is fairly undifferentiated particularly when it
comes to the use of sound. However, even with a lack of differentiation, Bodhi expresses
a number of different speech functions, as has been shown above. Had there been a larger
data set, there may have been differences to be found in the realisation of the speech
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functions. Following is a system network of Bodhi’s speech functions (Figure 6.2) as
based on this data, including the specialised linguistic service of articulation, and a table
(Table 6.3) that shows how these are expressed.

Please see print copy for Figure 6.2

Figure 6.2 Bodhi’s system of speech functions (after Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, p.108)
Key:
I=
I

if, T = then

initiate +give +information, Tdemand +linguistic service (articulation), means, if Bodhi

initiates with giving information, then he also demands the linguistic service of
articulation of that information.
I

linguistic service (articulation) Tdemand, means if Bodhi realises a linguistic service, it

is always as a demand.
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Move

Role

Commodity

Realisation

1 initiate

give

-

2 initiate

give

-

0

3 initiate
4 initiate

give
demand

goods-&-services:
other
linguistic service
(articulation)
information
goods-&-services:
other

No.
in
data
0

I

Pointing to something
Pointing to something + with
mixture of tones, often flat eg
Tone 1 or 3 but also rising eg
Tone 2
T with sounds that include
Tone 2 or 5,
unless lexis
with a mixture of tones,
mainly raised eg Tone 2 +
some gesture
-

31

-

0

If replay then same realisation
as (3); otherwise gesture
-

9
8
0

As replay with (9);
same realisation as (5)
12 respond demand
As replay; same realisation as
(6)
Table 6.3 Bodhi’s moves within the speech function network with realisations

9

I

initiate

demand

linguistic service
(articulation)

6 initiate

demand

information

T5

7 respond give
8 respond give
9 respond give
10 respond demand
11 respond demand

goods-&-services:
other
linguistic service
(articulation)
information
goods-&-services:
other
linguistic service
(articulation)
information

19
31
15
0

4

Key:
I=
I

if, T = then

initiate +give +information, Tdemand +linguistic service (articulation), means, if Bodhi

initiates with giving information, then he also demands the linguistic service of
articulation of that information.
I

linguistic service (articulation) Tdemand, means if Bodhi realises a linguistic service, it

is always as a demand.
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As shown, in order to differentiate between the different speech functions, one needs to
look to Bodhi himself and to the surrounding environment, but an understanding of
Bodhi’s life is also a great help to the communication partner. Additionally, an
understanding of the speech function network itself can also assist the communication
partner, as when Bodhi initiates, they can go through the various possibilities: is he
giving or demanding something and is it information or goods-&-services. If goods-&services, then which kind: either the ordinary kind or the specialised linguistic service of
articulation. This will be developed further in the chapter on exchange structure.
6.1.9 Moves without a speech function
In total, moves by Bodhi that have a clearly discernable speech function across both the
Dodo and Mark transcripts account for 66 percent of Bodhi’s moves. This leaves 44
percent of moves unaccounted for. However, the communication partner still responds to
these moves. For example:
(T2/E53-56)
MARK: Is that ok? Tomorrow Dad will take you to Saturplay and Bruce will come in the
car too. We’ll have Bruce in the car, with a banjo and a double bass. Yes…
BODHI: /1 ye´/ (smile)
MARK: Yeah Bruce
BODHI: /1 he he´/ (laughish)
MARK: You like Bruce?
BODHI: /1? hi-ye´/ (laughish)
MARK: I think you do
BODHI: /h´- h -h-h/(laughs)
MARK: Tomorrow. In the morning
BODHI: /´-e A/ (high pitched)
MARK: yeah
BODHI: /A-A/ (high pitched)
(pause)
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BODHI: /h´ h´/(laugh)
MARK: Yeah. Tomorrow Bruce will come. Is that what you’re happy about? Yes? Is that
what you’re happy about? Bruce? Wanna see Bruce tomorrow?
BODHI: (chest taps = ‘yes’)
MARK: Yes, he’s going yes. Bruce with his banjo. The banjo…
BODHI: /´hi hi hi hi hi/(laughing)

In the example above, Mark responds to almost all of Bodhi’s moves, although other than
the second last one, they do not have a discernible speech function. However, it is clear
that Bodhi is expressing some kind of happiness in the laughter, and this is what Mark
responds to.
The 44 percent of moves that do not have a speech function, can be divided into a number
of different types depending on their mode of expression. Most have some kind of sound
as well as another mode, such as an action. The categories are laughter, action (with and
without sound) and sound with other modes unknown. These will be dealt with in turn. In
terms of function, however, SF theory does not offer much to account for these moves. In
their work on casual conversation, Eggins and Slade (1997) give some account of
laughter, drawing upon the work of the conversation analysts such as Jefferson, Sacks
and Schegloff (1987) who observed different functions of laughter, such as to invite
intimacy. But given that some of these moves of Bodhi’s, such as actions, are primary
semiotic non-linguistic forms of semiosis, SF theory does not account for them. As
discussed in Chapter 2, in the field of AAC, Light et al (1985b) developed a set of
communicative functions for people with communication disorders, which combines
speech functions and exchange structure moves with other moves that are particular to
multimodal communication. Laughter can be accounted for in this framework as
communicative function number 9, which is Expressions of self: Expressions of protest,
humour, positive and negative emotional states. Further, Brady et al (1995), who studied
repair moves of people with severe intellectual disabilities, describes certain multimodal
moves as protodeclarative, meaning that whilst not having the structure of a declarative,
they function as a declarative. Bodhi’s laughter is interpreted in this light, as it functions
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to give information about Bodhi’s state of mind, that is to say, it tells the communication
partner that he is happy.
The moves that are constituted by sounds and other modes that are unknown are mostly
unintelligible to the researcher because the other modes were not seen and noted down at
the time, but they are not necessarily unintelligible to the communication partner, and the
communication partner responds to them. These kinds of moves can be partly accounted
for with Light et al’s communicative competence number 12: Unintelligible utterances:
turns which are unintelligible as to their propositional content or illocutionary force to
both partner and coder. However the fact that the communication partner responds to the
moves must somehow mean that they are not entirely unintelligible. For example, in the
following segment although most of these moves do not have a discernible speech
function, Mark responds to them. What he is responding to is in fact Bodhi’s actions (or
non-actions), which in this case are of non-compliance:
(T2/E20-23)
MARK: Hopping in the car. Let’s get in your seat.
BODHI: /5 ih /1 ´h/
MARK: Bodhi. Hop in your seat please
BODHI: /5 ih /3? ´h/ (doesn’t hop in seat)
MARK: Bodhi. No no no
BODHI: /3 ih/
MARK: What d’you…Where are you going? In the back, oh.
BODHI: /1? ´h/3? hIh /5? hI-hI/ (Bodhi climbs in the back and points to the back
seat)
MARK: No we’re not sitting in the back. Can you hop in your seat please?
Would you like to come with me in the car?
BODHI: /1 ´h/
MARK: would you like to come with me in the car?
BODHI: /3 i/ (chest tap)
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MARK: ok. Can you hop in your seat please? (*he’s just saying yes)
BODHI: /1 Ih/3 hI/
MARK: Come on.
BODHI: /3 i/2 i/ (pointing to the ground)
MARK: Yeah. We’re going to jump out the back of the car.
One, two, three, go
BODHI: (Bodhi jumps)
(*note to researcher)
The third group of moves with no discernible speech function are actions Bodhi performs
often in response to a directive from the communication partner. For example, when
Bodhi is doing a jigsaw puzzle with Dodo, she instructs him to remove the pieces and he
responds by doing so:
(T1/E70-71)
DODO: you take them out. (*Bodhi’s pointing to them).
BODHI: (takes the pieces of puzzle out)
DODO: That’s right. Take them all out.
BODHI: (takes pieces of puzzle out)
(*comment to researcher)
Whilst these moves may not be linguistically semiotic, in that they are realised without an
intermediary plane, such as that of lexicogrammar, they still have a place in the
interaction as they are the expected compliant response to an imperative, named an
undertaking – only they are nonverbal. In other words, they still have a function. As
Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) note, even if responses to demands for goods-&services are often verbalised, they can be constituted by nonverbal action alone.
However, although they acknowledge this, they do not offer any way of analysing
responses that are nonverbal, as they say that “typically in real-life situations all four
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[speech function] responses are verbalized” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, p.109). The
corollary to this is that only the verbalised responses are able to be analysed, presumably
because as Halliday (1984) notes, they are the part of the response that is realised via the
semiotic plane of the lexicogrammar. However, since the aim of goods-&-services
transactions is to achieve “what are essentially non-linguistic ends” (Halliday &
Matthiessen 2004, p.110), it is not surprising then that Bodhi’s move is realised nonlinguistically. But what are we to make of it in terms of analysis?
In order to account for these non-linguistic semiotic moves, I return to the premise that
language is a form of social behaviour. Whilst a non-verbal response is not a linguistic
form of social behaviour, it is still nevertheless a social behaviour and still makes
meaning as a response. Where there is an absence of language, such as in Bodhi’s case,
the non-linguistic social behaviour has to suffice and, from the above examples, it can be
seen that it does. In terms of the meanings made by these non-verbal modes, in the case
where they are responses to imperatives, they function as the expected or discretionary
responses. That is to say, either they comply or they do not, and they therefore still
function as a response to a goods-&-services transaction.
At this point it is useful to revisit the cline of semiosis. On the one hand, Bodhi
communicates in ways that are linguistically semiotic, yet on the other, he communicates
in ways that are not linguistically semiotic. The moves he makes that have a discernible
speech function are the linguistically semiotic, sitting up the higher end of the cline of
semiosis. They have an intermediary layer of meanings, not a lexicogrammar, that is to
say, not wordings, but multimodes made up of sounds, gestures (including signs) and
pictorials. The moves that don’t have a speech function sit down the lower end of the
cline, as they don’t have an intermediate level of meaning. Like an infant’s language, a
protolanguage, they are two tiered with just content and expression, and sometimes the
expression is realised nonverbally. Additionally, like the moves made by an infant, they
are interpreted as meaningful and responded to by the communication partner (Halliday
1975). These kinds of moves could therefore be called proto types of moves: protodeclarative, proto-interrogative and proto-imperative.
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6.2

Conclusion

This chapter explored Bodhi’s communication from the interpersonal perspective of
speech function. It showed how Bodhi is able to realise a number of speech functions,
using a variety of different modes of expression.
Specifically, the chapter showed that Bodhi’s realisation of speech function is somewhat
undifferentiated, as he uses the same sound and rising tone to both give and demand
information, and to demand the specialised linguistic service of articulation. Regardless
of this lack of differentiation, the chapter showed that with help from the communication
partner attending to Bodhi to jointly work out what speech function he is realising, Bodhi
is able to give and demand information and goods-&-services.
The chapter also demonstrated how within Bodhi’s communication, there is a novel move
that combines two speech functions: giving information and demanding a specialised
linguistic service of articulation. The specialised service of articulation was shown to be
somewhat similar yet different from the linguistic service identified by Ventola (1987) in
her analysis of service encounters. The difference is that Bodhi multimodally provides
the information whilst simultaneously demanding the communication partner articulate
that information back to him in words, whereas in Ventola’s linguistic service, the
speaker requests information they don’t already know. It was also shown that Bodhi’s
expression of this dual move, generally with a rising tone, is different from the way he
expresses an ordinary demand for goods-&-services, which is generally with a falling
tone.
Finally, this chapter showed how 44 percent of Bodhi’s moves do not have an easily
discernible speech function, and that these moves cannot be accounted for within the SF
framework using speech function. However, this does not mean that they have no
function, and using the construct of communicative functions (after Light, Collier et al.
1985b), coupled with the broader concept of a cline of semiosis, the chapter was able to
account for all of Bodhi’s moves.
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The following chapter continues the exploration of Bodhi’s meaning making within the
turn from the perspective of the ideational metafunction.
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 7
THE DESCRIPTION OF BODHI’S SYSTEM WITHIN THE TURN
PART 2 – THE IDEATIONAL METAFUNCTION

______________________________________________________________________

7.0

Introduction

This chapter explores the meanings Bodhi makes from the perspective of the ideational
metafunction, using the systems of ergativity and transitivity. As the ideational
metafunction is concerned with representations of the world and the relations between
those representations, this chapter explores how Bodhi constructs the world around him
through his communication.
7.1

The ergative model

Unlike the transitive model, which sees Processes separated into their different types, the
ergative model is a clause patterning that is the same for all Process types. It highlights
what all the Process types have in common, whereas the transitive model highlights the
differences between the Process types. Ergativity also highlights the difference between
‘doing’ and ‘happening’ (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004). That is, in the ergative model,
the participants, regardless of which Process they belong to, have different roles
depending on whether they bring about or cause the Process, or whether they are the
participant through which the Process is actualised. If causing the Process to occur, the
participant is named the Agent. The Agent is the participant with power - the doer or
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causer in the Process. If actualising the Process, the participant is called the Medium. As
Halliday explains, the Medium is the “nodal participant…not the doer, nor the causer, but
the one that is critically involved, in some way or other according to the particular nature
of the process”. Further, he states: “Every process has associated with it one participant
that is the key figure in that process; this is the one through which the process is
actualised, and without which there would be no process at all” (Halliday 1994, p.165).
This can be seen in the following sentence:
Tessa

snaps

snakes

Actor

Process: material

Goal

Agent

Process

Medium

Tessa causes the snakes to be snapped, so it is she who is the Agent (as well as the
Actor), but it is the snakes that get snapped, so the snakes are the Medium as they form
the participant through which the Process is actualised. In terms of traditional grammar,
the Medium is equivalent to Actor in an intransitive clause, but Goal in a transitive
clause. Halliday (1994) gives the example “the tourist woke” for the intransitive clause,
with “the tourist” as both Actor and Medium, and “the lion woke the tourist” as the
transitive clause, where the Goal and Medium is “the tourist”, as it is the tourist who
wakes up in both cases.
Additionally, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) show that the ergative perspective is
useful for examining the way information is constructed in numerous contexts in English,
particularly, for example, in scientific writing, where the Agent is often omitted in order
to foreground the Process and Medium. But also, in the print media, for the same reason,
to foreground the information carried in the Medium, and background the Agent, which
is either omitted, or placed after the Medium and Process, as in the example from the
Sydney Morning Herald newspaper (10/5/2005) below:
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The

former

Chechen has

been during an operation

president and rebel leader

killed

Goal

Pro:material

Medium

Process

by Russian special
forces

Circumstance

Actor
Agent

Halliday (2004) states that from an ergative perspective, the nucleus of the clause is
constituted by the two constituents Process and Medium. These two elements are the only
elements that can alone make up a major clause. Every other constituent is optional and
determined in relation to the Process and the Medium. Thus the Medium is named the
nuclear participant of the clause.
Ergativity is also linked to the system of voice, which classifies clauses depending on
whether or not they have agency. So while all major clauses hinge, as it were, on the
constituents of Process and Medium, some also have an Agent as a major participant. As
a result, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) divide clauses into two types of voice: middle
and effective. Middle clauses are those that contain a Medium and Process but no Agent.
In other words, these clauses contain no feature of agency, and are neither agentive nor
passive. Effective clauses are those with a feature of Agency. They can be operative,
containing the Agent, or receptive, where the Agent is left implicit, such as in a passive
clause.
7.1.1 The usefulness of ergativity and the system of voice
Ergativity and Voice are useful in an examination of Bodhi’s communication because
they provide a view of his communication that cuts across all clause/Process types. In a
sense, they provide a more general, or big picture view on his expression (or lack thereof)
of the more specific constituents in the system of Transitivity. Ergativity constituents can
be identified in Bodhi’s moves in the same way that Transitivity constituents are. That is
to say, while there is no clause per se, and even though it can be a little problematic, there
are still some constituents expressed, and these can be identified and analysed.
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It is therefore possible to interpret each of Bodhi’s moves that contain some experiential
content as being of a particular voice. There are 83 such moves, that is, 83 moves where
it is possible to identify some kind of Transitivity constituent. Of these moves, there are
16 (19%) that can clearly be interpreted as effective and 45 (54%) as middle. The rest
(27%) are unclear. This shows that Bodhi makes moves with no agentive feature (middle)
much more often than moves with an agentive feature (effective). (See Appendix 7).
When combining voice with ergativity, the findings show that in all the 16 effective
moves, Bodhi omits expressing the Agent, although the Agent is implied. This can be
seen in all the exchanges where Bodhi is indicating that he wants to flush the toilet, by
only expressing ‘toilet’. These moves are interpreted as material with ‘toilet’ as the
Medium (Goal), and Bodhi as the Agent, as it is he who wants to flush the toilet. For
example:
(T2/E48)
BODHI: /2 i/2 i/ (signs toilet)
MARK: Toilet um, yeah you can play, flush the toilet when you come home, when we go
home, not at the chemist shop. There’s no toilet at the chemist.
Of the 45 middle clauses, where Bodhi himself is Medium, he also omits himself, instead
expressing either the Range or nothing. This can be seen in the following example where
Bodhi has uttered his sound for “escalators”. As they are traveling in the car and the
dialogue has been around where they are going, who’s coming and what they might do
there, such as flush toilets, it is interpreted here that Bodhi is asking if they are going to
the escalators, therefore, escalators is like a circumstance of location: place. The Medium,
that is who is going to the escalators, is Bodhi, the expression of which he omits.
(T2/E35)
BODHI: /5 i-i*/5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /
MARK: No, no escalators today. Not escalators
(*Bodhi’s sound for escalators)
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However, when the Medium is someone other than himself, he expresses it, such as in the
following, where Bodhi asks who is coming in the car with them:
(T2/E29)
BODHI: /2 b√b /2 b√b / (= Mum Mum)
MARK: Is Mum coming?
BODHI: /2 i-√h /(= his brother Davi)
MARK: No, Davi’s not coming. Mum’s not coming.
Both “Mum” and “Davi” are interpreted here as Medium, as they are the ones who are
“coming” or not. Each of the ergative constituents will be examined individually and in
more detail below, starting with Range.
Range
The Range is the participant that expresses “the domain over which the process takes
place” or that “expresses the process itself, in either general or specific terms” (Halliday
1994, p.146). Across both transcripts there are 52 instances of Bodhi expressing a Range.
These predominantly occur in the Mark transcript, for example where Bodhi points to
something to tell Mark what that something is:
(T2/E8)
BODHI: /1 i /5 i /2 i / (pointing to hanging door beads in doorway)
MARK: Yes, that’s the beads
The interpretation of Bodhi’s pointing to the beads as Range is based on a number of
factors: firstly, the above move is interpreted as a relational17 type move because it is as if
Bodhi is naming the beads, or asking the Communication Partner to name them for him.
17

Process types and their corresponding participants are explained in the section on

Transitivity.
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Secondly, in relational clauses, both the Attribute and the Value are the Range, and
Bodhi’s pointing to the beads is interpreted as the Value in a relational type move.
Bodhi typically expresses the Range by pointing, as can be seen in the example above.
Medium
There are 18 instances across both transcripts of Bodhi expressing a Medium. Fourteen of
these occur in the Mark transcript, for example when Bodhi signs ‘toilet’:
(T2/E33)
BODHI: /?´h /i /´h /eh / (signs ‘toilet’)
MARK: Toilet? Yes. When we go home, you can play with the toilet. Not the shops.
There’s no toilet at the shops.
As stated above, toilet is interpreted as Medium because it is what Bodhi wants to play
with or flush, making it the Goal. As it is an effective clause, the Goal is the Medium.
However, Mark often responds to Bodhi’s signing of ‘toilet’ as if Bodhi is asking
whether there is a toilet, which makes it more like an Existential clause:
(T2/E31)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (signs ‘toilet’)
MARK: No there won’t be toilets. There’s no toilets. [He’s giving the sign for toilets]. No
toilet at the chemist and there’s no toilets at the fish shop.
If we construe Bodhi’s above move as being like an elliptical Existential clause, then
‘toilet’ is still Medium, as it is like the Existent.
Bodhi expresses the Medium by either signing, as in the example above, pointing or
verbalising, if the Medium is the name of someone he can verbalise.
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Omission of self as Agent
As mentioned above, Bodhi primarily omits the Agent from his move. But if we examine
this in more detail, it fits into a larger picture that corresponds more closely with the
organising function of language, the textual metafunction, and will therefore be dealt with
in detail in the following chapter. However, in order to understand what is occurring
ergatively, it is necessary to show some of this here; that is, in terms of Given and New
information, Bodhi generally articulates what is New only. If the Agent is Bodhi himself,
then he is in the Given position, in the sense that he is the active participant, articulating
his own desires and actions. In other words, Bodhi, as Agent in his move, is not New, and
is left out. For example, when Bodhi signs ‘toilet’, he is asking whether he can flush or
play with the toilet.
(T2/E48)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (signs ‘toilet’)
MARK: Toilet um, yeah you can play, flush the toilet when you come home, when we go
home, not at the chemist shop. There’s no toilet at the chemist shop.
This shows Bodhi not expressing himself as the Agent in the move, only expressing that
which he wants, in this case the Medium, i.e. the toilet.
Omission of self as Medium
Correspondingly, when Bodhi is Medium, it is Medium that he leaves out. This can be
seen in the first move of the Mark transcript where Bodhi is telling his brother, Nadav
(Davi), that he is going in the car:
(T2/E1)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing car picture)
NADAV: You’re going in the car
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In this move, Bodhi only expresses the circumstance, which again, is the New
information. He, himself, is Given. As this elliptical move is like a middle clause, there is
no Agent, and Bodhi is the Medium.
As shown above, when there are moves where people other than Bodhi are the Agent or
Medium, they are expressed, as they are the New information. This can be seen in
Bodhi’s second move in the Mark transcript, where he is asking if Nadav (Davi) is
coming with them in the car:
(T2/E3)
BODHI: /1?i /3?i /2?i /?i/ (pointing at Nadav)
MARK: Yeah, Davi’s not coming
NADAV: No, Davi’s not coming
7.1.2 Summary of findings from the ergative model and voice
To summarise the findings from the application of the ergative model and the system of
voice, when communicating about himself, Bodhi omits referring to himself in his move,
either as Agent or Medium. However, when communicating about others, regardless of
their role, those others are included. What he most frequently expresses is whatever
occurs in the position of New. This is mostly constituted by the things he wants, whether
as a straightforward demand for goods-&-services, or as the dual move of giving
information plus demanding the linguistic service of articulation.
Bodhi’s omission of himself in all his moves where he is the active participant links to
Halliday’s (1994, p.44) observation about everyday conversation that the item that most
commonly occurs as the unmarked Theme (Subject/Theme) is the first person pronoun
“I” as much of our conversation concerns ourselves and what we think and feel. This is
true for Bodhi, only he omits the “I” (himself), which would occur as Subject in
unmarked Theme position. Thus the ergative model has firstly shown that in an effective
move Bodhi omits the Agent when it is himself, but not when it is others, and secondly,
that in both middle and effective moves, when the move is about himself, he generally
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expresses the Medium, Range, or a circumstance, depending on the context. Thirdly, the
ergative perspective has shown that Bodhi invariably does not express a Process.
7.2

Experiential meanings – the transitive model

This section will examine the constituents of the experiential metafunction that Bodhi
expresses. This includes which modes Bodhi uses to express experiential meanings and
how regularly he expresses them. The analysis for this section can be seen in Appendix 7.
Halliday (1994) divides the ideational metafunction into two parts: the experiential and
the logical. The experiential refers to how we represent our experiences in and of the
world, that is, the construal of experience into the clausal constituents: processes,
participants and circumstances. Processes refer to some process or event that unfolds in
time (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004); participants refer to those things that are involved in
the process, such as the people; and circumstances contain information that tells where,
when, how or why the process takes place. In English, the process is typically realised by
a verbal group; the participant is typically realised by a nominal group; and the
circumstance is typically realised by an adverbial group or prepositional phrase.
The logical part of the ideational metafunction refers to the connections between clauses
– that is, how clauses are related to other clauses. The reason this chapter only explores
the experiential component of the ideational metafunction is that, as mentioned earlier, in
any one turn, Bodhi generally only communicates one unit that is similar to one clause.
This renders the logical metafunction redundant; by communicating no more than one
unit per turn, there is no multiplicity of units of communication and therefore no
interclausal or inter-unit links to examine.
7.2.1 Perspectives on the clause
When presenting the analysis for the constituent structure of clauses, Halliday (1994)
describes major independent clauses. Major clauses refer to those that have thematic
structure (Halliday 1994). That is, it must be possible to identify a Theme and a Rheme,
which in turn, means that they need to have Transitivity constituents that can be
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identified as participants, processes or circumstances, and the Mood constituents of
Subject, Finite and Residue. Minor clauses are clauses that do not have these constituents.
They consist of exclamations, calls, greetings and alarms.
In order to explore the experiential meanings within a clause, one examines the
Transitivity constituents of processes, participants and circumstances. As Halliday (1994)
explains, “the concepts of process, participant and circumstance are semantic categories
which explain in the most general way how phenomena of the real world are represented
as linguistic structures” (p109). According to Halliday (1994), there are six different
process types: material, behavioural, mental, verbal, relational and existential. Halliday
clusters these process types into different groups: doing, sensing and being, reflecting the
external world around us, our internal experience of it and our ways of classifying that
world. Additionally, each process type has particular kinds of participant roles associated
with it. According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), Transitivity refers to both the
system of language that construes experiential meanings and also to one particular (and
particulate) way of viewing the structure of the clause as Actor plus Process, and plus or
minus Goal: “The Actor is construed as bringing about the unfolding of the Process
through time; and this unfolding is either confined in its outcome to the Actor or
extended to another participant, the Goal” (p.282). In other words, Transitivity is about
representing the world as doings, done by participants, and affecting other participants,
with each Process type having a different set of participant roles.
Transitivity constituents were identified in the same way that ergativity constituents were.
However, it must also be said, as is probably evident by now, that Bodhi does not express
many experiential meanings in his moves, which makes this section a little problematic,
clutching at straws, as it were. Therefore, this section will begin with a brief discussion of
the problems I have encountered in applying a metafunctional analysis to Bodhi’s
communication.
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7.2.2 Problems encountered in applying a metafunctional analysis
In order to discuss the problems in applying a metafunctional analysis, it is useful to
compare Bodhi’s expression of meaning with a speaker’s possible expression of the same
meaning. In a full clause in spoken English, if I were to ask whether I am able to flush the
toilet, I might use the words “Can I flush the toilet?” In uttering these words, I would
have construed three constituents from the system of Transitivity: Actor, Process and
Goal, as can be seen below:
Can
Pro…

I
Actor

flush
…cess: material

the toilet?
Goal

However, as shown, when Bodhi asks to flush the toilet, the only constituent he
expresses, via a sign, is the Goal, ‘toilet’. Furthermore, when he expresses ‘toilet’, it is
expressed alone, pared back of any other words that might identify or describe it, or build
on its meaning in any way, such as the reference item “the”. Expressing only one bare
constituent of experiential meaning is common for Bodhi, occurring in all the turns where
he expresses any experiential content at all. In fact, the most experiential content one
generally gets from Bodhi in any one turn is one constituent, and, as shown in the
previous section, it is likely to be a single non-agentive participant or a circumstance,
showing what Bodhi wants. Across the Dodo and Mark transcripts, expressing only one
constituent from the Transitivity system occurs 93 times out of 177 communicative turns
(53%). 18

18

At the time of writing, Bodhi is occasionally expressing two components of

experiential meaning. For example, when seeing a car that is the same type as his Dad’s,
he points to the car and says /dQd /dQd /. This occurs when Bodhi can verbally articulate
one of the meanings. Once most recently, Bodhi expressed a fuller move: when in the
bath, he moved to the back of the bath, then pointed at the bath picture, then pointed at
me – indicating he wanted me to get in the bath with him.
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There are complications in applying a particulate style of analysis to Bodhi’s
communication because Bodhi’s communication is not always particulate in structure.
These include the fact that some of Bodhi’s moves express what is akin to a whole clause
rather than one constituent. These occur a number of times in two situations across the
Mark and Dodo transcripts. The first situation is in the instances in the Mark transcript
where Bodhi grabs Mark’s sleeve whilst they are driving along, simultaneously saying /i/.
The combination of grabbing the communication partner’s sleeve in the car whilst
uttering /i/ construes what is akin to a whole clause, as it means “Where are we going?”
The second situation where this occurs is in the Dodo transcript when Bodhi drops his
spoon on the edge of his bowl as a request to have the bowl scraped so he can eat the last
bits of his breakfast. This is also akin to a whole clause that is something like a demand
for an action service of scraping the bowl. If we count all these moves as containing some
construal of experiential meaning, the number of moves with experiential meaning
increases to 93 out of 155 communicative turns, which is about 60 percent of all
communicative turns. Even so, this means that it in only slightly more than half the times
that Bodhi communicates does he express some content that is possible to analyse for
experiential meaning. Accordingly, this also means that 40 percent of the time in the
corpus there is no analysable experiential content. This is addressed below.
This 40 percent of moves where there seems to be no content analysable for experiential
meanings consists of 22 instances of laughing (14%); five instances of non-verbal
communication (3%), where Bodhi responds to the communication partner with an
action; and 33 moves (21%) where Bodhi seems to only communicate interpersonal
content, such as using the sound /i/ to indicate some kind of demand, but it seems that no
experiential content is expressed at all, although in a couple of instances this is because I
did not see any, but the communication partner may have. The residual four percent is
filled by moves that resemble minor clauses, such as greetings, like Bodhi waving
goodbye. Whilst these moves do not have any identifiable Transitivity constituents, as the
communication partner still responds to them and treats them as meaningful, they have
mostly been addressed in the previous chapter on the interpersonal metafunction,
however, they will be briefly revisited at the end of this chapter.
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A final point must be made with regard to the difficulty in applying a Transitivity
analysis to Bodhi’s moves and this relates to the ambiguity that is often part of Bodhi’s
moves. Whilst moves such as Bodhi’s signing of ‘toilet’ seem to be relatively clear in
terms of their expression of the constituent Goal, many moves are not so clear and it is
very difficult to be accurate about exactly what Transitivity constituent Bodhi is
expressing. For example, in the following piece of data from the Dodo transcript Bodhi
has been eating his porridge and medicine, but the medicine cup is now empty, as he has
had all the tablets. He points to the empty medicine cup whilst saying /n /n /ni /ni / (a
closed-mouth version of /i/).
(T1/E13)
BODHI: /5 n / 5 nn / 5 nn / 5 nn / (point tapping medicine cup)
DODO: Yes. They’ve all gone. All gone now.
BODHI: (resumes eating)
If we interpret, as Dodo did, that Bodhi is communicating that the medicine is all gone,
then there are a number of possible ways to analyse this move: we could say that it is like
a relational intensive attributive clause where “medicine” is the Carrier and “all gone” is
the Attribute, but this is problematic for two reasons: firstly, we are using Dodo’s
response to analyse Bodhi’s move as he doesn’t actually articulate “the medicine is all
gone” and could have just as easily been communicating “There’s no more medicine”.
This latter interpretation is more like an Existential Process, with “no more medicine”
being the Existent, or even, as he regularly omits expressing himself, he may have been
saying “I’ve finished my medicine”, in which case “medicine” is more like a Goal in a
material clause. What this illustrates is, that in a way, for this study, it is hard to be
accurate with a Transitivity analysis because Bodhi doesn’t construe the meanings in the
same way a speaker would. He is much less specific. Furthermore and, in a way more
importantly, a Transitivity analysis doesn’t really help in the sense that it doesn’t really
matter whether Bodhi’s pointing to the empty medicine cup construes a Carrier, an
Existent or a Goal. What is important is that his pointing to the empty medicine cup is
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seen as the realisation of the non-agentive participant, the New and the salient piece of
information, the thing that he is trying to give information about. This perhaps relates to
what Halliday (1996) calls indeterminacy, where “the world of our experience is highly
indeterminate” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, p.173).
Returning to the problem of interpreting Bodhi’s pointing to the empty medicine cup as a
relational intensive attributive clause where “medicine” is the Carrier and “all gone” is
the Attribute, ambiguity arises from how each constituent might be allotted its particular
meaning. This ambiguity arises because pointing to the cup simultaneously conveys both
the Carrier (the medicine) and the Attribute (all gone/finished), because the cup is empty.
It is therefore possible that Bodhi is expressing both participants Carrier and the Attribute
within the one gesture. This shows that it is not always a simple matter of mapping the
Transitivity constituents onto the components in Bodhi’s move, as there is not a simple
one to one relationship the way there is with words.
These considerations make it very difficult to straightforwardly apply a Transitivity
analysis to much of Bodhi’s communication. However, for those moves where it is
possible, it must be done in order to attempt to examine how he is able to reflect on and
represent the world around him.
The difficulty in applying a Transitivity analysis perhaps relates to the fact that Bodhi has
not developed a means of expressing meanings of experience using a particulate
structure. He does not have the ability to string particulate units of meaning together in
order. He does display a considerable grasp of the paradigmatic, both because he seems
to understand more language than he can produce, and due to his ability to select choices
from various systems, such as speech function. He also displays some understanding of
the syntagmatic, again through his ability to comprehend at least some of what is said to
him. However, he does not express meanings syntagmatically.
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The next section will cover those Transitivity constituents Bodhi seems to realise,
beginning with processes. This will be followed by a discussion of participants, and
finally circumstances.
7.2.3 Processes
As mentioned in the above section on ergativity, there are no instances across both the
Dodo and Mark transcripts where Bodhi expresses a process on its own. However, as
there are some moves which seem to express what is akin to a whole clause, these moves
in some ways contain the process. The process itself is not expressed separately, but as
part of the whole move, as shown in section 7.2.2 above.
There is one situation where a process could almost be construed and that is in Bodhi’s
use of the ‘finished’ picture. For example, when something is finished or over, such as a
song on a video that Bodhi is watching, or when Bodhi has finished having a bath (i.e. he
is out of the bath, the water is gone, and he is getting dried), he regularly points to the
picture ‘finished’ to tell that whatever it is, is finished. If we presume that Bodhi is
communicating something to the effect of “I am finished my bath”, we could say that he
is expressing a process, however, I think it is more likely he is expressing something like
“the bath is finished” or “the song is finished”, as it would not make sense to say “I have
finished the song”.19 Furthermore, it seems clear that what Bodhi is communicating

19

Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, p.224 - 226) discuss the domain of attribution in

detail, showing how to distinguish between relational and other types of clauses, such as
mental and material. The criteria they give for a clause being relational rather than
material are: if you can add a submodifier like so, very, or too, eg “the bath is nearly
finished”; if you can convert the clause into one with marked phase, such as “it seems
encouraging”, eg “the bath seems finished”; and finally in terms of tense, the quality will
appear in present tense if an Attribute, but in past tense if a Process in a material clause,
eg “The bath is finished” is attributive in present tense, whereas “The bath was finished
(by someone)” is past tense in a material clause. You don’t usually say “The bath is
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about is not himself, but the thing itself, i.e. the bath or the song. This being the case, then
“finished”, while a verb, is actually functioning more as an Attribute in a relational
clause, rather than a process.
However, regardless of whether Bodhi expresses processes or not, as will be
demonstrated, processes are still implied in the expression of the participants that
accompany them.
7.2.4 Participants
In order to examine which types of participants Bodhi expresses, this section will be
divided into the different process types. The agentive participants of each process will be
examined first, followed by the non-agentives.
Participants of material processes
There are four possible participants in a material clause: the active participant, Actor; the
participant which is affected by the action, the Goal; the participant over which the action
occurs, the Range; and the person who benefits from or receives the action, the
Beneficiary, as either the Recipient (the one to whom something is given) or Client (the
one for whom something is done).
Actor
Across the Dodo and Mark transcripts, Bodhi only expresses an Actor when it is someone
other than himself. Expression of an Actor occurs 4 times, and in these transcripts it is
always to do with who is coming with Bodhi when he is going somewhere. For example:
(T2/E29)
BODHI: /2 b√b /2 b√b / (Mum Mum)
MARK: Is Mum coming?

finished (by someone)”, when talking about having a bath. Thus, “The bath is finished”
seems to fit the relational attributive type of clause.
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BODHI: / 2 i-√ / (*Davi)
MARK: No Davi’s not coming. Mum’s not coming
In these cases, Bodhi expresses the Actor through vocalisation. The observation data
shows that in cases where Bodhi does not verbalise a person’s name, he will point to a
picture of a person and use the sound /i/, to ask about them. 20
As shown in the section on ergativity, in moves where Bodhi himself is Actor, he omits
himself, whilst expressing the Range, Goal or a circumstance.
Goal
Bodhi expresses what could be interpreted as Goal five times in the Mark transcript and
thirteen times, although some not so distinctly, in the Dodo transcript. In the Mark
transcript all the instances are of Bodhi signing ‘toilet’. I have interpreted these as Goal
because I am presuming, as the communication partner Mark did, that Bodhi is
requesting to flush the toilet. This correctness of interpretation is evident if compared to
the following example from my observation data, when Bodhi and I are traveling in the
car. In this exchange, Bodhi persists in communicating till he is satisfied that I have
interpreted his move correctly:
(O9)
BODHI: (grabs my arm) /i /i /
SHOOSHI: We’re going to pick up Davi at Chris’ house
BODHI: (signs toilet) /i /i / (intensely)
SHOOSHI: Yes, they’ve got a toilet
20

At the time of writing, Bodhi is attempting to verbalise many people’s names, although he only utters

three distinct vowel sounds, i, √ and U. Anybody whose name has a vowel sound that is a variation of i, is
expressed as /i/, likewise with √ and U. So, for example, Liz, Rhett and Ella are all expressed as /i/, whereas
Julie, Ruth and Don are expressed as /U/.
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BODHI: (signs toilet) /i /i / (intensely)
SHOOSHI: yes you can flush it
BODHI: (smiles)
In this example, I have initially interpreted Bodhi’s signing of toilet as a relational:
possessive clause, that is, as if he is asking whether they have a toilet, but clearly, this is
not what Bodhi is asking, as he replays with the same move, trying to get me to give him
a different response. I then respond as if the move is like a material clause, with toilet as
Goal, that is, as if he is asking to flush the toilet. He is then satisfied that I have
understood and responded correctly.
In the Dodo transcript, the Goals are not as clearly demarcated as this. For example, in
the first and third moves of the Dodo transcript, where the dialogue is about Bodhi taking
his medicine with his breakfast, I have interpreted Bodhi’s moves as expressing a Goal:
(T1/E1-4)
BODHI: /5 nn /5 nn /3 nn /1 nn /3 nn / (pointing to the medicine cup)
SHOOSHI: (explaining to Dodo whilst getting the medicine out and putting it on the table)
So just what you have to do is get him one out and just put it here and he’ll put it in and
then when he…
BODHI: /4 i/
DODO: Are you going to do that yourself? Go on. Yes, you show me.
BODHI: (puts his medicine in the porridge, scoops it up and eats it)
DODO: Oh very good. Good boy.
I have interpreted Bodhi’s first move as Goal because he is requesting that Dodo get the
medicine out of the cup and on to the table. While this might seem like a stretch in
interpretation, he is pointing to the medicine cup, which does have medicine in it, and he
usually has the medicine at the start of his breakfast, which is when this transcript begins.
Further, he vocalises using a combination of tones, including flattened or falling Tones 1
and 3. As shown in the previous chapter, these indicate a demand for goods-&-services.
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The problem with calling Bodhi’s pointing to the medicine cup Goal is that it presumes
that he is communicating something to the effect of “Give me the medicine” or “Can I
have the medicine please”, when he really could be meaning to say something like “ I
want the medicine”, which would make “medicine” a Phenomenon in a mental clause.
With Bodhi’s next move, it is not entirely clear what he is referring to as I only wrote
down that he was pointing to the medicine and I don’t know whether that means the
medicine that was put on the table or the medicine that is still in the cup. From the
context and Dodo’s response, it seems like he is pointing to the one on the table as she
asks whether he is going to do “that” himself, “that” referring to putting the medicine in.
But either way, the medicine could still be like a Goal in a material clause, if we imagine
Bodhi was saying something like “I’m going to put my medicine in” or “I’m going to
have my medicine”. This ambiguity once again points to the difficulty in applying
Transitivity to much of Bodhi’s communication: in these instances, it is inaccurate at
best.
Other examples that could be interpreted as Goal include the following, where Bodhi is
pointing to his cup to ask for a drink:
(T1/E28)
BODHI: /4 i /4 i/ (pointing to a cup)
DODO: But you had two drinks already
In this example, Bodhi could be expressing a Goal, if we interpret his move as something
like “Give me a drink”. Indeed this exchange was not completed till Bodhi was given a
drink, which verifies the interpretation. One can interpret this move in light of other
similar moves where Bodhi points to things like cups, and make an educated guess that
he is asking to be given a drink, therefore demanding a drink – which makes it seem more
material in type than either mental or relational. But again, it seems immaterial which one
it is, as long as the communication partner understands that a drink is what Bodhi is
asking for.
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Recipient or Client (Beneficiary)
There are no instances in the data of Bodhi expressing either type of Beneficiary.
However, in moves such as the one above where Bodhi is demanding a drink, there is an
implied Recipient as he is demanding a drink for himself.
Participants of mental processes
Mental processes have an active participant, Senser, which is a sensate being, and
Phenomenon, which is what is being sensed. There are four types of mental process:
cognitive, perceptive, desiderative and emotive (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004).
Cognitive relates to thinking; perceptive relates to mental perceptions of things, such as
seeing and hearing; desiderative relates to wanting; and emotive relates to feeling. The
main type that Bodhi expresses, via the Phenomenon, is desiderative, but again, this is
problematic, as it involves using not only Bodhi’s response as a guide, but the
communication partner’s response and the gloss. The above example where Bodhi asks
for a drink shows this.
Bodhi also sometimes expresses the emotive type of mental process, showing his likes,
through expression of the Phenomenon. For example:
(E1/T16)
BODHI: /2 i / 2 i / 2 i / (pointing at the bowl)
DODO: Do you like that bowl?
BODHI: /1 i hi-hi / (+ giggle)
In this example, Bodhi points to his bowl and says /i/. Dodo interprets this as Bodhi
saying something like “I like this bowl”. As Bodhi is happy with her response, we can
presume that that is what he has tried to communicate. Therefore, Bodhi’s pointing at the
bowl is like the expression of a Phenomenon in a mental emotive type move.
Across the two transcripts, Bodhi expresses a Phenomenon eight times (5%), and most of
these are problematic. As Senser in all of these eight moves, Bodhi omits himself, and
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there are no other instances of Bodhi expressing the Senser in the Dodo and Mark
transcripts. However, in the observation data there are examples that could possibly be
construed as Bodhi expressing a mental type move of perception. The example at the start
of this thesis from observation data collected when Bodhi, his younger bother Kai and
Shooshi are travelling in the car is quite typical of the way Bodhi offers comments on the
world around him. In this example, he has seen a car that looks like his grandparents’ car
in the side mirror and has made his noises for his grandparents, called ‘Nanny’ and
‘Nono’.
(O1)
BODHI:

(makes 2 sounds, one after the other that are his sounds for his
grandparents: a kind of tongue click for “Nono”, and an /i/ for
“Nanny”)

KAI:

Why is Bodhi saying “Nanny and Nono”?

SHOOSHI:

I don’t know. Bodhi what are you saying that for? (Starts to look around
for clues and in the rear vision mirror sees a car behind that is the same as
Nanny and Nono’s car).

SHOOSHI:

I think he’s seen a car behind us that’s the same as Nanny and Nono’s. He
must have seen it in the side mirror.

BODHI:

(turns around to look at the car behind when Shooshi says “behind”)

Shooshi:

Is that right Bodhi? Have you seen a car like Nanny and Nono’s behind
us?

BODHI:

(taps chest = ‘yes’ and smiles)

The first move of Bodhi’s which seems to identify a non-agentive participant, could be
seen as Bodhi communicating something like “I can see a car like Nanny and Nono’s”,
which would be a move of mental perception. However, it is hard to know whether it is
this exactly or something more like a relational identifying type move expressing
something about the car’s identity and not about Bodhi, eg “that car is like Nanny and
Nono’s car”. The difference between these moves is significant. As a mental perception
type move, it is a move that is about Bodhi and has Bodhi as the point of departure. As a
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relational move, it is a move about the world outside of Bodhi, a move that actively
constructs the world around him as apart from himself. At the time of writing, Bodhi
frequently points to cars as we pass them and makes the sound for someone’s name, if the
car is the same as one belonging to someone we know. When I respond to this kind of
move of Bodhi’s, I generally respond in the latter way, the way that separates Bodhi from
what he has seen. Bodhi is just as happy with that kind of response as he is with the
response above where I have asked him if he’s seen a car like Nanny and Nono’s. This
can be seen in the following example when Bodhi and I are driving along and he sees the
same kind of car as ours:
(O10)
BODHI: /dQd /dQd / (distal pointing towards another car)
SHOOSHI: Yeah, that car’s the same as Dad’s car.
BODHI: (silence)
Participants of behavioural processes
Behavioural processes have an active human participant, the Behaver, and when there is
another participant, it is the Range. There are no instances in the data of Bodhi expressing
any participants of behavioural processes.
Participants in verbal processes
Verbal processes have an active participant, Sayer, and where there is some verbiage, the
second participant is Verbiage. There are two other participants: Recipient, the person to
whom the Verbiage is directed, and the less common Target, which is “the entity that is
targeted by the process of saying” (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, p.256). There are no
instances in the data of Bodhi expressing any constituent of a verbal type clause.
Participants in relational processes
Relational processes are divided into two types attributive and identifying. These will be
discussed separately.
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Attributive relational processes
The attributive type has two participants: Carrier and Attribute, where the Attribute gives
some kind of feature to the Carrier, for example, “Those flowers are beautiful”. In this
clause, “Those flowers” is the Carrier and “beautiful” is the Attribute, as it ascribes the
feature of beauty to the flowers. There are no instances in the data of Bodhi expressing
either participant in this type of relational clause.
Identifying relational processes
The identifying type of relational process has two participants: Token and Value. The
Token is the thing being identified in the clause and the Value is the thing that identifies
it, for example: “That book is the one I like best”. In this clause, “That book” is being
identified, so it is the Token, and “the one I like best” is giving value to that book so it is
the Value.
There are 15 instances in the data of what can be interpreted as Bodhi expressing a Value,
and these are all where he points to things whilst saying /i/. For example:
(T2/E11)
BODHI: /3 i /2 i / (pointing to the steps)
MARK: That’s another step. That’s the last one.
(They continue walking)
In this example, it is as if Bodhi has multimodally identified the steps by pointing to
them. As he is identifying particular steps, and not any steps, I have interpreted this
move, and other moves like it, as identifying. The simultaneous utterance of /i/i/ is a
demand for Mark to respond by articulating the multimodal move in words. Satisfied
with Mark’s response, Bodhi moves on. 21

21

There is something to be said here about the difference between a communication act

and just an act, and this can be seen in this (and many other moves). Whenever Bodhi
communicates something he stops what he is doing. So the communication act is
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In this corpus, there are no clear instances where Bodhi construes a Value.
There are three subcategories of relational Processes: possessive, causative and
circumstantial, which may be either attributive or identifying. But since there are no
instances in the data of Bodhi expressing either, I will not go into them.

delineated from other acts because it replaces them. Since Bodhi uses his hands to
communicate, such as with gesturing or by using pictures, it is not surprising that this is
the case. As a result, it is clear when the communication act is over, and when an
exchange is finished. In the ‘steps’ example, Bodhi stops walking in order to
communicate something about the steps. When the communication is over, he resumes
walking. The resumption of the action that takes place before Bodhi communicates
signals that the communication partner has correctly interpreted Bodhi’s move,
otherwise, he reinitiates and does not resume the action. This can be seen in the Dodo
transcript where Bodhi replays 3 times before he resumes eating, that is, until he is
satisfied that Dodo has correctly interpreted his move:
(T1/E19)
BODHI: /5 i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: that’s a lovely bowl isn’t it?
BODHI: /5 i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: that’s your bowl. yes
BODHI: /2 i-hi-hi /2 i-hi-hi /2 i-hi i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: yes, d’you like that bowl?
BODHI: / ´h´h/ (giggly sound)
(Bodhi continues eating)
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Participants in existential processes
Existential processes have one participant, and that is the Existent. There are no instances
in the data of Bodhi expressing an Existent.
7.2.5 Circumstances
Circumstances are the third major constituent from the system of Transitivity. They
provide information about the process such as where it took place, when, how and why
etc. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) give nine types of circumstance, with subcategories totalling 22 sub-types. Of these, the only ones that Bodhi expresses in the data
are those that provide information about place22. However, Bodhi’s expression of
circumstance is not always straightforward as, sometimes, when he expresses one, it
contains more meaning than just the circumstantial element.
Circumstance: spatial location
In the Mark transcript, Bodhi expresses what can be interpreted as a circumstance of
spatial location 19 times, indicating his interest in where they are going.
(T2/E35)
BODHI: /5 i-i* /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /
MARK: No, no escalators today. Not escalators
(*Bodhi’s sound for escalators)
Many expressions of circumstance are questions about where they are going. For
example:
(T2/E34)

22

At the time of writing, Bodhi is expressing the time construct ‘now’, by stamping one

foot. For example, if he wants to do something and we tell him that he can do it later, he
stamps his foot to indicate he wants to do it now. I have checked with him whether that is
what he is communicating and he has tapped his chest to indicate it is.
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BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (grabs Mark’s sleeve)
MARK: We’re going to the chemist shop to get your medicine. Then we’ll go to the fish
shop. [He’s grabbing my arm]. So let go of my arm.
In these instances there is more than an expression of the circumstance within the one
gesture, as the grabbing of the sleeve coupled with the utterance of the sound /i/ with a
rising tone contains the whole question, “Where are we going?” However, I have labelled
these as a type of circumstance of spatial location because the thrust of the question being
asked is circumstantial in nature, and the focus or salience of the message is “Where?”
In addition to these examples, there are seven other instances of circumstances of spatial
location in the data, all of which occur in the Dodo transcript, such as the following:
(T1/E14)
BODHI: /2 nn / 2 nn / 2 nn / (contact pointing bowl)
DODO: You’re eating your porridge. Yes
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing bowl)
DODO: in your bowl
BODHI: (giggles)
DODO: Yes
BODHI: (giggles and then continues to eat)
In this example Bodhi is pointing to his bowl whilst in the middle of eating his breakfast.
From her response, it seems that Dodo thinks Bodhi is telling her that he’s eating his
breakfast. But as Bodhi replays the move, Dodo tries a different response, interpreting
that he has told her that he is eating his porridge in his bowl, so that the main thrust of the
move is about what Bodhi’s eating out of, not the fact that he is eating. Bodhi giggles and
resumes eating, showing his satisfaction with Dodo’s response, which verifies that she
has interpreted his move correctly.
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Other instances in the data where Bodhi expresses a circumstance of spatial location are
more ambiguous, as they are when he is talking about somewhere that is not within arm’s
reach, and that he has no sign or picture for. The way Bodhi often identifies a place
which is not within arm’s reach or that is more distant than an arm’s length away, is with
a distal point - an open palm, facing downwards on an outstretched arm, held in the
direction of the place. For example:
(T1/E53)
BODHI: /pretonic + 1 i-hi i i i / (distal point in the direction of the kitchen)
DODO: No. I’m not going in there now.
In this exchange Bodhi has pointed towards the kitchen to indicate something about the
kitchen as a place. Dodo has clearly interpreted this as a directive to go to the kitchen, or
a question about whether she is going to the kitchen.
As Bodhi generally only expresses one meaning per move, many of his moves that
express some circumstantial aspect of meaning are most ambiguous. This is due to the
fact that if the circumstance is being expressed, it is at the expense of the expression of
any other constituent such as participant or process. This can be clearly seen in the
example directly above where Bodhi has pointed to the kitchen, however he has not
expressed anything about who is doing what in the kitchen. Also, with the earlier example
of Bodhi pointing to his bowl as an expression of circumstance of spatial location, Dodo
initially thinks Bodhi is talking about himself eating his porridge. It is quite logical that
Dodo would think this because he is actually eating. It is a much bigger stretch to jump to
circumstance at that point, particularly when Bodhi expresses both possibilities by
pointing to his bowl and saying /i/.
In other words, Bodhi’s expression of circumstance is often unclear, unless he has a
picture to point to. While there are no examples in the Dodo and Mark transcripts of
Bodhi using pictures to express circumstances of spatial location, there are in the
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observation data, such as the example below, from when Bodhi and I are travelling in the
car together:
(O11)
BODHI: /i /i / (intense) (grabs my arm)
SHOOSHI: You tell me where we’re going
BODHI: (looks down at pictures, then contact points escalators picture and looks at
me)
SHOOSHI: That’s right. We’re going to the escalators
BODHI: (contact points escalators picture) /i /i / (excitedly)
SHOOSHI: Yeah, we’re going to the escalators
BODHI: hii
In this example, Bodhi has grabbed my arm whilst simultaneously uttering /i /i / to ask
where we are going. Since I have just told him where we are going a few minutes before
this, I know that he knows the answer to the question he has just asked so I ask him to tell
me where we are going. He does so by pointing to the escalators picture. After providing
me with the answer, he is then very excited about this and tells me all over again that we
are going to the escalators.23
7.3

Discussion

In this chapter I have explored Bodhi’s communication from the perspective of the
experiential metafunction, through the systems of Ergativity and Transitivity. The
ergativity analysis showed that Bodhi generally only expresses one constituent per move,
23

At the time of writing, Bodhi has a heightened interest in where he is going. It is

something he asks about or checks on each morning, soon after he has risen, using
pictures and sounds. For example, he goes to the poster on the wall that has pictures of
his teachers and classmates on it, and point to his favourite teacher, to ask if he will be
going to school today to see her.
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and that it is never a process. When in the position of the active participant, Bodhi always
omits himself but will include others in this position by pointing to them or a picture of
them or attempting to say their name. Bodhi’s main focus is on the non-agentive
participants such as Medium or Range, or circumstances. Thus ergativity analysis is seen
to be useful in this context as it enables one to see which constituents Bodhi expresses
across the process types. It also shows that Bodhi conforms to what Halliday (1994)
observes about ‘typical’ everyday conversations, that is, that much of the focus in our
conversations is about ourselves, and so we, and he, feature as the active participant.
In relation to Bodhi’s omission of process, I return to Halliday’s (1994, p.165) statement
that is cited above: “Every process has associated with it one participant that is the key
figure in that process; this is the one through which the process is actualised, and without
which there would be no process at all” (my emphasis). I have emphasised the second
part of this sentence as it possibly sheds a certain light on the nature of Bodhi’s very
restricted communication. Halliday (1994, 2004) notes that, whilst the nucleus of the
clause is both the Process and the Medium, without the Medium there would be no
Process at all. This points to the importance of the Medium as perhaps being more or at
least equally significant to the Process. Whilst the Process may be nuclear to the clause,
what is interesting to note is that although Bodhi does not express it, it is most often
retrievable through collocation, specifically from the other constituents that are
expressed. For example, if he wants to play the guitar, he points to the guitar picture or, if
he wants to flush the toilet, he signs ‘toilet’. It is relatively easy to guess that he wants to
play the guitar not flush it, and flush the toilet, not eat it, as we, the communication
partners have enough knowledge of both the world and language that allows us to
presume this. Whereas, if Bodhi communicated ‘play’, the communication partner would
be left to work out “play what?” Thus, it is the Medium in these cases that seems to be
the nuclear constituent of the move.
With circumstantial information, the informed communication partner can mostly guess
from collocation or the context of Bodhi’s life what process is to occur with the
circumstance. For instance, if Bodhi points to the ‘escalators’ picture, one can guess that
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he wants to go there and go on them, not eat them nor flush them etc. However, if he
pointed to a ‘go’ or a ‘ride’ picture, one would be left guessing “go where?” or “ride
what?”
As Bodhi does not express the process, the question remains as to whether there is a
nucleus in Bodhi’s moves, and how it is to be identified. It seems to be the case that if
there is a nucleus, then it surely has to be the thing he most frequently expresses, which is
the most salient and least ambiguous thing, and that which he wants to communicate
about. This is generally the non-agentive participant, because, as explained above, it is
usually possible to guess what the process is from the participant. I will thus argue that
the nucleus of Bodhi’s move is the information that is crucial to the meaning being
conveyed, that which can’t be guessed without much further probing. In the case of
moves that have no circumstance and where Bodhi is the active participant, the nucleus is
the non-agentive participant such as Medium or Range. In the case of moves that have
circumstantial information such as “where”, the nucleus is the circumstance.
What is common amongst these moves of Bodhi’s is that they all present New
information. They have one of a number of constituents, but never the Process, only
occasionally the Agent and often the non-agentive participant. Thus, it is possible that it
is through the textual metafunction that we can identify a nucleus. This will be explored
in more detail in the next chapter.
In terms of Transitivity, this chapter showed that some of Bodhi’s moves express what is
akin to a whole clause worth of experiential meaning, whereas others express only one
element. It was also shown to be difficult at times to be accurate about exactly which
Transitivity constituents Bodhi was trying to express and that it was not a straightforward
case of mapping the Transitivity constituents onto the components of Bodhi’s moves as
there is not always a simple one to one relationship between them. Where Bodhi does
express a Transitivity constituent, it is mostly all retrievable from the immediate material
context, which grounds Bodhi’s communication in the here-and-now, and the concrete
world. The only instances where Bodhi moves beyond the here-and-now are in the
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expression of meanings about time in the future. In the corpus, these are all expressed by
a linguistic semiotic mode, such as a sign. For example, when Bodhi asks if there will be
toilets where they are going, he uses the sign for ‘toilet’.
In terms of the individual process types, Bodhi was shown to only express the Actor in a
material move when it was someone other than himself. Bodhi was shown in some
instances to be relatively clearly expressing the Goal, such as signing ‘toilet’ when asking
if he’ll be able to flush the toilet. However, in other instances, such as when he is
pointing to a cup, it was unclear if the constituent being expressed was a Goal, or
possibly a non-agentive participant from another process type. In total, around 33 percent
of Bodhi’s moves are of the material type.
Bodhi was shown to express constituents from two types of mental moves: emotive and
desiderative. These account for a mere six percent of moves. In the emotive type, Bodhi
expressed the Phenomenon, showing his liking for certain things. In the desiderative type,
Bodhi expressed wanting something. There are no moves that contain the cognitive type,
nor the perceptive type, perhaps reflecting the severity of Bodhi’s intellectual disability.
Relational type moves make up 11 percent, as Bodhi often likes to label things in his
environment. However, it is not clear which participant is being expressed, as by pointing
to the thing he is labeling, Bodhi expresses aspects of both participants of a relational
move. There are no instances of Bodhi expressing constituents from behavioural, verbal
or existential type moves.
If we examine Bodhi’s moves in terms of the semiotic space he inhabits, or represents
himself as inhabiting, it shows that he is predominantly concerned with the physical
world, the world of doing. His ability to represent himself as sensing the world is
predominantly about him wanting things, but also about his preference for certain things.
He also sometimes describes the world in terms of the relations between things. But all
these things are very much contingent upon or embedded within the concrete world.
Bodhi does not express a world about saying, thinking or verbalising things. In other
words, his language is ancillary rather than constitutive (Halliday & Hasan 1985). The
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question is, whether this lack of expressing a more abstract world is because of Bodhi’s
severe intellectual disability, or because of his lack of speech language, or both. It is a
chicken and egg situation, where it is hard to say which one, if any comes first, or
whether there is some kind of interweaving between them, and together they limit his
ability to engage with the world in a more abstract way. This thesis does not even attempt
to answer these questions, and only uses the theory as evidence for showing that the
semiotic space Bodhi inhabits is restricted to communicating about things co-present in
the surrounding material environment.
At this point I return to part of the 40 percent of moves that do not have any identifiable
Transitivity constituent but can still be somehow accounted for within this dimension,
beginning with laughter, which constitutes 13 percent of his moves. Whilst laughter was
addressed in the previous chapter in terms of function, here it is examined in terms of
content. That is to say, it is explored in terms of what Bodhi is communicating in terms of
the representation of his experience when he has a turn that is constituted by laughter.
As discussed in the previous chapter, all Bodhi’s turns of laughter can be said to convey
Bodhi’s happiness or pleasure about something. In some cases, the communication
partner responds more specifically to what they perceive is the content of the move, that
is, a proto-declarative expression of pleasure. This can be seen in the following example
where Mark interprets Bodhi’s laughter as expressing pleasure or liking for Bruce and the
fact that they will see him the next morning.
(T2/E54-55)
MARK: You like Bruce?
BODHI: hi (laughish)
MARK: I think you do
BODHI: h h h (laugh)
MARK: Tomorrow. In the morning
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So in terms of Transitivity, whilst there are no constituents expressed in laughter, it does
convey Bodhi’s pleasure or happiness, and can be interpreted in this light – which is what
the communication partners do. The accounts of laughter in SF theory and in the AAC
literature (such as Light 1985b) are not sufficient here. As mentioned, Light et al (1985a)
include laughter in a general category called ‘Expressions of self’, such as laughter and
crying. But as Eggins and Slade (1997) point out, laughter does serious interpersonal
work. I venture to say that within the nonverbal context, each person’s laughter and
almost each instance of laughter needs to be examined on its own terms, as Eggins and
Slade (1997) do in their treatment of it in casual conversation. Mclean et al (1993) have
applied concepts from speech act theory (Austin 1962) to describe or characterise the
behaviours of people with severe intellectual disabilities as either being perlocutionary,
meaning that they do not understand that their behaviour has effects on those around
them, or illocutionary, meaning that they have an awareness of and an intentionality
about their behaviour. Whilst Bodhi’s communication behaviour is generally
illocutionary, his laughter could be construed as perlocutionary in that he may not
intentionally be trying to have an effect on the communication partner, but as Light et al
(1985b) describe, is simply expressing an ‘expression of self’. As stated in the previous
chapter, in terms of a cline of semiosis, laughter is one of the less linguistically semiotic
modes of Bodhi’s communication, but it is still, nevertheless, semiotic, communicating
that Bodhi is happy. It still functions as a communicative turn in the conversation, which
the communication partner responds to. It has perlocutionary force as a proto-declarative.
However, the laughter does not provide any more information for the communication
partner. It does not explicitly show what Bodhi is happy about, and this is left to the
communication partner to find out. This can be seen in the following example (which is
the continuation of the above exchange about Bruce), where Mark checks with Bodhi
what he is happy about:
(T2/E56)
BODHI: he he (laugh)
MARK: Yeah. Tomorrow Bruce will come. Is that what you’re happy about? Yes? Is that
what you’re happy about? Bruce? Wanna see Bruce tomorrow?
183

BODHI: (chest taps = ‘yes’)
MARK: Yes, he’s going yes. Bruce with his banjo. The banjo…
To conclude this exploration of laughter from an experiential perspective, I turn to the
notion of the joint negotiation or construction of meaning, which is explored in more
detail in subsequent chapters. In order to establish the experiential dimension of Bodhi’s
laughter, that is to say, in order to find out what Bodhi is laughing about, the
communication partner uses confirmation questions, which means the meaning is being
jointly constructed by the communication partner and Bodhi, via transmodalisation.
Exploring Bodhi’s communication in terms of the experiential metafunction points to a
cline in Bodhi’s expression of experiential meanings from most explicit to most implicit.
The most explicit is where he expresses some experiential aspect (and most often that is
the non-agentive participant) and the least explicit is where he does not provide any
indication of the experiential content, and the communication partner has to glean the
meaning from three places: the surrounding material environment; a knowledge of Bodhi
and his life; and a shared knowledge of language. Each of these plays a part in the joint
construction of meaning.
Therefore in order for Bodhi to make meaning there needs to be four things: the first, is
some kind of move from Bodhi; the second, is an understanding of language and culture
on the part of the communication partner; the third, is an understanding and knowledge of
Bodhi and his life on the part of the communication partner; and the fourth is a
willingness on the part of the communication partner to engage in the process of joint
negotiation of meaning. It is therefore in a way myopic to view Bodhi’s output alone as
the sum total of his communication. Halliday’s metafunctional theory is focused on an
individual’s output, but clearly in the case of Bodhi, the communication partner’s efforts
are a crucial part of Bodhi’s meaning making. Further, and as discussed in Chapter 2,
within the field of AAC, being able to account for the communication partner’s
contributions to the meaning making process is identified as a fundamental aspect to the
examination of multimodal communication (Bedrosian 1997). Therefore, following the
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next chapter on the textual metafunction, Chapter 8 uses Exchange Structure Analysis
(ESA) to examine the communication partner’s contributions in more detail.
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 8
THE DESCRIPTION OF BODHI’S SYSTEM WITHIN THE TURN
PART 3 - THE TEXTUAL METAFUNCTION

8.0

Introduction

This chapter explores the meanings Bodhi makes from the perspective of the textual
metafunction. As discussed in Chapter 3, the textual metafunction is the organising or
“enabling” metafunction of language. It exists as a feature of language itself, organising
meanings into coherent texts and giving texts texture (Halliday 1979). Ontogenetically, it
is the last metafunction to come into being. There are two aspects to the textual
metafunction, the first being the resources of the system of Theme and Information
Status, and the second being the system of Cohesion. The chapter will explore these in
turn.
Halliday (1979) describes the textual organisation of a text or message in English as
being to do with prominence. In the beginning of a message there is the prominence that
identifies what the speaker is speaking about. Halliday (1994) calls this the Theme of the
message, specifically defining it as “the point of departure of the message… that with
which the clause is concerned” (p.37). At the end of the message there is another point of
prominence, the salient, which is where the tonic accent occurs, and where the new
information is typically located. The flow of these prominences forms a wavelike
structure and creates the texture of the message or text. As Halliday (1979) explains,

186

The effect of this is to give a periodicity to the discourse. The clause, in its
status as a message, begins with prominence of one kind, thematic
prominence, and ends with prominence of another kind, prominence due
to information focus. (p.69)
With regard to speech, the textual metafunction is concerned with the unfolding of words
in time. With regard to writing, it is concerned with the unfolding of words on the page.
One of the ways to examine this unfolding in both spoken and written language is
through a Theme/Rheme analysis.
8.1

Theme/Rheme analysis

The application of a Theme/Rheme analysis to Bodhi’s moves has shown that there is no
Theme expressed in almost every move. What is expressed instead is in the Rheme (see
Appendix 6). However, a Theme can still be implied, as shown in the previous chapters,
where Bodhi generally only communicates one constituent per move, other constituents
are implied. This is evident in the numerous moves where although Bodhi omits himself
as the active participant, he is still implied in the move. For example, from the Mark
transcript, when he asks about whether they are going to the escalators, or from the Dodo
transcript, when he tells Dodo that he likes his bowl:
(T2/E35)
BODHI: /5 i-i* /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /5 i-i /
MARK: No, no escalators today. Not escalators
(*Bodhi’s sound for escalators)
(T1/E16)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (pointing at the bowl)
DODO: Do you like that bowl?
BODHI: /1 i / hi-hi (+ giggle)
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In both examples above, Bodhi himself is Thematic. That is, he is asking if he (or they)
are going to the escalators, and he is expressing his liking for the bowl, but this is not
expressed. What is expressed is in the Rheme, the place he wants to go to – the
escalators, and the thing that he likes – the bowl. These expressions correspond with what
Halliday would call the second point of prominence, the salient. So in terms of the textual
organisation of Bodhi’s move, all he expresses is what is new and salient. In comparison
with speech, where there is a continuous wave-like movement from the salient, or strong,
through to weak and so on, in Bodhi’s communication, there are no troughs, only peaks
of salience, containing the one core thing he wants to communicate about. This is
expressed with an utterance, if he has a word for it, such as Dad or Mum, or by a gesture,
such as pointing. If it is expressed via a gesture, it is coupled with the sound /i/, which
identifies its salience. For example, if Bodhi is saying /i/ whilst pointing at something,
such as the bowl in the example above, the /i/ serves to identify the bowl as the salient
piece of information. Thus, there is an intersection between the sound /i/ and the
expression of whatever other mode is being expressed in the same move. It is as if Bodhi
is saying, at that point, something like “I want to ask or tell you something about the
bowl”.24
As described in the previous chapter, there are a small number of moves that seem to
contain what is akin to a whole clause. These moves therefore contain all parts of the
move, both Theme and Rheme, although neither is distinctly expressed in a linear manner
as in spoken English (Halliday 1994). For example, when Bodhi says /i/ and grabs
Mark’s sleeve to ask where they are going, it is as if Bodhi is asking “Where are we
going?”. Whilst Bodhi is not saying this in words, this is what he is asking. The grabbing
of the sleeve coupled with /i/ means “Where are we going?” As this is interpreted through
the communication partner’s own semiosis, it is understood to contain both Theme and
Rheme.

24

As discussed in Chapter 5, Bodhi uses the sound /i/ in 61 percent of all moves in both

the Dodo and Mark transcripts. If taking initiations alone, Bodhi uses the sound /i/ 87
percent of the time.
188

8.2

The system of information status

As the salient is the sum total of what Bodhi expresses, it is the system of information
status that is able to shed a different light on his communication. The system of
information status is a system of a grammatical unit called the information unit. In this
system, information exists as a “tension between what is already known or predictable
and what is new or unpredictable” (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, p.89). The known
and predictable is called Given, whilst the new and unpredictable is called New, and it is
this New information that is the salient piece. According to Halliday (1979) the speaker
puts what is new information at the end, whereas the information that is known is
generally put at the beginning in the Theme. The Theme, he says, is speaker oriented in
that it is where the speaker identifies what s/he is on about, but the New is heareroriented. Therefore, it can be construed that Bodhi’s moves are hearer-oriented.
Moreover, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) say that the idealised form of each
information unit consists of one of each element, Given and New, but that as discourse
has to start somewhere, there are discourse-initiating units that are made up of a New
element only. Further, as the Given element often tends to be phoric, referring either to
something that is present elsewhere in the text, or to something that is present in the
surrounding environment, Matthiessen and Halliday (2004) conclude that the structure of
the information unit consists of one obligatory element only, The New, with the Given
element being optional.
This is a useful way of viewing Bodhi’s moves, since he expresses only the salient. We
can reframe this expression of the salient by saying that he expresses only the New
information, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. As Halliday and Matthiessen
(2004) state, the Given is, or should be, retrievable from the verbal or non-verbal context.
In Bodhi’s case, the Given is not retrievable from the verbal context, but from the nonverbal context, which includes both the surrounding material environment, and the
context of Bodhi’s life, that is, from a knowledge and understanding of who Bodhi is, and
what his likes and dislikes are and so on.
189

It can then be said, that each of Bodhi’s moves could be viewed as an information unit
consisting of the obligatory element of New only, with the Given being implied.
However, this does not complete the picture, as Bodhi does not express all of what is
New, leaving some or even much of it, such as the process, for the communication
partner to retrieve from other sources. For example, in the above exchange where Bodhi
is pointing to his bowl, while the pointing identifies what he wants to talk about, that is, it
shows he wants to talk about the bowl, there is no indication by him of what it is he wants
to say about the bowl. This is left to the communication partner to guess at, and as can be
seen in other examples in the Dodo transcript, such as the one below, it can be a drawn
out process, only finishing when Bodhi has confirmed that the communication partner
has understood and articulated what he was trying to communicate correctly:
(T1/E19)
BODHI: /5 i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: that’s a lovely bowl isn’t it?
BODHI: /5 i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: that’s your bowl. yes
BODHI: /2 i-hi-hi /2 i-hi-hi /2 i-hi i / (pointing to the bowl)
DODO: yes, d’you like that bowl?
BODHI: /´h´´ / (giggly sound)
(Bodhi continues eating)
If we could say that in this exchange, Bodhi is trying to tell Dodo that he likes the bowl,
he himself is Given, but both the process “liking” and the second participant,“bowl” are
New. As Bodhi only expresses “bowl” by pointing, Dodo has trouble recovering the
process, and it takes her three attempts to get it right.
To reframe then, Bodhi’s moves generally consist of a partial expression of the New. In
moves where he is the Given, that is, the active participant, such as in the example above,
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the New is located in the Rheme of the move. In moves where another person is the
active participant, such as in the example below where Bodhi asks whether others are
coming in the car, the New occurs in Theme position, but this is much less common,
occurring only four times across both the Dodo and Mark transcripts:
(T2/E29)
BODHI: /2 b√b /2 b√b / (= Mum Mum)
MARK: Is Mum coming?
BODHI: /2 i-√h /(= his brother Davi)
MARK: No, Davi’s not coming. Mum’s not coming.
This example also shows a partial realisation of the New, as Bodhi only expresses the
people, Mum and Davi, and not the process “coming”, which has to be retrieved from the
context.
In moves where there is no active participant, such as relational type moves, Bodhi
generally expresses the rhematic participant, or even both participants. This can be seen
in the moves where he is pointing to something and saying /i/ wanting, it seems to get the
communication partner to articulate what that thing is:
(T2/E8)
BODHI: /1 i /5 i /2 i / (contact pointing the hanging door beads)
MARK: Yes, that’s the beads
This type of example shows that what is both New and salient is constituted by the beads.
In Mark’s articulation, they are rhematic, but this is not entirely clear in Bodhi’s move. A
similar example shows this ambiguity when Bodhi points to the beads again, and Mark
only says “beads” and nothing else. Bodhi is still happy with the answer, so we can
presume that sometimes, the salient in Bodhi’s move is a single nominal element:
(T2/E9)
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BODHI: /5 ii / (contact pointing the hanging door beads)
MARK: Yeah. Beads
8.3

Summary

Thus far, what can be said about Bodhi’s expression of the textual metafunction of
language is:
1. that he only expresses the salient part of his move, which is in the New, and not
the Given;
2. that when he is the active participant in his move, he expresses the rhematic New
only;
3. that when others are the active participant, he typically expresses thematic New;
4. that when there is no active participant, he expresses just the salient, which may
be rhematic;
5. that this is what infants and people in desperate situations do: I am reminded of
the story of the parched person crawling through the desert calling “water, water”,
and not “I need water”. We have no trouble understanding that the person wants a
drink of water, although they only say “water.”
But there is more to say about the texture of Bodhi’s communication, and for that I turn
to the system of Cohesion.
8.4

Cohesion

Halliday (1985c, p.48) defines Cohesion as “the set of linguistic resources every language
has (as part of the textual metafunction) for linking one part of a text to another. As he
explains:
A text is characterised by coherence; it hangs together. At any point
after the beginning, what has gone before provides the environment
for what is coming next (p.48).
Further, Halliday and Hasan (1976) state that what distinguishes a text from something
that is not a text is that a text has texture. Texture is how a text functions as a united piece
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of discourse. In keeping with SF theory’s focus on semantics, Cohesion is seen to be a
semantic concept, referring to how the meanings in a text are related to one another.
In terms of this thesis, these above definitions need to be problematised as Cohesion is a
system that is internal to language itself, that is to say, internal to the lexicogrammar, and
Bodhi does not have a lexicogrammar. However, the conversations with Bodhi that
constitute the Dodo and Mark transcripts are not non-texts: they hang together containing
meanings that relate to one another. Both Bodhi’s and the communication partners’
moves contribute to the texture, however in Bodhi’s case, it is not strictly through the
typical realisations from the system of Cohesion. This section will examine the cohesive
features of the conversations with Bodhi that unify the meanings and provide texture.
In order to examine the Cohesion within a text, one traditionally looks at the cohesive
devices (Halliday and Hasan 1976). There are four sets of cohesive devices in English:
conjunction, reference, ellipsis and substitution, and lexical cohesion. Reference, ellipsis
and substitution, and conjunction are types of grammatical cohesion, whereas lexical
cohesion focuses on the cohesion achieved through the lexis, the vocabulary items in a
text. These will be explored in turn.
8.4.1 Conjunction
Conjunction is a system that contributes to the cohesion of a text by establishing links
and relationships between parts of a text, such as between clauses and clause complexes.
Conjunction differs from the other lexical devices because is about the links between
complete clauses whereas the other lexical devices link parts of clauses to each other. As
Bodhi generally makes what is akin to one clause per move, he does not express any
items from the system of Conjunction within any one turn. However, sometimes Bodhi
strings meanings together in a way that seems to point to some implicit expression of
conjunctive links. The complicating factor is that he demands the communication partner
articulate his meanings back to him after each move, so his moves occur in pairs with the
communication partner’s. This can be seen in the example below when Bodhi and one of
his carers, Liz, are preparing to go out:
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(O12/T4)
BODHI: /i /i / (contact pointing car picture)
LIZ: Yeah, we are going in the car, but first, we have to get dressed
BODHI: /i /i / i / (contact pointing walk picture)
LIZ: Show me
BODHI: (shows walk card whilst contact pointing it)
LIZ: A walk. D’you wanna go for a walk?
BODHI: (contact pointing car picture)
LIZ: D’you wanna go in my car?
BODHI: (contact pointing ladder picture)
LIZ: The ladder. Yep the ladder
BODHI: /i /i / (contact pointing guitar picture)
LIZ: Yeh the guitar. We won’t play the guitar now…what else?
BODHI: /i /i /hi / (contact pointing some picture)
LIZ: Guitar?
BODHI: /i / (contact pointing computer picture)
LIZ: That’s the um rabbit game
BODHI: (contact pointing bike picture)
LIZ: Bike
BODHI: /i /i / (points to car picture)
LIZ: Yep. We’re going in the car
In this example, Bodhi points to one picture after another, creating a kind of string of
meanings. It seems he is not demanding to go to these places because when Liz checks
with him, he does not answer her but instead points to the next card. His mission seems to
be to make conversation, not actually ask for these things. While it is a stretch to call
these evidence of the system of Conjunction, there is some kind of linking happening
here. If we consider the implicit relations, it could be said that in between each move it is
possible to insert the word “and”. Thus something like “we are/are we going in the car
AND we are/are we going for a walk etc.
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8.4.2 Reference
Reference describes the way words in a text refer to one another. Halliday and Hasan
(1976) explain reference items as “instead of being interpreted semantically in their own
right, they make reference to something else for their interpretation” (p31). Reference is
divided into two categories: endophoric, or those reference items that exist within the text
itself, and exophoric, which are those that exist outside the text. Endophoric reference is
further divided into anaphoric, which points backwards to something earlier in the text,
and cataphoric, which points to something forward in the text.
The kinds of devices that are found in the system of reference include pronouns, definite
articles, demonstratives and comparatives. There are no instances in the data of Bodhi
using any of the above items.
However, as shown in previous chapters, Bodhi does point to things, and in doing so,
expresses an experiential aspect of meaning. However, it is hard to say that Bodhi’s
pointing is reference, as all the linguistic devices that are referential are grammatical
items that exist within a text and Bodhi does not express grammatical items. It is more
likely that his pointing contributes to some kind of lexical cohesion.
8.4.3 Lexical cohesion
Lexical cohesion refers to the connections between the lexical words in a text, or as
Halliday and Hasan (1976, p.274) put it, lexical cohesion is “the cohesive effect achieved
by the selection of vocabulary”. There are two general categories to describe the
relationship between lexical items: reiteration and collocation. Reiteration involves the
repetition of a lexical item through either repeating the exact word, using a synonym, a
near-synonym, a general word or a superordinate. This includes the categories of
hyponymy, which is class and subclass relations, and meronymy, which describes kinds
of things within a set.
Collocation refers to lexical items that regularly co-occur, such as dog and bone, or dog
and bark. Collocation is where there is some cohesion “between any pair of lexical items
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that stand to each other in some recognisable lexicosemantic (word meaning) relation”
(Halliday & Hasan 1976, p.285).
There is some evidence of a lexical cohesion of sorts in the corpus, however, it is not
exactly lexical cohesion because Bodhi mostly does not produce lexis. However, as
shown, he does express some experiential meaning via the modes of vocalisation, sign
and pointing, and there is some measure of consistency in the identification of those
experiential meanings. This can be construed to be experientially cohesive. It is this
notion of experiential cohesiveness that is perhaps a more appropriate term than lexical
cohesion.
However, even this kind of cohesion is limited as most of Bodhi’s moves occur in pairs,
where he demands something and the communication partner supplies it. That is to say,
experiential items are not carried across more than a pair of turns, unless there is an
interruption to the exchange, such as a misunderstanding, which needs to be resolved for
the exchange to be completed. There is no extended conversation with Bodhi, and this
can be seen in the way the experiential items that Bodhi expresses are not developed or
extended by him across longer sets of moves. This accords with the findings of Fine et al
(1994), who explored the cohesive links used by children with Autism Spectrum
Disorder. Similarly to these children, Bodhi’s conversation refers mostly to the physical
world around him and not to previous text that has occurred in conversation. Fine et al
(1994) state that “this tends to make it difficult to build a reciprocal conversation, since to
a large extent, reciprocity is built by referring to previous conversation not by referring to
the physical environment” (p.325).
Generally, the type of experiential cohesion that occurs in Bodhi’s communication is
repetition, as can be seen by the numerous times Bodhi asks to flush the toilet in the Mark
transcript. The lexical cohesion analysis (see Appendix 9) shows that Bodhi is very much
focused on the task at hand. When he is eating breakfast with Dodo, he makes numerous
references to his medicine and his bowl. When traveling in the car with Mark, he makes
numerous references to where they will be going and what they will be doing. When
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there is a change in the environment, such as when Mark and Bodhi move from the house
to the car, the content of Bodhi’s moves changes. However, in each situation, there is a
measure of consistency and relevancy about the topic of Bodhi’s moves, even if they are
repetitive. For example, Bodhi asks Mark where they are going fifteen times and whether
he’ll be able to flush the toilet eight times within the space of a twenty minute car
journey. However, Bodhi does not begin to ask these things until they get in the car and
go on their way. As I have divided the transcripts into phases according to topic shift,
there is topic consistency within each phase, which can be seen in the experiential items
expressed by Bodhi.
In terms of meronymy and hyponymy, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, p.576) say that
there is not a clear line dividing between the two as “a given set of items may be cohyponyms of one term but co-meronyms of another – for example chair, table, bed are
‘kinds’ (hyponyms) of furniture, but ‘parts’ (meronyms) of furnishings”. Bodhi is seen to
express members of a class of puzzle pieces at the end of the Dodo transcript, where as he
puts the pieces of the puzzle in, he holds them up and points to each, asking Dodo to
articulate the name of each piece before he inserts it. First he holds up the blue truck
piece and points to it, then he holds up the ambulance piece, and so on. This is not
uncommon, and Bodhi frequently asks for the articulation of the labels of members of a
class of things. But he does not move beyond the labelling of the individual members of
the class to the superordinate. For example, Bodhi went through a stage of going to the
utensils drawer in the kitchen and bringing the utensils out one by one to be named, but
he never brought a handful out to ask for the superordinate label of ‘utensils’.
8.4.4 Ellipsis and Cohesion
So much is left out of Bodhi’s communication that if we say that this is part of the system
of ellipsis, then ellipsis must be the most prevalent aspect of Cohesion in Bodhi’s
communication. However, ellipsis presupposes substitution, as Halliday and Hasan
(1976, p.142) say, “ellipsis is simply ‘substitution by zero’ ”, and Bodhi is not
substituting something with zero. He is simply not expressing things.
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Work in the areas of languages other than English and non-verbal communication, such
as that of Martinec (1998; 2000), Hasan (1996) and Hori (1995), can also shed light on
this aspect of Bodhi’s communication.
According to Martinec (1998), who, as mentioned in Chapter 2, has applied the SF model
to the analysis of human gestures and movements, textual meaning is about “the devices
which the semiotic modes have for producing a cohesive piece of text rather than a
random collection of acts” (1998, p.161). Given that Bodhi is clearly not communicating
in random collections of acts, one must ask then, what it is in Bodhi’s communication
that makes it cohesive. Martinec (1998) frames cohesion in non-verbal actions by
reassigning the Transitivity roles to actual people and the actions they perform. He calls
the person involved in a particular action, the participant, and the acts they are involved
in, the processes. To exemplify this, he gives the example of a woman donating money to
a busker, where the woman does four different actions enacting four different processes:
getting money out, leaning down, throwing the money and straightening up. The
participant is always the woman, so the cohesion is achieved from the repetition of the
participant in all four processes. This approach can be applied to Bodhi in the sense that
in all the moves where he expresses the non-active participant and omits expressing
himself, that is, in all the moves where he is articulating his own desires and feelings etc,
it is Bodhi himself, as the participant, who is the common thread through all the moves.
In these moves, the cohesive element could therefore be said to be Bodhi, although he
does not express himself in the move. One of the ways cohesion is achieved in Bodhi’s
communication, therefore, is across the turns.
It could be seen to be problematic to have the main feature of cohesion always being
omitted, except that this is not unheard of in other languages. The omission of the
expression of self can be accounted for by drawing on the work of both Hori (1995) and
Hasan (1996), in their accounts of Japanese and Urdu respectively. In her transcripts of
data of Japanese conversation, Hori (1995) shows how clauses in Japanese can have no
Subject, no overt Theme and no Actor. While according to Hori, this is to do with the
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hierarchical nature of Japanese society, it still produces dialogue that is Subjectless,
Themeless and Actorless, which is similar to Bodhi’s moves. (The difference here, of
course, is that unlike Bodhi’s moves, Japanese contains the process, and the Subject is
implied in that).
Hasan’s (1996) writing on the semantic styles of languages such as Urdu and middle
class English, explicated through an exploration of encoding devices in language, shown
in Figure 8.1 below, is also relevant to Bodhi’s communication. She explains that there is
a cline of encoding devices from explicitness to implicitness in languages. The most
explicit case is where everything that is meant is retrievable from the words themselves,
to the most implicit where nothing is retrievable from the words. The example she
provides for the most explicit is “Phlox grows on rocks”, as in this case all the meanings
are present within the words themselves. For the implicit, she gives the example “They
will”. In this case, neither “they” nor “will” are able to be identified from the words
themselves. One needs more information, either from the surrounding co-text, or the
surrounding context to find out who “they” are and what “they will” be doing. Where the
meaning is not retrievable from the words themselves, Hasan (1996) gives the name
implicit devices. Implicit devices provide cohesion by linking to other parts of a text,
through reference, ellipsis and substitution.

Please see print copy for Figure 8.1

Figure 8.1

Hasan’s Taxonomy of encoding devices (1996, p.209)
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Of particular interest is Hasan’s further categorisation of the category of exophoric
reference, which is the category of reference item that refers to things that occur outside
the text. Hasan (1996) describes the most implicit category of encoding device, restricted
exophoric, as referring to things that not only do not occur in the text, but they do not
even occur in the immediate material environment, as exophorics generally do.
Understanding the meanings in restricted exophorics depends upon a shared knowledge,
which excludes outsiders, or those who are not privy to that knowledge, from
understanding the meanings being made. That is, one must know or understand certain
things that exist outside both the text and the immediate material environment, in order to
make sense of the meaning contained in the restricted exophoric. As Hasan (1996)
explains:
Whoever is able to supply the correct intended meanings here must possess
knowledge that goes beyond the here-and-now of the discourse. Thus the
correct retrieval of the intended meanings … argues for the existence of
interaction in the past, and for a consequent rapport between speaker and the
addressee. (p.204)
While she could easily be describing Bodhi’s communication, Hasan is in fact describing
Urdu, where the semantic style is implicit because the culture in which the Indo-Pakistani
people and language are embedded is a hierarchical one where “everyone’s place is well
known in respect of anyone they could possibly come into social contact with” (Hasan
1996, p.237). In other words, Urdu speakers don’t need the same degree of explicitness
that middle class English speakers need because the hierarchical nature of their culture is
reflected in the language, making explicitness redundant. Hasan (1996) shows how, in
Urdu, language use changes depending on who one is speaking to, so it is redundant to
articulate the person when the other words in the discourse already do that.
While it would not exactly be redundant if Bodhi expressed himself within his moves,
based on Hasan’s (1996) arguments, one could say that Bodhi’s communication has
texture through the use of the implicit device of the restricted exophoric, which is
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actually a form of ellipsis. However, I have avoided using the term ellipsis for Bodhi’s
communication, preferring to use the term omission, as the term ellipsis seems to imply a
text based omission, and/or an omission based on redundancy. Halliday (1994, p.309310) defines it as a clause, or part thereof, that “may be presupposed at a subsequent
place in the text (my emphasis) by the device of positive omission – that is, by saying
nothing, where something is required to make up the sense”. Or as Halliday and
Matthiessen (2004) explain, ellipsis is defined as that which “makes it possible to leave
out parts of a structure when they can be presumed from what has gone before” (p535).
The difference here is that most of the omissions in Bodhi’s communication can mostly
not be retrieved from the co-text, but, as pointed to by Hasan (1996), from a shared
experience in the past: “a relationship of intimacy, if not necessarily that of informality, is
logically required, since the interpretation of meanings rests on shared knowledge which
is a product of consistent past interaction” (p.215). Therefore, presumptions can be made
about Bodhi’s communication, including that:
1. Bodhi will omit himself in moves where he is communicating his own wants and
feelings;
2. that it is he himself that is repeated and therefore cohesive; and
3. that in all moves, he will omit everything other than the most pared back part of
the salient piece of information, being that thing he is trying to talk about.
This points to, as Hasan (1996) also mentions, a kind of communication that excludes
strangers and casual listeners. It also points to a very restricted kind of dialogue, if many
of the meanings need to be retrieved from outside the text and outside the immediate
surrounding environment.
8.5

Conclusion

This chapter has explored Bodhi’s communication from the perspective of the textual
metafunction. The chapter showed how Bodhi rarely expresses a Theme, unless it is
embedded within a move that expresses what is akin to a whole clause. However the
chapter has shown that Bodhi always expresses a part of the New, which is the salient
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element of the move. Further, it showed how the Given is not retrievable from the cotext, but from the non-verbal context, which includes the surrounding material
environment, and the context of Bodhi’s life. What cannot be ignored here is that the
communication partner’s own knowledge of language also helps them retrieve Bodhi’s
omitted meanings. Through the resources of collocation, the communication partner
knows what pieces are needed to make sense of the one salient meaning Bodhi
communicates. In other words, if he expresses a Range such as ‘toilet’, they know there
needs to be some Process attached to that (for example ‘flush’), and some non-nuclear
Participant (such as ‘Bodhi’), to do the flushing.
The chapter also showed how Bodhi’s communication is experientially cohesive,
although this is limited because his moves do not form extended sets, but rather, remain
as pairs (when there is no repair needed). The chapter showed how Bodhi’s
communication contains a feature called restricted exophoric, and this means that the
understanding of his moves is limited to a small circle of people who can retrieve the
meanings from the surrounding material environment, and who possess a knowledge and
understanding of Bodhi and his life.
I therefore finish this chapter with the point that with Bodhi, it is the communication
partner’s knowledge, understanding and willingness to persist with him in a process of
the joint negotiation of meaning that is crucial to both the understanding and the analysis
of his communication. Therefore what occurs across the communication turns, as well as
within them, needs to be examined to gain a fuller picture of how Bodhi communicates.
The following chapter on Exchange Structure Analysis will explore the meaning making
that occurs across the turns of communication.
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_____________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 9
THE DESCRIPTION OF BODHI’S SYSTEM ACROSS THE TURN EXCHANGE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

______________________________________________________________________
Exchanges of meaning succeed, if they do,… because each of those
taking part has some idea of what the others will mean and assumes
that they have some idea of what he will mean. (Halliday 1984, p.9)
9.0

Introduction

This chapter uses Exchange Structure Analysis (ESA) to explore Bodhi’s communication
from the perspective of what occurs across the communicative turns. ESA is used to
reveal the kind of communicator Bodhi is within a conversation environment. Unlike the
three preceding chapters, where the meanings within Bodhi’s individual turns were
examined, this chapter explores Bodhi’s ability as an interlocutor/interactant, in terms the
variety of roles he is able to take up in a conversation. The chapter begins with a review
of the possible moves within an exchange, and discusses the problems in applying these
to Bodhi’s communication. It shows how in the application of the Exchange Structure
model it has been necessary to both modify and extend some of the moves in order to
capture Bodhi’s unusual style of communicating. After discussing the results of the
Exchange Structure Analysis, the chapter goes on to explore misunderstandings and the
role of the communication partner in the communication process which, given the
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undifferentiated nature of Bodhi’s communication, is crucial to the success of his
meaning making. It also sheds light on the process of the negotiation of meaning that
occurs between the communication partner and Bodhi. The analyses for this chapter can
be found in Appendix 5.
Whilst Exchange Structure Analysis has often been used to highlight unequal power
relations (see for example the work of Togher and others (1996; 1999a; 2001), and
Thwaite (1994) reported on in Chapter 2), it has been used here in a more broad sense.
That is to say, whilst I am still interested to show whether or not Bodhi is a powerful
communicator, I also use ESA to explore other aspects of Bodhi’s communication
including misunderstandings, Bodhi’s persistence in getting himself understood and the
joint negotiation of meaning.
9.1

Exchange structure – synoptic moves

Building on the work of Ventola (1987, 1988) Martin (1992) and Berry (1981a, 1981c)
the view taken here is that the exchange is the basic unit of social interaction, being the
“co-operative construction of a message” (O'Donnell 1990, p.309). Conversations are
therefore divided into exchanges, which are further divided into moves. The move is
taken as the basic unit of analysis, after Eggins (1990) and defined by Togher (2000) as
“a semantic unit of information that is the smallest unit of potentially negotiable
information presented by one speaker within one turn of interactive talk” (p.369).
Exchanges are constituted by sequences of moves. Moves are determined by speech
function and therefore relate to whether one is exchanging (giving or demanding)
information or goods-&-services. This throws up the possibilities of different moves,
which are all given names according to the role they occupy in the exchange. These
moves are all explained below.
Primary Knower (K1)
A move where the interactant gives information is called the Primary Knower (K1) move,
as the person who makes this move possesses the information being exchanged (Berry
1981a, p.126). This move is generally realised by the declarative Mood, and is the only
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obligatory move in an information exchange. All the other moves are optional. An
example of a Primary Knower move is “My dog has fleas.”
Secondary Knower (K2)
A move where the interactant demands information is called the Secondary Knower (K2),
move as the person who makes this move does not possess the information but is “to
whom the information is imparted” (Berry 1981a, p.126). This move is generally realised
by interrogative Mood. An example of this is “What is your name?”
Primary Actor (A1)
A move where the interactant gives goods-&-services is called the Primary Actor (A1)
move, as this person is carrying out an action (Berry 1981a). This can be realised by a
number of Mood choices in English, including with declaratives, e.g. “Here’s a cup of
tea”; and imperatives eg “Have a cup of tea”; or with no language at all, and just an
action. There were no issues with applying this move to Bodhi’s communication as he
doesn’t make any of them.
Secondary Actor (A2)
A move where the interactant demands goods-&-services is called Secondary Actor (A2)
move, as the person who makes this move is not doing the action, but demanding that the
action be done by someone else. This move is congruently realised by the Imperative
Mood, however, in certain social situations in English, it can be impolite to use the
Imperative Mood. It is therefore common for the Secondary Actor move to be realised by
other Mood classes, such as (modulated) interrogative (Martin 1981; Halliday &
Matthiessen 2004). An example of this is “Would you mind shutting the door?”
Delayed Primary Knower (DK1)
Exchange Structure was initially developed on classroom discourse, where the teacher
usually controls the talk and spends a considerable amount of time doing so. This is
reflected in the identification of the Delayed Primary Knower (DK1) move. This move is
where the person speaking already possesses the knowledge, but is withholding it to see
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if the person they are talking to also possess it. This move is typical of school teachers,
who often ask questions they know the answer to in order to test the students’ knowledge
(see Sinclair & Coulthard 1975). The Delayed Primary Knower then becomes the
Primary Knower in a subsequent move. An exchange beginning with a DK1 move could
be something like:
DK1

Do you know what the capital of Australia is?

K2

It’s Canberra.

K1

That’s right.

Delayed Primary Actor (DA1)
The Delayed Primary Actor (DA1) move is where the person delays carrying out the
action to check if it is the right thing to do. An exchange beginning with this type of
move is as follows:
DA1

Would you like a drink?

A2

Yes please.

A1

Here you are then.

Follow-up moves
The above exchange could easily have the receiver of the drink expressing thanks and the
provider of the drink telling them that they are welcome, so in order to capture following
responses people make to other moves, Berry (1981a) and Ventola (1987) have added
follow up moves (coded with an “f”) to the initial exchange structure. As both speakers
can make follow up moves, there are K2f, K1f plus A2f and A1f moves. If we add them
in, the above exchange could then become something like:
DA1

Would you like a drink?

A2

Yes please

A1

Here you are then

A2f

Thanks
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A1f

No problem

These moves combine syntagmatically to form the synoptic structure of the exchange.
They are represented as follows and only occur in the following order, with the optional
elements being contained within parentheses. For knowledge exchanges:
((DK1) K2) K1 (K2f) (K1f)
This means K1 (giving information) is the only obligatory move in an exchange, however
it can be preceded by K2 (requesting information), which can be preceded by DK1
(delaying giving information). K1 can be followed by a follow-up move from the other
interactant, which can also be followed up with a move by the person taking up the K1
position. The range of synoptic moves in knowledge exchanges can only occur in
sequences, and Togher (1998b) has listed them as follows:
Information giving
K1

Information requesting

Teaching exchanges

K1

K1

K2

K2

DK1

DK1

K2f

K2f

K1

K1

K2

K2

K1f

K2f

K2f

K1

K1

K1f

K2f

K2f
K1f

The same applies for action exchanges:
((DA1) A2) A1 (A2f) A1f))
As is the case in knowledge exchanges, A1 (providing goods-&-services) is the only
obligatory move in an exchange, however it can be preceded by A2 (requesting goods-&services), which can be preceded by DA1 (delaying giving goods-&-services). A1 can be
followed by a follow-up move from the other interactant, which can also be followed up
with a move by the A1 person. The range of action exchanges sequence are listed by
Togher (1998b) as follows:
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Provision of action
A1

Action requesting

Offer of action

A1

A1

A2

A2

DK1

DK1

A2f

A2f

A1

A1

K2

K2

A1f

A2f

A2f

K1

K1

A1f

K2f

K2f
K1f

Ventola (1987) extends the synoptic exchange network to include opening and closing
calls for attention and greetings. Martin (1992) also extends the network to include calls
and responses to calls, greetings and responses to greetings, and exclamations and
responses to exclamations.
9.1.1 Adjustments to the synoptic system
Bodhi’s idiosyncratic use of a dual move to simultaneously give information whilst
demanding articulation of that information, has meant that he occupies two exchange
roles simultaneously: Primary Knower and Secondary Actor. As SF theory reflects
typical or ‘normal’ ways of interacting, it hasn’t been developed to account for the
possibility of dual moves, which in Bodhi’s case are prevalent. Therefore, I have
expanded the synoptic system to include this. The next section will explore this in detail.
9.1.2 Dealing with the dual move
As shown in the chapter on the interpersonal metafunction, there are many instances,
where Bodhi makes the dual move. This is problematic for ESA, because there is no
move that realises two speech functions simultaneously, other than Ventola’s linguistic
service.
As shown in Chapter 6, Ventola’s (1987) category of move called linguistic service is
similar to Bodhi’s move because it combines a service with an information exchange.
However, it is also different for reasons that will be explained again below, but in
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reference to exchange as well as speech function. Notating it as follows, A1:LS [K2],25
Ventola (1987) shows that in service encounters, a demand for information functions as a
linguistic service. This means the person making that move is demanding the linguistic
service of the provision of information. As Thwaite (1994) points out, this move has a
double function.
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, Bodhi’s dual move is different from this type of
linguistic service in two ways. Firstly, when Bodhi demands a linguistic service, unlike
the person demanding the linguistic service in Ventola’s examples, he is not demanding
information, he is concurrently giving information. This means A2 goes with K1, and not
with K2. Following this, exchanges would then be coded as follows:
(T1/E35)
A2:LS [K1]

BODHI: /? i / ?i /2 i / 2 i / 2 i / 2 i / 2 i / 2 i / (pointing to the cup)

A1:LS [K2f] DODO: That’s your cup
Coding the moves in this manner shows that whilst Bodhi is the Secondary Actor (A2),
requesting a linguistic service (LS), he is simultaneously the Primary Knower (K1),
giving information. Correspondingly, Dodo is providing the linguistic service, so she is
the Primary Actor (A1:LS), but she is also the Secondary Knower (K2f), as she does not
know the information Bodhi is providing, and, as her move is a follow-up to Bodhi’s K1
move, it gets coded with “f”.
Secondly, the linguistic service that Ventola identifies is a service of the provision of
information. The linguistic service that Bodhi demands is the provision of articulation. In
order to account for this extra level of delicacy in the network of choices of types of

25

It seems that Ventola (1987) has misnamed the linguistic service move A1 instead of

A2. As Martin (1992) shows, a demand for service is labeled A2, with the move that
provides the service being labeled A1.
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service, the linguistic service move will be labeled LS:A, for linguistic service of
articulation.
To further establish the case of identifying Bodhi’s move as having two functions: giving
information and demanding articulation, I return to Ventola’s (1987) outline of the
recognition criteria for a linguistic service. To recap, in her aim to distinguish this move,
Ventola (1987) shows how the kind of response that follows a certain move, such as a
linguistic service, can help determine what kind of move that initial move is. If this is
applied to Bodhi’s dual move, such as in the example above, it becomes evident that his
move is different from Ventola’s linguistic service. To show this, it is useful to look
again at what a typical response might be to both giving information and demanding
goods-&-services. Firstly, if we presume Bodhi is making a move that simply gives
information (K1), the communication partner might have made a follow-up move (K2f)
more typical of a response to the giving of information, such as “Is that so?” In other
words, a typical follow-up move (K2f) to a move that gives information (K1) is usually
something that responds to the information being given by some kind of
acknowledgement. Examples of this type of follow-up move (K2f) from Ventola (1987)
include uhum, yeah, right, okay and fine.
Secondly, if we presume Bodhi is making a move that demands an ordinary linguistic
service (A2:LS), that is, not one that was giving information as well, the communication
partner’s answer (A1:LS) would probably contain information that Bodhi doesn’t already
know, such as in the example Ventola (1987, p.116) provides:
A2:LS [K2]

C:

and I’d like to know how much it would cost to send it surface
mail to the UK and how long it would take please

A1:LS [K1]

S:

it’ll take between 10 or 12 weeks

In other words, a typical follow-up move (A1:LS [K1]) to a move that demands a
linguistic service (A2:LS [K2]) is usually something that contains information that is not
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contained within the A2 move. As can be seen above, C is asking for the linguistic
service of the provision of information that s/he doesn’t already know.
A comparison of these typical responses to K1 and A2:LS [K1] with the typical responses
to Bodhi’s A2:LS [K1] move shows a marked difference: all of the responses to this
move of Bodhi’s (that Bodhi is happy with) contain a verbalisation by the communication
partner of what he has communicated multimodally in his A2:LS move. For example:
(T2/E10)
A2:LS [K1]

BODHI: /1 i /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing steps)

A1:LS [K2]

MARK: Those are steps, You’re going down the steps.

In this exchange, Bodhi, in his dual move (A2:LS [K1]), has communicated something
about the steps through the mode of contact pointing, and Mark has verbalised “steps” in
his follow-up move (A1:LS [K2]). Additionally, sometimes the follow-up move also
contains some acknowledgement of what Bodhi is communicating, as well as the
verbalisation of Bodhi’s multimodal provision of information. For example:
(T2/E14)
A2:LS [K1]

BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing step)

A1:LS [K2]

MARK: small step. Yeah.

or:
(T2/E8)
A2:LS [K1]

BODHI: /1 i /5 i /2 i / (contact pointing hanging door beads)

A1:LS [K2]

MARK: Yes, that’s the beads.

But it is the articulation of Bodhi’s move that is the mandatory element in the follow-up
move. The acknowledgement is optional.
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In other words, in the type of exchange where Bodhi has initiated with a dual move, the
information being exchanged occurs twice within the exchange: first in Bodhi’s initiating
A2:LS [K1] move in a multimodal form, and second in the communication partner’s
A1:LS [K2] move in verbal form. This is not the case for the type of linguistic service
Ventola (1987) outlines. In the service encounter type, the information being exchanged
only occurs once, in the responding A1:LS [K1] move, and not in the initiating A2:LS
[K2] move.
It is possible to argue then, that the recognition criterion for Bodhi’s dual move is that the
information being communicated multimodally by Bodhi appears twice within the one
exchange: first, when Bodhi communicates it, and second, when the communication
partner articulates it verbally in their response to him.
Moreover, Bodhi will make sure this occurs, as can be seen in the numerous examples in
the Dodo transcript where Dodo does not articulate what Bodhi has communicated
multimodally, and so he persists with a replay of the same move until she has done so:
(T1/E74)
A2:LS [K1]

BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing blue truck puzzle piece)

K2f

DODO: You show me where that one goes

rp

BODHI: /2 i / (continues contact pointing blue truck puzzle
piece)

A1:LS [K2]

DODO: That’s the blue truck

(rp = replay)
Establishing the recognition criterion provides grounds for the move as being a particular
move, idiosyncratic, it seems to Bodhi’s communication.
Finally, in order to validate this move, extra pieces of observational data were collected
in a situation where Bodhi regularly makes the dual move. This situation occurs when we
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are in the car driving down the main road past streets where friends live. In these
instances, while it seems obvious that Bodhi is making the dual move, I tried to give him
different answers in order to see whether he would be happy with a response that did not
verbally articulate his move back to him. However, as can be seen from the example
below, Bodhi was only satisfied when his move was articulated verbally.
(O13)
BODHI: /i /i / (distal pointing at Rhett and Ruth’s street as we approach it)
SHOOSHI: Yes. They do
BODHI: /i /i / (continuing to distal point at Rhett and Ruth’s street)
SHOOSHI: That’s where Rhett and Ruth live
BODHI: (silent)
This helps to demonstrate that Bodhi is not only giving information, because if he were,
one would think he would be happy with the response “Yes, they do”. He is only happy,
it seems, when the information he is providing multimodally is articulated back to him in
words. Consequently, there is a need for labeling his move with two functions: giving
information (K1) and demanding the linguistic service of articulation of that information
(A2:LS).
9.1.3 Coding the dual move
As shown above, Ventola (1987) notates a demand for a linguistic service as A1:LS [K2],
putting the service demand first, followed by LS, to show that it is a specific kind of
service, a linguistic service, that is being demanded. She then follows this with the
knowledge demand that is enclosed in squared brackets. While she doesn’t explain the
reason for notating it in this manner, the bracketing of the knowledge component is
possibly because the main focus of the move is to demand a linguistic service, and the
knowledge component is part of that demand. With Bodhi, however, the case is different:
it is the giving of knowledge that is his primary concern, and the demand for the
linguistic service of articulation is simply a demand for the verbalisation of that
knowledge because Bodhi cannot articulate it himself. The articulation is the vehicle
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through which the giving of knowledge is actualised. This move will therefore not be
notated with the K1 enclosed in brackets, as Ventola (1987) does, but with the knowledge
part first, followed by the action part: K1/A2:LS.
Finally, in order to code this move more delicately and take into account the
identification of the type of linguistic service of articulation, A2:LS will be followed with
A, to show that it is the linguistic service of articulation that Bodhi is demanding.
Consequently, Bodhi’s dual move is given the exchange code of K1/A2:LS:A, standing
for a move that gives information and demands the linguistic service of articulation.
The response to this move, where the communication partner articulates in words what
Bodhi has communicated to them multimodally is coded K2f/A1:LS:A. The K2f
represents the communication partner’s role as Secondary Knower making a follow-up
move, which is a response to being given knowledge. The A1:LS:A stands for the
communication partner’s role as Primary Actor giving the linguistic service of
articulation. Consequently:
(T1/E74)
K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing the blue truck puzzle piece)

A2

DODO: You show me where that one goes

rp

BODHI: /2 i / (continues contact pointing the blue truck puzzle
piece)

K2f/A1:LS:A

DODO: That’s the blue truck

(rp = replay)
9.1.4 Counting the dual move
Having established that the dual move can exist as a move in its own right, the question
arises as to where to include it when counting different move types, as it is both a
Primary Knower (K1) move and a Secondary Actor (A2) move. It is important to count it
as both, or else a false picture is given of how often Bodhi takes up these positions, so
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these moves will be counted separately, both as Primary Knower moves and as
Secondary Actor moves, but also together as an idiosyncratic move in their own right.
9.1.5 Revisiting the synoptic network
Incorporating Bodhi’s dual move into the synoptic system of the exchange network
changes the system and its options. In Ventola’s (1987) outline of the exchange system
network, it is at the point where one chooses between a knowledge-oriented exchange
and an action-oriented exchange, that the dual move, which is both knowledge oriented
and action oriented is added. The revised synoptic system is therefore as follows in
Figure 9.1:
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Please see print copy for Figure 9.1

Figure 9.1 Exchange model (after Ventola 1987)
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System 1 is the choice between initiating and not initiating an exchange. System 2 is the
choice between orienting the move to oneself or to others. System 3 is a choice between
attention getting, greeting and transmitting messages. System 4 derives from attention
getting and is the choice between opening up or closing down attention. System 5 derives
from greeting and is also the choice to open or close the greeting. System 6 is the choice
between A-events and B-events, where A-events are things that A (the initiator) knows
about but B does not, and B-events are things that B knows about but A does not (after
Labov 1972; see also Berry 1981a). System 7 is the choice of whether to negotiate (that
is, delay) the message or not. System 8 is the choice between knowledge and action
exchanges, and in Bodhi’s case, between a third variable, which is an exchange that is
both knowledge transmitting and action. System 9 relates to action exchanges and is the
choice between carrying the action out immediately or postponing it. System 10 is a
choice for the Secondary Knower or Actor, between making a follow-up move or not and
System 11 is a choice for the Primary Knower whether to respond to the Secondary
Knower’s follow-up move.
9.2

Exchange structure – dynamic moves

People frequently interrupt exchanges in order to challenge, query, repair, clarify, check
and so on. In order to capture these kinds of interruptions, a dynamic system of exchange
was generated (see Berry 1981a; Burton 1981; Martin 1985, 1992; Ventola 1987). The
dynamic system used here will build on this work, particularly on the work of Martin
(1992) and Ventola (1987). Thwaite (1994) and Togher (1998a) have also expanded the
range of dynamic moves, and these will be incorporated where necessary.
Ventola (1987) proposes three types of dynamic moves: suspending, aborting and
elucidating. Martin (1992) amalgamates Ventola’s suspending and elucidating moves
under tracking, and calls aborting and other moves that challenge, challenges. Martin
therefore proposes only two categories: tracking and challenging. This study uses
Martin’s (1992) version of dynamic moves, with some modifications and additions where
necessary.
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Tracking moves
Martin (1992) describes tracking moves as exploring the experiential meaning of the
previous turn. Whilst they can be found at any point in the exchange, they are more
common at the beginning and depend on the move they are tracking. Martin outlines five
types of tracking move: backchannels, checks, clarifications, confirmations and replays.
After Thwaite (1994), Togher (1998a) adds forward channels. These will be discussed
separately.
Backchannels (bch)
Backchannels are used by the listener to monitor the dialogue “reassuring interlocutors
that negotiation is proceeding smoothly” (Martin 1992, p.67). They are often realised by
either polarity items, such as yes or yeah, or paralinguistically, with utterances such as hm
or mm, and often occur in a pause or breathing space that the speaker might take during
their turn. An example is:
(hypothetical)
K1

A: so what I was saying was…

bch

B: m-hm

K1

A: that I didn’t really like it

Backchannel moves differ from the other tracking moves in that they don’t require a
response. According to Martin (1992), all the other tracking moves deal with doubts
about the experiential meaning being negotiated and therefore require a response.
Checks (check)
Checks are tracking moves only available to the speaker (Thwaite 1994), whereby the
speaker checks with the listener that the listener is keeping up with them. These often
occur when a message is long. They pair up with a response where the listener has a
chance to let the speaker know that they are following. An example is as follows:
(hypothetical)
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K1

A: so you go up to the lights, turn left, follow that along till you get to the
round-about and then turn left again.

check

Get it?

rcheck

B: I think so

Clarifications (cl)
Clarifications are moves that expand on the experiential meaning of the previous move or
part thereof. They often fit the logicosemantic relation of elaboration (Martin 1992).
Ventola puts clarifications in the category of elucidating moves, but Martin leaves them
in tracking moves, as they build on the experiential meaning of the previous clause. An
example of one from Ventola’s (1987) data is:
K2

C: what time do flights go to Sydney tomorrow?

cl

S: /2 er tomorrow morning or afternoon now/

rcl

C: uh midmorning early afternoon

K1

S: uh well you’ve got a 9, p.30 and 10, p.15…and a 10, p.55…and then
nothing then until 3, p.40 tomorrow.
(p.108)

(rcl = response to clarification)
To specifically show the elaborating feature of clarifications, Martin (1992, p.68)
provides a hypothetical example of the same speaker expanding their own move:
1
=2

What time do flights go to Sydney tomorrow:
What time do they go in the morning?

While both examples above are given by Martin to exemplify clarifications, there is a
difference between them that is left unaccounted for by Martin (1992), although he
supplies these examples one straight after the other. In Ventola’s example, the
clarification occurs as a question asked by one speaker about the other speaker’s previous
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turn. In other words, it is a request for clarification by one speaker to another. In Martin’s
example, while the clarification is still a question, it is provided by the same speaker, who
is elaborating their own previous clause within the same turn. In other words, it is the
unprompted provision of a clarification as the speaker perhaps realises they need to give
more information. This seems to me to be a notable difference, and whilst Ventola
divides another move, confirmation, into two moves; giving confirmation and requesting
confirmation, neither she nor Martin divide clarifications in this manner. Further, other
researchers, such as Thwaite (1994), who make extensive use of Exchange Structure
theory do not seem to find the necessity to divide clarifications in this manner. However,
since Togher (1998a, 1998b, 2000) deems it necessary to divide this move and, given the
examples above, it does seem useful to divide them; sometimes a speaker requests
clarification from another speaker, and sometimes a speaker volunteers it without being
requested. For the purposes of this thesis, clarifications will be divided into two separate
moves with corresponding responses: a straight clarification (cl), which is provided
unprompted by a speaker when they clarify their own move, that is, when they build on
the experiential meaning of their own move, as in Martin’s second example above; and
clarification request (clrq), where one person requests a clarification from the other. This
is generally followed by a clarification (cl) as a clarification is often provided upon
request. Both these moves can be followed up with a response to clarification (rcl). This
is useful because it allows one to distinguish between whether a person spontaneously
provides clarification, or whether someone asks another for clarification. Whilst Togher
(1998a, 1998b, 2000) separates clarification requests from clarifications, she couples
clarification requests with responses to clarification requests, rather than to clarifications.
It makes more sense, based on the notion of speech function, to code and label them as is
being done in this chapter.
In Bodhi’s case, where there are frequent needs to clarify what it is he is trying to
communicate, requests for clarification show the efforts of the communication partner.
They also show that Bodhi does not clarify unless requested, but if requested, he will
respond. This can be seen in the following two examples:
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(T1/E48)
A2

BODHI: /2 ´i hi ih /1 hi /

clrq

MARK: What? What do you want to show me?

cl

SHOOSHI: He wants to sit in the chair with Dodo and have a cuddle I
think.

cfrq

MARK: Do you want to sit here with Dodo?

cf

BODHI: /3 i / (chest tap)

A1

MARK: ok. I’ll get up. Yeah. I’ll go have some porridge

(clrq = clarification request
cl = clarification
cfrq = confirmation request
cf = confirmation)
In this example, Bodhi has tried to tell or show Mark something and Mark has missed
what that is, so he requests a clarification of experiential meaning from Bodhi. The
clarification comes from someone else, however, (me, the supposed observer). Mark then
requests confirmation from Bodhi that sitting with Dodo is what he wants, Bodhi
confirms this and the exchange is completed.
The next example comes from Mark and Bodhi’s journey to the chemist and follows on
from an exchange about Bruce coming the next day.
(T2/E57)
K1

BODHI: h´-h´ (laughing)

K2f

MARK: Yeah. Tomorrow Bruce will come.

clrq 1

Is that what you’re happy about? Yes?

replay

Is that what you’re happy about?

clrq 2

Bruce? Wanna see Bruce tomorrow?

rclrq

BODHI: (taps chest = ‘yes’)
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In this example, Bodhi has laughed about something and Mark has assumed that Bodhi is
laughing because he is happy about Bruce coming. Given the previous exchanges where
Bodhi has laughed happily when they are talking about Bruce coming, Mark has
interpreted Bodhi’s laughing as a meaningful move, expressing his joy about Bruce
coming. But as laughing is ambiguous, Mark clarifies with Bodhi that that is what he is
laughing about. It is somewhat like one person saying, “I’m happy”, and the other person
responding with “about what?” If the definition of a clarification move is that it has to
build on the experiential meaning in the previous move, then this fits the criterion, as it
builds on the experiential meaning expressed in Bodhi’s move by providing a
circumstance of matter (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004).
Thus, clarification moves have been divided into three types: requests for clarification
(clrq), provisions of clarification (cl), and responses to (provisions of) clarification (rcl).
Clarification requests are realised by demands for information, whereas (provisions of)
clarifications are realised by giving information.
Confirmations (cf)
As mentioned above, Ventola (1987) divides confirmations into two separate moves:
giving and requesting confirmation. Giving confirmation involves one interactant telling
or confirming with the other that s/he has heard what they are saying correctly. For
example:
(hypothetical):
K1

A: So what you do is undo the screw and then remove the part

cf

B: undo the screw first, then remove the part

rcf

A: that’s right

(rcf = response to confirmation)
As can be seen from the example, giving confirmation involves one person repeating the
focal point of their partner’s message as a way of checking what they have heard.
222

Requesting confirmation involves one interactant asking the other if they themselves
have heard and understood correctly. For example:
(hypothetical):
K1

A: So what you do is undo the screw and then remove the part

cfrq

B: do you mean this screw?

rcfrq

A: yes, that one

(cfrq = confirmation request
rcfrq = response to confirmation request)
Ventola states that whilst both giving information and requesting it repeat the focal point
of the move they are responding to, requesting confirmation is usually uttered with a
rising Tone 2, indicating demand for information, whereas giving confirmation is not.
However, whilst it may be the case that the examples Ventola provides show a difference
in tone, the example she gives for a confirmation move is still actually seeking
confirmation from the other partner, except that it does not use the raised Tone 2. I would
therefore venture to say that while it may be useful to distinguish between a move that is
a request for something and a move that is the provision of something, Ventola’s
examples are both requests. Perhaps this is why Martin (1992) does not divide
confirmations in this manner. However, as with clarifications, it may be useful to divide
confirmations into the two subcategories of confirmation request and confirmation, based
on whether the interlocutor is requesting the move or supplying it. This is a useful
distinction for communicating with Bodhi because as the communication partner
frequently needs to confirm with Bodhi that they have understood him correctly due to
the lack of differentiation in his communication. For example:
(T2/E36)
K2

BODHI: /5 i /
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K1

MARK: Yes. We’re going to the chemist shop and the fish shop.

cfrq

Is that what you wanna know? Yes?

cf

BODHI: (taps chest = ‘yes’)

rcf

MARK: Good. [He’s saying yes]

In this example, Mark has requested confirmation from Bodhi after he has given Bodhi
the answer, however it is common for the communication partner to request confirmation
before they respond to Bodhi’s move. For example:
(T1/E29)
A2

BODHI: /2 i /1 i /2 i /

cfrq

SHOOSHI: Do you want more drink?

rcfrq

BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i /

cfrq

SHOOSHI: or are you trying to, you want, Do you want Dodo to get you a drink?

cf

BODHI: /hi /

*A1

DODO: (gets Bodhi a drink)

*The final A1 move for this exchange, which is Dodo getting Bodhi a drink does not
occur immediately.
As per clarifications, Togher (1998a, 1998b, 2000) also separates confirmations and
confirmation requests. However, again, she calls the response move to confirmation
request, response to confirmation request, although it is actually a confirmation that is
being given. Thus, as has been the case with the treatment of clarifications in this study,
confirmations have also been divided into requests for confirmation (cfrq), provisions of
confirmation (cf), and responses to (provisions of) confirmation (rcf).
Replays (rp)
Replays are defined by Martin (1992) as moves that one person makes when they have
misheard the previous move of the other interactant. Replays use words like what,
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pardon, sorry etc in order to get the other interactant to replay their move. Martin (1992)
provides this exchange by way of example:
K2

A: Do you have Snow White?

cf

B: The Snow Queen

rcf

A: No

rp

Snow White

rrp

B: Oh

K1

No

(cf = confirmation
rcf = response to confirmation
rrp = response to replay)
As per clarifications, Martin does not distinguish between requesting a replay and giving
one. But again, for the purposes of this thesis, I divide replays into replay requests for
replay and provisions of replay, to account for a particular feature of Bodhi’s
communication. The dynamic moves discussed until this point have all been moves that
Bodhi’s communication partner makes, however replays are a move that Bodhi
frequently makes when he has initiated an exchange and the communication partner has
misunderstood him. As shown in the previous chapters, Bodhi replays his move with the
same or a similar version of the initiating move, as a response to being misunderstood,
and presumably in an attempt to get the communication partner to understand and
respond differently.
Replays fit into the dynamic structure of the exchange in that they occur as interruptions
to the exchange. However, the replays Bodhi makes do not fit neatly into either Martin’s
(1992) tracking moves, which occur when there is some doubt about the experiential
meaning being negotiated, or challenging moves, which occur when there is some doubt
about the interpersonal meaning. This is due to the fact that Bodhi’s replays can be either
experientially focused or interpersonally focused, or can cross the boundaries of both:
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sometimes he replays due to a misunderstanding of the experiential component of the
move; sometimes due to a misunderstanding of the speech function of the move;
sometimes due to the communication partner not responding to him, which is neither
experiential nor interpersonal per se, so it could be both; and sometimes he replays due to
the communication partner misunderstanding both the move type and the experiential
content of the move.
However, these types of replay differ from Martin’s definition of replay in that, as stated
above, Martin’s (1992) definition of replay constructs this move as a request that is
uttered by the current listener to check whether they heard something correctly. To quote
Martin (1992, p.68): "where this meaning has been completely misheard, interlocutors
request a complete replay”. So, according to this definition, the move called replay is
actually a request for a replay. This is confirmed by Togher (1998a, 1998b, 2000), who
has renamed Martin’s replay move as ‘request for replay’. However, Bodhi’s replay is
not a request for a replay, but the provision of a replay. It fits more closely to Martin’s
(1992) and Togher’s (1998a, 1998b, 2000) example of the response to the replay, which
is the move where the actual replay occurs. A simple solution to this mismatch could be
if Martin had divided replays into requesting a replay and providing a replay, as Ventola
did for confirmations, as not all cases of replay involve requests by one interactant for a
replay of the other’s previous move. Sometimes one of the interactants can hear for
themselves that they have been misheard and it is they themselves, as in the example
from Enid Blyton (1939/1984) below, who volunteers the replay:
K1

Fanny:

There! You look like yourself now. You looked horrid
without all your saucepans on – like a snail without a
shell.

ch

Saucepan Man: I never had a bell

rp

Fanny:

rch
cfrq

Shell,
I said

Saucepan Man: Smell?
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rrp

I can’t smell anything at the moment. What sort of smell

clrq

– nice or nasty?

rp

Fanny:

Shell,

ch
K2f

not smell
Saucepan Man: Oh, shell.

clrq

What shell?

(p.100)
(ch = challenge
rp = replay
rch = response to challenge
cfrq = confirmation request
rrp = response to replay
clrq = clarification request)
For the purposes of this thesis, and as per clarifications and confirmations, replays will be
divided into two moves, to account for the differences in providing a replay and
requesting one. The moves will be coded rp for providing or giving a replay; rrp for a
response to a replay; rprq for requesting a replay. The application of this to the exchange
about the puzzle piece where Bodhi replays his initiating move is exemplified below:
(T1/E74)
A2:LS:A/K1

BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing the blue truck puzzle piece)

K2f

DODO: You show me where that one goes

rp

BODHI: /2 i / (continues contact pointing the blue truck puzzle
piece)

A1:LS:A/K2f

DODO: That’s the blue truck

There is final point to make about replays that relates to the move directly after Bodhi’s
replay. If we look again at Dodo’s final A1:LS/K2 move in the exchange above, it is
conceivable to argue that this move is not the corresponding synoptic pair to the first
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move, but actually the corresponding dynamic move, response to replay, which is the pair
of Bodhi’s replay. In fact, it is both the synoptic and the dynamic pair, as Bodhi’s replay
move is the initiating move again, so Dodo is responding to both the replay and the
initiating move replayed. As such, her final move is both a response to replay, and also
the correct response for Bodhi’s initiating move. It is clear that this move is the correct
response to Bodhi’s initiating move, that is, a synoptic move, because if it weren’t, he
would have replayed the move again until he got the required response, as can be seen in
other exchanges from the data. When Bodhi replays, it is an indication that the exchange
is not complete. When he does not replay, it is an indication that he has received the
correct response to his initiating move and the exchange is over. Therefore, the final
move of the communication partner will be coded as the synoptic move, not as a dynamic
move.
Challenging moves (ch)
Challenges are moves where one person challenges what the other has said. Martin
(1992) describes them as focusing on the interpersonal content of a preceding move and
attacking its validity (Ventola 1987). He discusses many different types of challenges,
such as refusals or negotiations, but they are all coded as challenges. For example:
A2

A: Get me a beer, will you?

ch

B: It’s too hot

rch

A: No it isn’t

ch

B: It’s 30 degrees

rch

A: Rubbish

(rch = response to challenge)
The significant feature of challenges for this study is that they can often accompany a
replay move, as the reason a replay is required is because there is dispute about a
previous move, and the dispute generally needs addressing before the replay is made.
This can be seen in the above example from Enid Blyton where one character, Fanny,
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corrects the other character, Saucepan Man’s interpretation of the previous move.
However, in the exchanges where Bodhi makes a replay move, there are no explicit
challenge moves present, although it seems fairly obvious that he is challenging the
communication partner’s response to his move. As he has no words with which to
challenge, the challenge is implicit in the replay, as the only reason he is replaying the
move is because he is challenging the communication partner’s response. It is almost like
he is saying something like “that’s not what I meant. I meant ….”, the way Fanny says,
“Shell not smell”. Therefore, all the replay moves that Bodhi makes in order to get the
communication partner to have another go at understanding him are conflated with
challenges.
There are other moves that have been added to the dynamic system by Gurney (1985)
Thwaite (1994) and Togher (1998a, 1998b, 2000). These are forward channels,
collocational prompts, self corrects and justifications. However, as they do not occur in
this data set, they will not be discussed. Conjecture as to why these moves do not occur is
located at the end of this chapter.
9.2.1 The dynamic system expanded
In order to distinguish between moves that are requested and moves that are provided,
this study has expanded upon the dynamic system as outlined by Martin (1992). Thus
instead of the paired options that Martin (1992) offers of confirmation and response to
confirmation, clarification and response to clarification, and replay and response to
replay, these moves have been extended to include requests for these moves. Thus, with
each of these moves a request for the move can occur before the move itself occurs. The
request for the move is realised by a demand for information whereas the actual move
itself is realised by the provision of information. The set of moves possible for these three
types are therefore:
Request for confirmation ^ confirmation ^ response to confirmation
Request for clarification ^ clarification ^ response to clarification
Request for replay ^ replay ^ response to replay
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All of these move sequences are possible without the request first. In other words, if an
interactant is seeking a confirmation, clarification or replay from another, they will
request it, and if the other person complies, they will provide the requested move.
However, this is not the only way these moves occur, as an interactant may
spontaneously provide any of these moves without being requested, as Bodhi does with
replay.
The complete set of dynamic moves is then as follows:

Please see print copy
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(after Togher 2001)

9.3

Additional moves to be dealt with

There are some moves within this data that are not accounted for using either the synoptic
or dynamic moves. The main one is laughter, which, as shown in previous chapters,
occurs frequently. Whilst Bodhi’s laughter has been explored from the perspective of the
interpersonal and ideational metafunctions, it will be further explored here in the context
of the exchange.
Laughter
As mentioned, within SF conversation analysis, laughter is dealt with in a number of
different ways. To recap, Eggins and Slade (1997) deal with it under the umbrella of
humour, viewing it as “an important resource for achieving serious interpersonal work
while not appearing to do anything except have fun” (p.16), and as part of the business of
reflecting and constituting our social world. They say it often functions to demonstrate
support or to cloud underlying tensions and realities, however they do not identify its role
in a move network other than to say it is a nonverbal move. Thwaite (1994) codes
laughter as a dynamic response move, backchannel, if the speaker laughs at their own
remark, or a synoptic follow-up move (K2f), if the laugher is responding to someone
else’s remark as “it is functioning to ‘appraise’ that remark” (Thwaite 1994, p.177).
Similarly, in the current study, Bodhi’s laughter is coded depending on where it fits and
how it functions within the exchange, as well as on how the communication partner
interprets and responds to it. This follows the case first put forward by Schegloff,
Jefferson and Sacks (1977), and taken up elsewhere (see, for example, Ferguson 1992b;
Ventola 1987), that looking at the subsequent or next turn (to the laughter in this case) for
verification of a move is a legitimate way of determining the nature of that move. As
shown above, Mark treats Bodhi’s laughter as an initiating move in the, therefore it
functions as an initiating move:
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(T2/E57)
K1

BODHI: /h´-h´ / (laughing)

K2f

MARK: Yeah. Tomorrow Bruce will come.

clrq 1

Is that what you’re happy about? Yes?

replay

Is that what you’re happy about?

clrq 2

Bruce? Wanna see Bruce tomorrow?

rclrq

BODHI: (taps chest = ‘yes’)

As shown in previous chapters, Bodhi also laughs in response to an initiation move by the
communication partner. This can be seen in the previously shown exchange that Dodo
has initiated, and Bodhi responds by laughing. In turn, Dodo treats the laughter as a
response, although in the first instance it seems she is not quite sure how to respond to it
and she reframes her question. She then responds to the laughter as if it is an acceptance
of her offer to sit with Bodhi in the chair.
(T1/E49)
DA1

DODO: Can I sit with you?

A2

BODHI: (giggles)

cl

DODO: Can we sit together?

rcl

BODHI: (giggles)

A1

DODO: Oh, we both squeeze in together. That’s nice

The next and final example of laughter as a follow-up move shows Bodhi laughing in
response to Dodo giving him a drink.
(T1/E38)
A1

DODO: here you are

A2f

BODHI: /h´ h´/ (laughing)
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Thus, the way that laughter will be dealt with here is the way it functions in the exchange.
And, as shown, one of the ways to determine the function of the laughter is to examine
how it is interpreted and responded to by the communication partner.
The following section discusses how all of Bodhi’s exchange moves were identified.
9.4

Identifying Exchange moves

Bodhi’s exchange moves were identified from a number of things:
1.

the modes he uses;

2.

the context in which he makes the move; and

3.

the subsequent moves, that is to say, both the communication partner’s
responses to Bodhi and Bodhi’s subsequent response to them helps identify
the move retrospectively.

In most cases, the above factors were enough to identify the moves, but in some cases
they were not. Consider the following example from the Mark transcript where while
driving, Bodhi has pointed towards the location of his Saturday playgroup whilst saying
/i/ with a rising tone.
(T2/E52)
A2/K2

BODHI: /2 i /2 i /

A1

MARK: Yeah, we’re turning down this way to go to Wollongong.

A2/K2

BODHI: /2 i / (distal pointing westwards)

A1

MARK: No not Saturplay.

jst

Tomorrow’s Saturplay.

In this example, Mark has interpreted Bodhi’s move as a Secondary Actor move, that is,
that Bodhi is asking about which way they are going, but as Bodhi replays the move, this
is not what he was communicating. Second time around Mark still interprets Bodhi’s
move as a Secondary Actor move, but with a different experiential focus: whether they
are going to Saturplay. However, it is only when Mark has articulated “Saturplay” in his
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second turn that Bodhi is happy, as evidenced by the fact that he does not replay the
move again. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily identify Bodhi’s initiating move as a
Secondary Actor move, as it could also be a Secondary Knower move where Bodhi asks
where they are going. Mark’s second response has components of both action and
information. The first part of his answer “Not Saturplay. Tomorrow’s Saturplay” is an
action response, telling Bodhi they are not going to Saturplay, and the second part is an
information response, telling Bodhi when he will be going instead, or giving reason or
justification for why they are not going right then. Since Bodhi does not replay, there is
no way of telling which it is.
Additionally, the move could also be the dual move of Bodhi telling Mark where
something is, because it is realised in the same way that Bodhi realises the dual move –
with distal pointing and the sound /i/ with a rising tone. Generally, as consistently shown,
when Bodhi makes the dual move and the communication partner does not understand
and respond accordingly, Bodhi replays the move. However, in the above case, Mark
changed the topic and so Bodhi may have been going to replay his move but got
interested in the new topic instead. It is hard to know.
Further, some of Bodhi’s moves have features that identify them as one move or another.
For example, whenever Bodhi says /i/ with a rising tone whilst signing ‘toilet’, he is
making a Secondary Actor move, whereas when he says /i/ with a rising tone whilst
grabbing the driver’s sleeve, he is making a Secondary Knower move. However, there are
also many moves that were difficult to identify, because Bodhi did not do anything to
mark them as one move or another. Consider the following example from the Dodo
transcript:
(T1/E55-58)
?

BODHI: /5 i-hi /5 i /5 i / (contact pointing chair)

clrq

DODO: d’you want?

A1
cl

Alright, you sit there. Woop.
SHOOSHI: no he’s just telling you about the chair
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rp/?

BODHI: /1? i /2 i /2 i /2 i /2 i / (going to the chair where Dodo's moved to)

cfrq

SHOOSHI: d’you want to sit in that chair now?

A1
?

No Dodo’s sitting up there (unclear)
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i /

(unclear - everyone talking at once)
A1

DODO: you’ve had your porridge

?

BODHI: /? nh /

DA1

SHOOSHI: d’you want to do a puzzle with Dodo?

A2

BODHI: (chest tap)

A1

SHOOSHI: Alright..? Do a puzzle with Dodo

BODHI: /3 ih /1 i /2 i /2 i / 2 i / (stamping foot on floor once)
SHOOSHI: no at the table.
In this example, Bodhi has initiated an exchange with the sound /i/ and a rising tone.
However it is unclear to both the communication partners (Dodo and myself), as well as
to me as researcher, what that move is. Dodo interprets it as a Secondary Actor move,
that is, that Bodhi is requesting to sit in a particular chair, however Shooshi interprets it
as a Primary Knower move and tells Dodo something to that effect, so that she might
respond accordingly. Bodhi however, moves to another chair, the one that Dodo is sitting
in and replays his move, with two more /i/s. Shooshi then interprets Bodhi’s move as a
Secondary Actor move and asks a confirmation question to check on this, and then
replies. Bodhi then replays again, but this is lost in the conversation. Shooshi then
redirects Bodhi to another activity. Bodhi’s original move could be the dual move, or it
could be a Secondary Knower move, of Bodhi asking to sit in a particular chair.
However, given that this exchange followed a sequence of exchanges where Dodo and
Bodhi were sharing the armchair, it seemed reasonable to imagine that Bodhi might be
trying to tell that he has been sitting in the chair with Dodo. However, this may also not
be the case, and again, there is no real way of knowing. Initiating moves of Bodhi’s like
the ones in the above two examples were given unknown codings, marked with a
question mark, or a number of codings with a question mark to show it could be one or
another.
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9.5

Bodhi’s Exchange moves

Before discussing the results from the Exchange Structure Analysis, the system network
(Figure 9.2) of the Exchange moves Bodhi realises is presented and discussed.
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Figure 9.2

Bodhi’s exchange moves.
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Figure 9.2 will be briefly explained here, however examples are provided in the next
section on results.
At the point of entry, Bodhi’s move is either initiating or responding. If initiating, it is
one of the three synoptic moves Bodhi makes. The first is the dual move, which is called
Primary Knower (dual move). This move is typically realised by the sound /i/ with a
rising tone and the gesture of pointing, to indicate the experiential content of the move.
The second initiating move is the Secondary Knower move, which is also realised by the
sound /i/ with a rising tone and sometimes a sign, or by a word approximation. If it is the
sound /i/, it is usually accompanied by a gesture or sign to indicate the experiential
content of the move, but sometimes it is just the sound.
The third initiating move is Secondary Actor, which is also typically realised by the
sound /i/, but the tone is varied, sometimes rising (Tones 2 or 5), sometimes falling
(Tones 1 or 3). What is interesting to note here is that the falling tone Secondary Actor
moves are clearly a demand for service, but the rising tone ones are also used for
Secondary Knower and Primary Knower (dual move) moves. The distinguishing feature
in this corpus is the other mode that the sound /i/ is coupled with. The Secondary Actor
moves in the Mark transcript are all coupled with the sign for ‘toilet’, however in the
Dodo transcript they are not so clearly identified, and are coupled with a variety of
actions and gestures.
Of responding moves, Bodhi makes the choice between synoptic and dynamic moves.
Synoptic moves are constituted by Primary and Secondary Actor moves. The Primary
Actor move is Bodhi’s response to being told what to do, and is realised by actions,
gestures and sometimes vocalisations with falling tones. The Secondary Actor move is
Bodhi’s response to someone doing something for him, such as getting him a drink. In
this corpus, this only occurs in the Dodo transcript and is realised by laughter.
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There are four dynamic moves: clarification, confirmation, challenge and replay.
Clarifications and confirmations are provided by Bodhi after the communication partner
issues a request for these moves. Clarifications are realised by signing, usually his sign
for ‘yes’. Confirmations are also realised by signing and sometimes sound as well. There
are two types of challenge. The first is the challenge that is conflated with a replay, and
that is realised by the sound /i/ with a rising tone and usually the gesture of pointing. The
second type of challenge is when Bodhi responds with non-compliance to a
communication partner’s command. This is typically realised by sound and action.
9.6

Results from applying Exchange Structure Analysis

This section will discuss the results from the application of Exchange Structure Analysis
to the data. It begins with an examination of what kind of initiator Bodhi is, and then
continues with the moves in the synoptic system, looking at both which synoptic moves
Bodhi initiates, as well as how he responds to moves made by others. Following this will
be an examination of the sorts of dynamic moves Bodhi makes, and the way he responds
to others’ use of dynamic moves. The data will be discussed at the levels of text and
phase, to show how Bodhi communicates differently in different contexts.
9.6.1 Bodhi as an Initiator
Exchange Structure Analysis shows that Bodhi regularly initiates interactions. This is
evidenced by the number of exchanges Bodhi initiates in both the Dodo and Mark
transcripts. Across the two transcripts there are 130 countable exchanges. Of these 130,
Bodhi initiates 83 (64%) of them, which is almost two thirds of all exchanges.
In the Dodo transcript, Bodhi has 89 turns of which 40 (45%) are initiations and 49
(55%) are responses. In comparison, in the Mark transcript Bodhi has 77 turns. Of these
turns, 46 (60%) are initiations, 31 (40%) are responses of which 5 are replays. The
difference in number can be accounted for by the different contexts. In the Mark
transcript, Bodhi constantly wants to know things, such as where they are going and
whether there will be toilets there. Further, the context for the Mark transcript is a quiet
drive to Wollongong to get Bodhi’s medicine. It is not so much Mark who is interested in
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making conversation with Bodhi, but Bodhi who is interested in making conversation
with Mark26. In the Dodo transcript, however, whilst Bodhi is interested in interacting
with his grandmother, as evidenced by the number of exchanges he initiates, 40 out of 74,
Dodo is also interested in interacting with him. He is, after all, her grandson, and she does
not see him very often. Her interest is evidenced by the 21 exchanges that she initiates.
The rest of the exchanges (13) are initiated by other people or are from Dodo and directed
towards other people.
Determining the kinds of moves Bodhi makes as an initiator can reflect the kind of
communicator he is; it is usually the more powerful person in an interaction who is more
likely to hold the knowledge and be the Primary Knower (K1) (Togher et al. 1999a). The
less powerful person tends to be the Secondary Knower, although there is also some
power associated with being in the position of asking questions.
As an initiator, Bodhi takes up three of the synoptic positions possible in an exchange.
These are Primary Knower, Secondary Knower and Secondary Actor. This means he
gives and demands information, as well as demanding goods-&-services. Further, he
takes up these moves differently depending on the context, and this can be seen in the
different phases of the transcript data. These will be explored separately.
9.6.2 Bodhi as Primary Knower
Bodhi frequently initiates as Primary Knower using the dual move. Across both
transcripts, this occurs 26 times, which is 31percent of his total initiations. However the
numbers differ between the transcripts, and across the phases within the transcripts. For
instance, in the Dodo transcript, of the 40 times Bodhi initiates, 22 are as Primary
Knower (55%), whereas in the Mark transcript, only 14 of 44 initiations are as Primary
Knower (32%). This can be accounted for by the different contexts as described in the

26

I make this judgement based on the fact that Mark and I live with Bodhi, and as he is

very demanding and commmunicative, we both often allow silence to occur, as it is a rare
phenomenon when Bodhi is around.
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previous section 9.6.4. With Dodo, Bodhi seems keen to tell her things about his
environment, so he is more often in the position of Primary Knower. With Mark, Bodhi is
keen to know and to have confirmed (many times over) where they are going and what
they’ll be doing, consequently he is less in the position as Primary Knower but more as
Secondary Knower.
Looking in more detail at the transcripts, it can be seen that in the different phases within
the transcripts, Bodhi takes up the Primary Knower position more in certain situations
than others. For example, in the Mark transcript Bodhi only assumes the role of Primary
Knower 32 percent of the time, in certain phases within this transcript he is Primary
Knower 100 percent of the time. For example, in phase 2 of the Mark transcript, which
contains twelve exchanges involving Bodhi, seven are initiated by Bodhi as Primary
Knower. In this phase, Bodhi and Mark are walking through the house on their way to the
car and Bodhi is commenting on things as they pass them. But this is almost the only
phase within the Mark transcript that is like this, and it contrasts with phase 4 in the
transcript, where Mark and Bodhi are driving in the car and Bodhi wants to know where
they are going, nine out of the 17 exchanges in this phase are initiated by Bodhi as
Secondary Knower. This also contrasts again with phase 1 of this transcript where out of
seven exchanges, only three out of the seven exchanges are initiated by Bodhi and only
one of them is as Primary Knower. In other words, in some phases, Bodhi initiates only
as Primary Knower, whilst in others he does not take up the Primary Knower position at
all. It all depends on the situation. A typical example of Bodhi as Primary Knower,
commenting on his environment, is as follows (noting that when Bodhi initiates with a
Primary Knower move, he makes the dual move):
(T2/E44)
K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: /2i /2/5 i / (distal point to R&R’s street)

K2f/A1:LS:A

MARK: Yes. That’s where Rhett and Ruth live, isn’t it?

As mentioned above, Bodhi realises this move with the sound /i/, uttered with a rising
Tone, and usually the gesture of pointing.
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9.6.3 Bodhi as a Secondary Knower
Secondary Knower is a position Bodhi takes up regularly as he often wants to know
things about his life, such as where he is going and who with, and what he will be doing.
However, across the two transcripts, the picture of Bodhi as Secondary Knower is quite
different: in the Dodo transcript, there are no instances of Bodhi as Secondary Knower,
whereas in the Mark transcript there are 15 instances, making up 43 percent of the total
number of times Bodhi initiates in that transcript (excluding the unknowns). In other
words, in one transcript Bodhi does not seek knowledge at all, but in the other, he seeks it
nearly half the time he initiates. Again, this is due to the context: in the Mark transcript,
Bodhi repeatedly asks Mark where they are going and whether he’ll be able to flush the
toilet. A typical example of Bodhi initiating as Secondary Knower, asking where they are
going, is:
(T2/E34)
K2

BODHI: /2? i /2? i / (grabs Mark’s sleeve)

K1

MARK: We’re going to the chemist shop to get your medicine. Then we’ll go to
the fish shop. So let go of my arm.

As noted above, Bodhi realises this move with the sound /i/ and a rising tone, and usually
a sign or action, such as grabbing the driver’s arm, or by distal pointing.
9.6.4 Bodhi as Primary Actor
The Primary Actor move is where language accompanies action. It is the comment a
person makes when they are doing something for someone else. An example from
Ventola’s book on service encounters (1987, p.99) is:
A1

S: there we are dear (handing over the packet)

There are no examples of Bodhi making this kind of move in any of the data.
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9.6.5 Bodhi as Secondary Actor
There are two types of Secondary Actor role taken up by Bodhi. The first and most
common occurs within the dual move, where the Secondary Actor part of the move
constitutes the request for a linguistic service. However, as this move is predominantly
about giving information and occurs together with the Primary Knower move (as the dual
move), it was included as part of the Primary Knower move above, and is therefore not
discussed here.
The second type of Secondary Actor role Bodhi takes up is when he wants people to do
things for him. This occurs fairly regularly, 26 percent of all initiating moves in the
Dodo transcript, and 20 percent of all initiating moves in the Mark transcript. Examples
of this are the numerous times Bodhi asks Mark if he is going to be able to flush the
toilet, or in the Dodo transcript, where Bodhi wants Dodo to give him his medicine, or
get him a drink. For example:
(T1/E12)
A2

BODHI: /1 n n n /

K1

DODO: it’s all messed up now, somewhere in there…

K1

SHOOSHI: there it is, I think, oh oh…

K1

DODO: Oh…

K1

1
x2

SHOOSHI: you’ve just gotta make sure you see it on top.
Anyway, if he eats the whole bowl he’ll get it.

rp

BODHI: /1 nn /5 nn /3 n …nn /

cfrq

DODO: Do you want to do the next one [ie medicine]?

cf

BODHI: /5 nn /

A1

DODO: alright. There you are

A2f

BODHI: n (pause)

A1f

DODO: oh good. That’s very good. That’s all now. They’ve all gone.
You’ve done them all. Good boy.

A2f

(Bodhi continues to eat)
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In the above exchange, Dodo has dropped Bodhi’s epilepsy prevention tablet into the
bowl of porridge and can’t find it. Bodhi, using shorter sounds in quick succession, and
with tones that are more descending in nature, seems to be asking her to hurry up.
Secondary Actor moves are realised in two ways: in the Dodo transcript, by the sound /i/,
or a variation of it with a falling tone, such as in the above example, and contact pointing;
but in other instances in both the Dodo and Mark transcripts, by the sound /i/ with a rising
tone and some kind of action, gesture or sign, such as ‘toilet’.
9.6.6 Summary of initiating moves
The range of initiating moves Bodhi makes shows that even without speech, Bodhi is a
relatively powerful communicator, able to initiate interactions with the appropriate
knowledge or action position that will fulfill his purposes, across different contexts. He is
able to be both Primary and Secondary Knower, as well as Secondary Actor. While
Bodhi does not take up the Primary Actor role, this does not mean he is not a versatile
communicator. It just means he does not a carry out actions for someone else and/or does
not communicate in language whilst carrying out an action for someone else.
In contrast to the children in many of the AAC studies reported on in Chapter 2, (see, for
example, Harris 1982; Beukelman & Yorkston 1982; Light et al 1985a), these results
show that Bodhi is an active communicator. In particular, there is not the conversational
asymmetry that is reported to exist between children with communication disorders and
their communication partners. Unlike the children in the studies reported on in Chapter 2,
Bodhi is successful in directing the focus of the interactions, in eliciting responses from
communication partners when he has initiated the topic and in establishing new topics.
9.6.7 Bodhi’s response moves
Bodhi also responds to other people’s initiations. Of the 111 exchanges that involve
Bodhi across both transcripts, other people initiate 38 times (34%). Of these, Bodhi
responds to almost all with a variety of moves and modes, both vocal and non-vocal,
including laughter, actions of compliance, actions of non-compliance, and sound, or a
combination of sound and action. The 38 initiations by others are constituted by four of
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the synoptic move types: Secondary Knower, Primary Actor, Secondary Actor and
Delayed Primary Actor, but not Delayed Primary Knower (DA1) and Primary Knower
(K1). It is not surprising that there are no Delayed Primary Knower moves from Bodhi’s
communication partners, as this move is often exhibited under testing or teaching
conditions, such as in classrooms and quiz shows. However, it is more surprising to find
no initiating Primary Knower moves as this means that communication partners do not
give Bodhi information unless he asks for it. This will taken up in the discussion at the
end of the chapter.
All Bodhi’s responses to moves initiated by others have been coded as exchange moves,
even when the move is something like laughter, because as shown above, these constitute
appropriate response moves, particularly in the multimodal context. Each type will be
dealt with separately.
Bodhi as Primary Knower (responding to Secondary Knower)
Bodhi responds as Primary Knower only three times in the corpus, always by answering
“yes’ to a question.
(T2/E39 - Mark and Bodhi are in the car)
K2

MARK: Wanna come to the fish shop?

K1

BODHI: (taps chest = ‘yes’)

Bodhi as Secondary Actor follow up (responding to Primary Actor)
Bodhi responds with a Secondary Actor follow up move when people do things for him,
however, there are no instances of this type of move in the Mark transcript. The response
is mostly laughter, as below:
(T1/E38 - Dodo is getting Bodhi a drink)
A1

DODO: here you are

A2f

BODHI: /h´ h´/ (laughing)

A1

DODO: here’s your drink
245

Bodhi as Primary Actor (responding to Secondary Actor)
Bodhi responds as Primary Actor when people attempt to get him to do things. This
occurs a couple of times in each transcript, and is initiated by a parent. The response is
action and sometimes sound as well, as in the example below.
(T2/E12 - Mark is trying to get Bodhi to go up the step into the garage)
A2

MARK: Up

ch

BODHI: /4h h /(goes elsewhere)

rch

MARK: into the garage

Bodhi as Secondary Actor (responding to Delayed Primary Actor)
Bodhi responds as the Secondary Actor to a Delayed Primary Actor move when people
offer to do things with him. As shown earlier, this occurs numerous times in the Dodo
transcript, and Bodhi responds with laughter:
(T1/E49 - Dodo and Bodhi are in the lounge room)
DA1

DODO: Can I sit with you?

A2

BODHI: (giggles)

DA1

DODO: Can we sit together?

A2

BODHI: (giggles)

A1

DODO: Oh, we both squeeze in together. That’s nice

9.6.8 Dynamic moves
To paint a picture of the dynamic climate of the exchange, this section will examine
which dynamic moves Bodhi makes, and which ones communication partners make and
Bodhi responds to. These include clarifications and clarification requests, confirmations
and confirmation requests, challenges, and replays and requests for replays.
Clarifications and clarification requests
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Clarifications and requests for clarifications occur more frequently in the Dodo transcript
than in the Mark transcript, where there is only one instance. They show the
communication partner trying to get Bodhi to expand on his original move, to give them
more information, so they can understand what he is communicating. Generally, when
presented with a clarification request, Bodhi responds by repeating his original move
rather than expanding on it in any way. For example:
(T1/E80)
K1/A2:LS:A BODHI: /2i /2i / (contact pointing puzzle piece whilst holding it)
(everyone keeps conversing)
rp

BODHI: /2i /2i / (continues contact pointing ambulance piece of puzzle)

clrq

DODO: you show me…. Show me. What is it?

cl/rp

BODHI: (continues contact pointing the ambulance piece)

K2f/A1:LS:A DODO: That’s the ambulance
K1/A2:LS:Af BODHI: (giggles)
(clrq = clarification request
cl = clarification)
Confirmations and confirmation requests
Confirmations and confirmation requests (by the communication partner) occur quite
frequently in the data as the communication partner often needs to check with Bodhi
whether they have understood him correctly, as can be seen in the example above. In the
transcript data, there are twelve instances of confirmation requests with their pair
confirmation. Nine are in the Dodo transcript and three in the Mark transcript. The
difference here can again be accounted for by the fact that Dodo is not as informed a
communication partner as Mark is, and regularly needs to check with Bodhi whether she
has understood him correctly. Bodhi provides confirmation with sound and/or the sign
‘yes’.
Challenges
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Bodhi frequently makes challenge moves when the communication partner has
misunderstood him. As stated, many of these kinds of challenge moves by Bodhi are
conflated with a replay, as when Bodhi is replaying a move it is because he is challenging
the response the communication partner has given him. For example:
(T1/E25)
K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: /2i /2i / (walking towards kitchen with bowl)

K2f

DODO: yes go on. I’m watching.

ch/rp

BODHI: /2i-hi-hi ih ih/

K2f/A1:LS:A

DODO: You take your bowl. Yes

K1/A2:LS:Af

BODHI: NV (Bodhi takes his bowl to the kitchen)

A1f

DODO: Very good.

In this exchange, Bodhi is telling Dodo he’s taking his bowl to the kitchen, but she only
responds as if he is giving her information, not as if he is asking for articulation as well,
so he challenges her response and replays his move. She then articulates his move, albeit
as an imperative, but that seems adequate and he continues on his way to the kitchen with
his bowl.
The second type of challenge that Bodhi issues is a challenge of non-compliance. There
are three instances of this in the Mark transcript, but none in the Dodo transcript. For
example:
(T2/E21)
A2

MARK: Bodhi. Hop in your seat please

ch

BODHI: /´h ´h / (doesn’t hop in seat)

rch

MARK: Bodhi. No no no

rp

BODHI: /´h /

clrq

MARK: What d’you…Where are you going?

rclrq

In the back, oh.
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This exchange shows Bodhi issuing a challenge via sound and action as an act of noncompliance towards what Mark is asking him to do. While there are not many instances
of this kind of challenge in this data set, they do occur regularly and are invariably
realised by the modes of vocalisation and behaviour. For example, when Bodhi is not
allowed to go to the toilet to flush it because someone is using the toilet, he lies on the
floor and yells while kicking the toilet door.
Replays and requests for replays
Replays are the main dynamic move that Bodhi makes as a response to being
misunderstood or ignored. There are eight instances of Bodhi issuing replays in the Dodo
transcript, but only one in the Mark transcript. The difference is attributed to the differing
levels of knowledge about Bodhi. An example of Bodhi issuing a replay is as follows:
(T2/E52 – Bodhi and Mark traveling in the car)
K2 or A2

BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (distal pointing towards Saturplay)

K1 or A1

MARK: yeh, we’re turning down this way to go to Wollongong.

rp

BODHI: /2 i / (distal pointing towards Saturplay)

K1 or A1

MARK: No not Saturplay. Tomorrow’s Saturplay.

The replay move that Bodhi makes is generally the same as his initiating move, although
it often has a different number of sounds, as can be seen in the example above.
This contrasts with the children in Light et al’s (1985b) study which showed that
children never replayed moves to get their communication partners to continue
interacting, whereas the partners issued many replays to try to get a response or the
required response.
Dynamic moves not found in this data
There are a number of dynamic moves in this corpus that Bodhi did not make. These
include back channels, forward channels, confirmation requests, clarification requests,
checks, collocational prompts, self corrects and justifications. In other words, Bodhi did
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not make most dynamic moves. As stated, the issues this raises will be discussed at the
end of the chapter.
9.7

Misunderstandings

Misunderstandings occur as a result of Bodhi’s undifferentiated communication. Due to
those found in the corpus, I became interested in misunderstandings as a phenomenon of
Bodhi’s communication, so I started to note other misunderstandings that occurred in his
life. These are discussed, exemplified and categorised below.
In much of the AAC and misunderstanding literature, misunderstandings come under the
category of repair (see, for example, Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977; Paul & Cohen
1984; Brinton, Fujiki, Loeb & Winkler 1986; Schegloff 1987b, 1992; Brady et al. 1995;
Levy, Tennebaum & Ornoy 2003). Repairing communicative breakdowns is seen as a
critical skill for people with severe intellectual disabilities because their communication
is often highly ambiguous, leading to misunderstandings that can cause frustration and
aggressive behaviour (Carr & Durand 1985; Brady et al. 1995). Studies have also shown
that people with intellectual disabilities repair less often than their non-disabled peers
(Brinton et al. 1986; Brady et al. 1995).
The misunderstandings that occur with Bodhi are of a particular type, called third turn
repair in the misunderstanding literature (Schegloff et al. 1977; Schegloff 1987a; 1992).
In Bodhi’s case, this is where Bodhi has initiated, the communication partner has
misunderstood him, and it is Bodhi who tries to repair the misunderstanding with a replay
move in his very next turn, the third turn in the exchange. Schegloff (1987a) has further
defined some categories of misunderstanding in conversations amongst ‘normal’ speakers
of English, however, these do not cover all the types of misunderstandings that occur
with Bodhi. I have therefore used the metafunctional analyses of Systemic Functional
theory, plus the analyses and elaborations from Exchange Structure Analysis to
categorise and systematise Bodhi’s misunderstandings. Before describing these, I will
first discuss the causes of Bodhi’s misunderstandings.
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Causes of misunderstanding
Misunderstandings of Bodhi’s moves are the result of a number of factors: Bodhi’s lack
of differentiation between different move types, and the fact that the environment in
which his communication occurs is transmodal. These points are elaborated below.
To begin with, the prevalent use of the sound /i/ with a rising tone causes much of the
confusion. Whilst as researcher it has become clear that the differentiation of Bodhi’s
moves can often be found in what other modes he uses in conjunction with the sound /i/,
as shown in this chapter, it is also often the case that there is nothing in his move to
differentiate between move types, and the communication partner has to draw on
resources outside the text, as well as needing to check with Bodhi.
Additionally, Bodhi’s moves to repair misunderstandings do not provide the
communication partner with any more information as they are replay moves – meaning
that when misunderstood, he simply repeats his move. Brady et al (1995) divide repair
moves are divided into three types: repetition, expansion and revision. They suggest that
expansion and revision are higher order repair strategies than repetition.
As stated, another reason misunderstandings occur is that the communication occurs in a
transmodal environment, where Bodhi communicates in his particular set of modes,
which then get translated, as it were, by the communication partner into words. This
seems to be quite a unique situation, not reported on in the misunderstanding literature
(see, for example, Gumperz & Tannen 1979; Schegloff 1987a; Coupland, Wiemann &
Giles 1991). It is hard to say exactly why Bodhi needs his move articulated in words, but
it seems to function to enable him to hear that he has been understood correctly, and to
have things confirmed. This transmodality means that communication with Bodhi
straddles both multimodal and linguistic forms of communicating, which, in some
respects, is a commonality with cross cultural communication, which straddles different
cultural norms as well as accent and language usage peculiarities (Weigand 1999).
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From an examination of all the collected misunderstandings that occur with Bodhi, it is
clear that they can be grouped along metafunctional lines. There are misunderstandings
within the interpersonal domain and within the experiential domain. Within the
interpersonal domain, misunderstandings occur as a misunderstanding of speech function.
Within the experiential domain, misunderstandings are particulate in nature. That is, the
communication partner misunderstands one or more of the constituents of experiential
meaning that Bodhi is trying to communicate. In addition to these two kinds of
misunderstanding, there is a third, which is a misunderstanding of the dual move. That is,
the communication partner may well comprehend that Bodhi is trying to give
information, they just don’t understand that they have to articulate his multimodal move
back to him in words. Whilst this is slightly different from the other interpersonal
misunderstandings, as it is misunderstanding by omission, as it were, it will still be
classified as an interpersonal misunderstanding. All of the above types will be explored in
turn.
9.7.1 Misunderstandings of move or speech function
The misunderstandings of move or speech function are where Bodhi initiates with a
particular move or speech function but the communication partner thinks it is another.
There are three different versions of this type of misunderstanding in the data.
Misunderstanding of the dual move (as a demand for action)
The first is when Bodhi makes the dual move of giving information and requesting
articulation of that information and the communication partner interprets this as a demand
for action. The example that best illustrates this is the one from the observation data that
has been shown in other chapters, when Bodhi is at school walking around the
playground with his teacher. To recap, he sees someone in the toilet, but, as the teacher
has spent most of the year trying to get Bodhi to be interested in things other than
flushing toilets, she interprets his move as a request to go to the toilet (which she mostly
does not grant, but as they are just walking around the playground, she allows him to go).
As it turns out, this is not what Bodhi wants, and he does not let it go until the teacher has
understood him correctly and he has received the required response, which is the
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articulation of his multimodal move. Incidentally, this was one of the first times he
clearly showed a desire to give information:
(O5)
K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: (stops walking) /i /i / (signs ‘toilet’)

A1

TEACHER: Alright then. Off you go. Go to the toilet

rp

BODHI: (stamps foot) /i /i / (signs ‘toilet’)

rrp

TEACHER: well go on. Go to the toilet

rp

BODHI: (stamps foot) /i /i / (more insistently) (signs ‘toilet’)

K2f/A1:LS:A

TEACHER: (looks over at the toilet) Oh! You’re telling me you can
see there’s someone in the toilet.

K1/A2:LS:Af

BODHI: (resumes walking)

Misunderstanding of Secondary Actor move 1 (as the dual move)
The second type of misunderstanding of speech function that occurs with Bodhi is the
reverse of the above: that is, it is when Bodhi makes a Secondary Actor move, which is a
demand for an action service, and the communication partner interprets it as the dual
move and provides articulation of that move. The following example of this, when Bodhi
and I are traveling in the car together, also shows the usefulness of confirmation requests
for determining what Bodhi is communicating.
(O3)
A2

BODHI: /i /i / (distal points to street as we approach it)

K2f/A1:LS:A

SHOOSHI: That’s where Rhett & Ruth live.

rp

BODHI: /i /i / (continues to distal point to street)

cfrq

SHOOSHI: Do you want to go and visit them?

cf

BODHI: /i / (chest tap)

A1

SHOOSHI: ok. Let’s go and see if they’re home

K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: /i /i / (excitedly) (grabs my sleeve)

K2f/A1:LS:A

SHOOSHI: Yes, we’re going to Rhett and Ruth’s

253

(rp = replay
cfrq = confirmation request
cf = confirmation)
Misunderstanding of Secondary Actor move 2 (as Secondary Knower move)
The third misunderstanding of speech function is when the communication partner reads
a Secondary Actor move as a Secondary Knower move. In other words, the
communication partner thinks Bodhi is asking for information when he is asking for an
action. For example, in the interaction shown before, Bodhi and I are in the car on the
way to pick up his brother from a friend’s house when Bodhi asks where we are going
and whether he can flush the toilet there, however, I initially read this as a question about
whether they have a toilet:
(O9)
K2

BODHI: /i /i / (grabs my arm = where are we going?)

K1

SHOOSHI: We’re going to pick up Davi at Chris’ house

A2

BODHI: /i /i / (intense) (signs toilet)

K1

SHOOSHI: Yes they’ve got a toilet

ch/rp

BODHI: /i /i / (intense) (signs toilet)

A1

SHOOSHI: Yes you can flush it

A2f

BODHI: (smiles)

Misunderstanding of the dual move (without recognition of demand for articulation)
Misunderstanding of the dual move occurs when, although the communication partner
realises Bodhi is giving information about something, they do not realise that he wants
them to articulate that piece of information in words. Given that this dual move seems to
be fairly idiosyncratic to Bodhi’s communication, it is common for communication
partners, particularly the less informed ones, to misunderstand it. This can be seen in the
Dodo transcript where Dodo responds with “yes” to Bodhi’s dual move about eating
porridge, but he is not happy until she articulates the words back, although she does so in
the imperative Mood:
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(T1/E5)
K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: /2 nn´ / (contact pointing the bowl)

K2f

DODO: yes

ch/rp

BODHI: /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing the bowl)

K2f/A1:LS:A

DODO: yes, you eat some more porridge

K1/A2:LS:Af

BODHI: NV (Bodhi eats his food)

In this exchange, Dodo has responded to Bodhi in the same way one would respond to
someone if they made the same move in spoken language. For example, if Bodhi were to
say in words “I’m eating my porridge”, it would be quite legitimate to respond with “yes”
or “yes, you are”. However, as can be seen from the example this does not satisfy Bodhi.
9.7.2

Misunderstandings of experiential meaning

Misunderstandings that occur in the experiential domain can range from a complete
misunderstanding of the whole of the experiential meaning to a partial misunderstanding
of one of the constituents. Complete misunderstandings will be dealt with first.
Complete misunderstanding of experiential meaning
The following example shows that even the most informed communication partners, such
as myself, can misunderstand Bodhi, particularly if we are not privy to some aspect of his
life. The following misunderstanding occurs because at the time of data collection, Mark
had been the main one to give Bodhi breakfast, and he and Bodhi had a routine of putting
Bodhi’s leftovers into the bucket of scraps kept for our chickens. As Bodhi often contact
points things to indicate he wants the thing he’s tapping, I firstly presume that he is
asking me to give him something from the chicken’s bucket and then when he taps his
bowl, I think he’s asking for more breakfast.
(O14)
A2

BODHI: (brings breakfast bowl into the kitchen after he’s eaten half
of it and puts it on the bench, then taps the chooks bucket)
255

/i /i /
A1

SHOOSHI: (seeing old cake in the chicken’s food bucket) you can’t eat that,
it’s in the chooks bucket

rp

BODHI: (keeps contact pointing the chicken’s bucket and starts to get
upset) /√/√/ (then points to his bowl)

cfrq

SHOOSHI: Do you want some more? (picking up his bowl)

cf

BODHI: (shakes head, cries) /√/√/

cf

MARK: He wants you to put it in the chook’s bucket

rcf

SHOOSHI: Oh, Bodhi, you want me to put it in the chook’s bucket?

rrcf

BODHI: (chest tap)

A1

SHOOSHI: (puts it in the chicken’s bucket)

In this exchange, I have correctly interpreted the speech function of the move, that is that
Bodhi wants some action, and I have correctly understood that Bodhi wants me to do
something for him, however I have completely misunderstood what that action is, due to
both the undifferentiated nature of his communication and due to a lack of knowledge
about Bodhi and his life: the fact that he and Mark had a little routine of scraping the
breakfast dregs into the chickens’ bucket.
Partial misunderstandings of experiential meaning
There are a number of instances in the data where the communication partner understands
most of what Bodhi is trying to communicate but misses just one part. For example, and
as shown in Chapter 7, in the following exchange, Dodo understands that Bodhi is giving
her information about the bowl, but she does not get that he is saying he likes the bowl
until his third attempt. She interprets his move as a relational move about the bowl (That
(Carrier) is (relational: intensive) a lovely bowl (Attribute) or That (Token) is (relational:
intensive) my bowl (Value)), and not a mental move about Bodhi’s liking of the bowl:
(T1/E19)
K1/A2:LS:A

BODHI: /2 i / (contact pointing the bowl)

K2f/A1:LS:A

DODO: that’s a lovely bowl isn’t it?
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ch/rp

BODHI: /2 i / (contact pointing the bowl)

rrp

DODO: that’s your bowl. yes

ch/rp

BODHI: / 2 i hi hi /2 i hi hi /2i hi /2 i /

rrp/K2f/A1:LS:A

DODO: yes, d’you like that bowl?

K1/A2:LS:Af

BODHI: /´h´h / (giggly sound)

Further, in the next example, when Bodhi points to the bowl, she thinks he is telling her
he’s eating his breakfast, but actually he’s telling her he’s eating his breakfast in that
bowl, so she misses the circumstance of spatial location, in this/my bowl:
(T1/E14)
BODHI: /2 nn / 2 nn / 2 nn / (contact pointing bowl)
DODO: You’re eating your porridge. Yes
BODHI: /2 i /2 i /2 i / (contact pointing bowl)
DODO: in your bowl
BODHI: (giggles)
DODO: Yes
BODHI: (giggles and then continues to eat)

9.7.3 The network of misunderstandings that occur with Bodhi
Bodhi’s misunderstandings have been ordered as a system network in Figure 9.4.
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of dual move as demand for action
interpersonal
(of move or speech
function)

of request for action as dual move
of demand for action as demand for information
of dual move – not recognising the demand for
articulation

Misunderstandings

complete
experiential

process type
partial
circumstance

Figure 9.4

Misunderstandings that occur with Bodhi

The significance of categorising Bodhi’s misunderstandings is in the application to his
life: that is, to how this information might assist communication partners to better
understand him. As training communication partners has been noted to be beneficial to
the successful outcomes of communication with people with Aphasia (see for example
Kagan & Gailey 1993), the categorisation of Bodhi’s misunderstandings can be used as a
guide for Bodhi’s communication partners. Taking into account the fact that Bodhi’s
communication partners are not linguists, the above network has been rewritten (as
Figure 9.5), for communication partners to use as a preventative measure, or a
navigational tool.
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Is he making a comment
(telling you something)?

If so, what is it
about?

Articulate it for him

What about?

Use questions to
check, confirm and
clarify

yes/no question
What is Bodhi
saying?

Is he asking a question?

If so what type?
WH-question

Is he asking for some
action or thing?

If so, what is it?

Figure 9.5 Guide for communication partners
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Figure 9.5 guides communication partners to ask themselves what it is that Bodhi is
communicating. From an entry point of “What is Bodhi saying”, it guides the
communication partner to ponder whether he is making a comment, asking a question or
asking for some thing (that is, what move he is making and what speech function is he
realising). Then if he is making a comment, they need to find out what the comment is
about. As can be seen from the data, Bodhi often gives some indication of what he is
commenting about, through either sign or pointing, however the context and a knowledge
of Bodhi and his life certainly plays a role here. For example, when Bodhi points to the
street of friends whilst going past it in the car, if the communication partner does not
know who Bodhi knows in that street, there is no way they can articulate Bodhi’s move
back to him. Once they have established what Bodhi is telling them, they then need to
articulate it for him.
If asking a question, the communication partner needs to determine what kind of question
Bodhi is asking, and then what it is about. If he is asking for some action or thing, again,
they need to determine what action or thing it is. The crucial and final point is that the
communication partner needs to use Bodhi as the guide by questioning him, in order to
clarify and confirm that they are getting it right. This highlights the importance of the use
of the confirmation and clarification requests.
Figure 9.5, the guide for communication partners, covers the areas of speech function and
experiential meaning, and sees the multimodal communicator as the key to the process of
successful communication. It encourages the communication partner to jointly negotiate
the meaning with Bodhi.
9.8

Discussion

This section discusses the issues arising from using Exchange Structure for the analysis
of Bodhi’s communication. As a way into this discussion, the following table (Table 9.6)
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that summarises the moves Bodhi makes will be discussed, as this shows what kind of
communicator Bodhi is.
Moves

Number of occurrences
T2 (Mark)

Total

Primary Knower (K1)
Secondary Knower (K2)
Secondary Actor (ordinary goods-&services) (A2)
Unknowns

22
0
10

14
15
9

26
15
19

7

4

11

Primary Knower (K1)

1

2

3

TOTAL

40

44

75

Primary Knower follow up (K1f)

0

1

1

Secondary Knower follow up (K2f)
Dual move follow up (K1/A2:LS:Af)
Primary Actor (A1)
Secondary Actor (A2)
Secondary Actor follow up (A2f)
Primary Actor follow up (A1f)
Unknowns

1
8
10
1
7
1
8

2
0
5
0
0
0
2

3
8
13
1
7
1
10

TOTAL

36

10

44

backchannel
0
check
0
response to check
0
clarification request
0
clarification
1
response to clarification
0
confirmation request
0
confirmation
4
response to confirmation
0
replay request
0
replay
8
forward channel
0
collocational prompt
0
TOTAL
13
Table 9.6
Bodhi’s exchange moves across the data

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
2
0
0
6
0
0
9
0
0
9

Dynamic

Responses
Responses

Synoptic

Initiations

T1 (Dodo)

Table 9.6 shows that overall, and as demonstrated, the highest concentration of Bodhi’s
moves are initiations, which confirms that he is an active communicator. Further, it
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shows that he mostly initiates as Primary Knower, followed by Secondary Actor and
Secondary Knower. In other words, Bodhi regularly comments on his life and the world
around him, as well as asking for things and asking about things.
Response moves are divided into Synoptic and Dynamic moves. Of the synoptic moves,
Bodhi most often makes Primary Actor moves and Dual Move follow-ups. The Primary
Actor moves show that Bodhi responds to other people’s directives. He is, after all, a
child who is told what to do reasonably often. The Dual Move follow-ups show that
Bodhi responds to other people’s responses to him.
Of the dynamic moves, what stands out is that there are only three types present in this
corpus: replays, confirmations and clarifications. The presence of theses moves seem to
be features of the multimodal communication environment, where misunderstandings are
common. As shown, the replays are used by Bodhi to prompt the communication partner
to have another go at responding to his move. On the other hand, the confirmation and
clarification questions are used by the communication partner to question Bodhi about
what he is trying to mean. This seems to point to the usefulness of these types of
questions in the multimodal communication environment. In other words, to promote
successful communication, the communication partner should regularly check their
interpretation with the multimodal communicator before responding.
Table 9.6 also shows that there are many moves that Bodhi does not make. In other words
he enacts a fairly restricted conversation. Many of these absent moves, such as
backchannels, forward channels and checks, are moves that tend to occur in longer
stretches of conversation, and this is not the kind of conversation one has with Bodhi.
This brings me to two points, the first being about the structure of interactions with
Bodhi, and the second being about why conversations with Bodhi are the way they are.
Both are discussed in 9.8.1 below.
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9.8.1 Conversations with Bodhi
Dividing the transcripts into exchanges sheds light on the kind of conversation Bodhi
engages in. Most exchanges are relatively short, being constituted by pairs of moves,
where either Bodhi initiates and the communication partner responds, or vice versa.
Responses are not used by Bodhi as a starting point for a new conversational departure.
This conforms to one of the features Painter (1989) outlines as belonging to the
protolanguage stage, and in this sense, Bodhi is very much like an infant communicator.
It is difficult to move beyond the immediacy of pairs of moves when Bodhi does not have
the means, it seems, to converse further. It seems that he sometimes does have the
inclination and would converse further if he had the means. This assumption is based on
two factors: the high number of times Bodhi initiates interactions, especially to give
information; and the occasions where Bodhi initiates and maintains a conversation by
showing a series of pictures to the communication partner. It could be argued that this is
Bodhi’s attempt to generate a conversation of more than one pair of moves. This can be
seen in the example below (also used in the previous chapter to demonstrate move links)
when Bodhi and one of his carers, Liz, are preparing to go out:
(O13/T4)
BODHI: /i /i / (contact pointing car picture)
LIZ: Yeah, we are going in the car, but first, we have to get dressed
BODHI: /i /i / i / (contact pointing walk picture)
LIZ: Show me
BODHI: (shows walk card whilst contact pointing it)
LIZ: A walk. D’you wanna go for a walk?
BODHI: (contact points to car picture)
LIZ: D’you wanna go in my car?
BODHI: (contact pointing ladder picture)
LIZ: The ladder. Yep the ladder
BODHI: /i /i / (contact pointing guitar picture)
LIZ: Yeh the guitar. We won’t play the guitar now…what else?
BODHI: /i /i /hi /(contact pointing some picture)
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LIZ: Guitar?
BODHI: /i / (contact pointing computer picture)
LIZ: That’s the um rabbit game
BODHI: (contact pointing bike picture)
LIZ: Bike
BODHI: /i /i / (contact pointing car picture)
LIZ: Yep. We’re going in the car
In this interaction, Bodhi is going through his cards one by one and pointing to each of
them in turn, as if to make conversation as best as he is able to. While it is hard to say
exactly which move he is making, either Secondary Actor, Secondary Knower or Primary
Actor, he is clearly trying to make conversation in some way. Sometimes the
communication partner only responds by labeling the pictures, as Liz does above, but at
other times the communication partner is seen to attempt to extend the conversation, as
Liz does further on in the interaction.
(O15/T4)
BODHI: /i /i / (contact pointing escalators picture)
LIZ: Show me. I can’t see. Escalator! Did you go on the escalator today?
BODHI: /i / (contact pointing escalators picture)
LIZ: We’re not going on the escalator. You like escalators, don’t you?
BODHI: (clapping his hands) /i /i / (distal pointing towards a street)
LIZ: That’s Denmark Street. We’re not going that way. We’re going past Sam’s house,
but we’re not going in. We’re going to drive down the hill to the park. We’re going to the
playground. You can climb on the ladder and you can flush the toilet. We can walk…
BODHI: /i /i / (distal pointing towards a house as they drive past it)
LIZ: Yeah, that’s Sam’s house but we’re not going there.
What is evident from interactions like (O15/T4) above is that even when the
communication partner aims to extend the conversation, Bodhi brings it back to
adjacency pairs of questions and answers, or demands and responses to demands. It is
264

difficult to say whether the conversational constraints are a result of Bodhi’s intellectual
disability or lack of speech language, or the interplay of both. Regardless, what is evident
from the analysis is that conversations with Bodhi are characterised by a limited range of
moves that mainly occur in pairs.
Additionally, the communication partners rarely initiate casual conversations with Bodhi,
and the more experienced they are, the less likely they are to do it, as evidenced by the
lack of exchanges where communication partners adopt the Primary Knower role. So not
only does Bodhi not initiate extended conversations with other people, but they do not
initiate them much with him. This clearly shows the limitations of conversations with
Bodhi.
9.8.2 Significance of the dual move
The dual move is a significant feature of Bodhi’s communication and needs some
discussing. It shows how Bodhi uses the communication partner’s language abilities to
have his move transmodalised, with the aim, it seems, of having it understood. It is
almost as if Bodhi knows he can’t speak, but knows the communication partner can, and
exploits their lexicogrammatical ability. This indicates that he has the paradigmatic
system of language but not the syntagmatic, yet he needs the syntagmatic in order to hear
and verify the communication partner’s understanding of his message. If this is the case,
it is almost impossible, then, to view Bodhi’s communication output on its own, because
it cannot, and does not, exist without the efforts of the communication partner. While this
can be said to be the same for speakers, it is all the more so for Bodhi, who doesn’t have
the words with which to express himself. As the communication partner does have the
words, it is through the sharing of their verbal output, that it is possible for Bodhi to make
his meanings. This perhaps confirms Halliday’s (1996) point that “all human semiotic
activity, from early childhood onwards, is as it were, filtered through our grammar-based
higher order consciousness” (p.6).
It also indicates that Bodhi and the speaker share the same underlying system of language
and meanings, but not the same modes of expression to construe those meanings. Bodhi’s
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output is different in two main ways: the first being that he uses different modes of
expression, and the second being that even with his modes of expression, there are many
meanings he cannot explicitly express, and it is left up to the communication partner to
retrieve those meanings from the context.
In terms of what Bodhi is demanding with the dual move, I turn to Halliday’s (1984)
description of the two kinds of exchange of meanings:
goods-&-services, where language is ancillary to a (non-symbolic) process
that itself is independent of language, and information, where the process
is itself a symbolic one - the ‘commodity’ that is being exchanged is
language, or rather is a semiotic that is realised in the form of language.
(p.29)
Here Halliday explains that an information exchange is an exchange of language. That is,
when a person asks for information, they are actually asking for language as a
commodity. Whilst Bodhi is not asking for information with his dual move, he is still
nevertheless asking for language, language as articulation of his multimodal move. This
makes an interesting distinction between Bodhi’s communication and a transition
language as used by a child. Halliday (1984, p.27-28) states that the difference between
the pragmatic and mathetic functions of the transition stage is that in the mathetic
function no response is called for. The mathetic function shows the child verbally
reflecting on the world around them, which does not require the same response as the
pragmatic function, where the child demands a response. However, this is not the case
with Bodhi as when he gives information, he also demands a response of articulation.
9.9

Conclusion

This chapter used Exchange Structure Analysis to examine the kind of communicator
Bodhi is, by showing which exchange roles he takes up. It showed that he is a particular
communicator, taking up three out of the six initiating synoptic moves. Further, this
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chapter also showed that Bodhi has a limited number of response moves, however, he
responds to a variety of moves initiated by others.
In order to account for the idiosyncratic nature of Bodhi’s communication, this chapter
has also extended and developed Exchange Structure theory in a number of ways. Firstly,
there is the addition to the synoptic system of the dual move, a move that simultaneously
contains the two speech functions of giving information and demanding a service.
Secondly, the chapter has shown how Bodhi’s demand for service is a particular type of
service, a linguistic service, which is different to Ventola’s (1987) description of a
linguistic service. Ventola’s is a demand for the service of the provision of information
by one person who does not already have that information, whereas Bodhi’s is a demand
for the linguistic service of articulation of information that he simultaneously provides
through multimodal means. This study only looked at Bodhi’s type of linguistic service,
being articulation. However, given the fact that Ventola (1987) describes a type of
linguistic service that is a demand for the provision of information, the question remains
as to whether there might be further types of linguistic service, such as translation. The
exploration of this is, of course, beyond the scope of this study.
This chapter has also extended the work of Ventola (1987) and Martin (1992) on the
dynamic system of Exchange Structure, by dividing the moves replay and clarification
into two moves based on whether they are requests or provisions. This built on Ventola’s
(1987) work, which split the move confirmation in the same manner, and was adopted in
order to account for the fact that Martin’s (1985) definition of replay defined replay as a
request for replay, whereas Bodhi’s replay move is the provision of a replay.
Finally, this chapter has classified Bodhi’s misunderstandings into a number of types,
based on the Systemic Functional parameters of move and speech function. It has taken
the classification of misunderstandings to a further and different level of delicacy than
did the ethnomethodologists, such as Schegloff et al (1977), who classified Bodhi’s type
of misunderstanding according to the place it occurrs within the exchange, or according
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to ways that are not particularly useful here because they relate to lexicogrammatical
features (see Schegloff 1987a & b).
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______________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION

______________________________________________________________________
10.1

Introduction

This study set out to explore the meaning making abilities of Bodhi, a boy with a severe
intellectual disability and a severe communication disorder. Specifically, the study
examined the kinds of metafunctional meanings Bodhi makes and the resources he uses
to make those meanings. In doing so, the study also shed light on the underlying system
of language that Bodhi uses, as well as exploring the roles Bodhi takes up within
exchanges of meaning with others.
The aim of this chapter is to both review the research questions in order to synthesise the
answers provided within the thesis, and to discuss issues that are raised at various points
in the thesis, and that can only be discussed after having explored all the various aspects
of Bodhi’s meaning making. It must be pointed out, however, that in some ways, this
study raises as many questions as it answers.
10.2

The research questions
•

What meanings does Bodhi make?

As stated at the start of this thesis, this question was designed to be able to examine the
metafunctional meanings Bodhi makes. This was explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8,
focusing on the interpersonal, ideational and textual metafunctions respectively. These
chapters demonstrated that Bodhi’s expression of these kinds of meanings is more
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restricted in some areas than in others. Specifically, Chapter 6 demonstrated that even
without speech language, he is able to express three of the four speech functions, (but not
offers), albeit in a somewhat undifferentiated manner. In terms of metafunctional
meanings, the interpersonal metafunction is probably the least restricted or most
developed area of Bodhi’s meaning making. This could mean that, as with typically
developing children (see, for example, Painter 2004), the interpersonal aspect of
communication is the most important thing for Bodhi: being able to interact with people,
to have an effect in and on the world and the people around him, to be able to share his
life with them. Bodhi’s keenness to interact with people is confirmed by the high number
of exchanges he initiates.
Ideationally and textually, Bodhi’s meaning making was much more restricted, with only
a limited number of experiential meanings, and relatively few textual meanings being
expressed. Chapter 7, on the ideational metafunction, showed that in terms of the
semiotic space Bodhi occupies, it is predominantly one of the concrete world, and not at
all of the abstract world. Chapter 8, on the textual metafunction, showed that Bodhi only
communicates peaks of salience in his moves, which are constituted by new information,
and that the rest of the meanings must be gleaned by the communication partner from
sources outside the text.
These findings lead to the question of whether Bodhi has what can be called a language,
and if so what kind. At this point it is useful to revisit the SF work on child language
development reviewed in Chapter 2; since Bodhi’s communication is so restricted, it
seems to be in many ways like a protolanguage. In order to explore this further, the
features of the proto and transition stages of language will be reviewed and discussed
here in relation to Bodhi’s communication.
Painter (1989) outlines three features of the protolanguage phase:
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1. The child is restricted to conversing about the here-and-now context as by not
having a language they have no means to bring into the conversation things that
are not co-present in the immediate environment.
As demonstrated, this is primarily true of Bodhi in that he is limited to communicating
about things that are co-present in the immediate surrounding environment. However, it
is more the case that he is stuck in the ‘here’, rather than the ‘now’, because Bodhi
communicates about the future, shown by his constant questioning of Mark whether he’ll
be able to flush the toilet when they get to the chemist shop. Interestingly, expressing the
future is accomplished by the use of a sign, in this case the sign for ‘toilet’, which shows
that if Bodhi does have a linguistically semiotic mode of expression, he can move beyond
the present time and into the future. The same applies to the past; while there is no
evidence in the corpus of Bodhi communicating about the past, he has done so from time
to time using a picture. For example, upon returning from a trip to the escalators, he has,
and still does, sometimes point to the picture of the escalators to tell me where he’s been.
But this is not a common occurrence and his interest seems to lie in the present and the
near future. Nevertheless, the place of augmentative and alternative communication is
clearly a lynch pin here for helping Bodhi access meanings that exist beyond those copresent in the surrounding environment.
2. The sounds produced are novel and not imitations of the adult language. Each
sound is also specific to its function.
This is not entirely the case with Bodhi, because as demonstrated in this study, he does
make sounds that are imitations of adult language where he can. However, he also makes
prevalent use of the sound /i/, which is not an imitation of adult language, but it is also
not a sound that is used in only one function; when expressed with different tones, it
expresses some differences in meaning. The sound /i/ is consistently used across a range
of functions, but when uttered with a rising tone, it functions to initiate.
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3. Interactions occur in pairs where either the child initiates and the adult responds,
or vice versa, and the response cannot be or is not used as a starting point for a
new conversational departure.
As shown in the previous chapter on Exchange Structure, most of Bodhi’s interactions do
occur in pairs, and responses are not used by him to extend the conversation.
Halliday adds to Painter’s three points that the child’s protolanguage “cannot create
information” (Halliday 1993, p.96). As has been demonstrated in this study, Bodhi does
attempt to “create information”, giving the communication partner a variety of pieces of
information about his environment, for example what he is touching as he passes (the
steps, the beads), what he likes (his bowl), and that his grandmother is visiting.
By comparing Bodhi’s communication to the above four points, it can be seen that
Bodhi’s language has some features of a child’s protolanguage, but not others. However,
we can further this trajectory by also comparing Bodhi’s communication to the features
of the transition phase of language development, outlined by both Halliday (1975) and
Painter (1989). The transition phase sees the child develop two macrofunctions:
pragmatic and mathetic. The main features of the pragmatic function are that the child
learns to have an effect on the world, and to assign roles to both themself and others,
culminating in the ability to use language to inform. As Halliday (1975) states:
…success consists no longer in simply obtaining the desired object or piece
of behaviour, but rather in playing one’s part; in freely accepting the roles
that one is assigned, and getting others to accept those that one has assigned
to them. (p.51)
There is no doubt from the data presented in this thesis that Bodhi has learnt to have an
effect on the world, that he assigns roles to others and accepts the roles that others assign
him. Further, as demonstrated in numerous examples, Bodhi does use his modes of
expression to inform.
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The main features of the mathetic function as outlined by Painter (1989) are:
1.

The development of an understanding that speech may be an appropriate response
to a request for some action or thing.

From the data it can be seen that Bodhi both understands that speech is an appropriate
response to a request for some action or thing. As shown, when he asks whether he can
do something, such as flush the toilet, he accepts Mark’s verbal response to his request.
2.

The generalising of experience, where the child is able to label actual things in the
real world and compare them to symbolic ones, such as pictures in books.

Bodhi’s use of pictures is an indicator that he is able to generalise experience from the
real world to the symbolic representation of the world. For example, when he points to
the picture of the escalators to talk about going to the escalators.
3.

The building up of lexical items into taxonomic sets with hyponymic or
meronymic relations, where the child realises and expresses that things are the
same or different, or part of a set.

Bodhi cannot really do this, as clustering lexical items into sets requires the abstract term
of the superordinate, which Bodhi is not able to express. It remains to be seen whether, if
we were to provide him with pictorial resources of superordinates, he would be able to
build up sets of things. Other than bringing out the kitchen utensils one by one (which
incidentally he does not do anymore), Bodhi does not show an interest in categorising
the world in this manner. Since the data was collected, Bodhi shows other signs of early
development of taxonomizing. For example, he will point to cars that are the same make
as the cars of people we know, and utter his sound for those people’s names, to say that
that particular car is the same as theirs.
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4. The verbal interpretation by the child of events in their world as they unfold,
where the child produces a kind of “running-commentary” (Painter 1989, p.45).
As can be seen from both the Mark and Dodo transcripts, Bodhi does make comments
about his life as it unfolds. For example, in the Mark transcript, on the way to the car,
Bodhi comments on the beads, the steps and some paper he has found. At breakfast with
Dodo, Bodhi comments on his bowl, his medicine, his puzzle and a variety of other
things. However, the comments are fairly restricted. The only types of comments Bodhi
seems able to make are labeling (people, places and things); telling of his liking or
preference for something. The running commentary does not extend to narrative retelling
of events.
5. The development of linguistic structure, where the child adds to his meaning potential
by adding classifications to his/her original labels, such as from ‘dog’ to ‘big dog’; or
by adding a Process to his/her original labels, such as ‘pat dog’, configuring what is
argued to be the nucleus of the clause in SF terms, Process plus Medium (Halliday &
Matthiessen 2004).
As described, Bodhi sometimes classifies nouns, for example when he such points to a
car and says /DQd /DQd /, to identify a car that is the same as his Dad’s. He also
classifies places, however, his meanings are so implicit that unless you have a knowledge
of Bodhi and his life, it is impossible to know what he is classifying, as demonstrated by
Bodhi ‘s pointing to the street where friends live when we drive past it. This is by no
means an isolated incident. In fact, every single time we drive somewhere Bodhi points to
numerous streets to identify various places and people who live in those streets.
As shown in the ergativity analysis in Chapter 7, Bodhi does not express a Process,
therefore he does not configure the nucleus of the clause in English. However, in
conjunction with the communication partner, through transmodalisation, the Process is
revealed.
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There are other points to consider in relation to the transition phase as well. For instance,
Bodhi’s use of different intonation patterns, such as a raised tone to ask for goods-&services including the linguistic service of articulation, and falling or flattened tones for
answering in the affirmative concords with the transition phase. As Benson et al (2005c)
suggest, the recruitment of intonation in addition to articulation is a step towards the
possibility of making more complex discourse, a step which allows meaning making that
is symbolic.
Further Halliday (1975) points out that in the transition phase of language, the child
expresses meanings of either one or the other of the pragmatic or mathetic functions,
whereas in the adult system multiple meanings are expressed simultaneously. Halliday
(1975) explains the difference as one of ‘function’ rather than ‘use’. Further, Halliday
explains that the transition phase of language is seen to be complete when the child has
mastered “the principles of grammar and of dialogue, and thus effectively completed the
transition to the adult language system. He is still, of course, only just beginning his
mastery of the adult language (p.51). But if one does not have access to the wordings of a
language, does this mean one does not have access to the system of language? Can one
have the paradigmatic without the syntagmatic? As shown in the study, Bodhi
understands at least some of the language others use with him, especially when it is about
relatively concrete matters, therefore, he must understand some of the system of
language.
But where does this leave us? If Bodhi says /i/ with a rising tone, can it be said that, like
Nigel (Halliday 1975), he is expressing a pragmatic choice, that is, a demand for
someone to do something. Additionally, if he says /i/ with a falling tone, can it be said
that, like Nigel, he is expressing a mathetic choice and is reflecting on the world for
himself? As indicated by my analysis, these conclusions are not possible. Instead, I argue
that, among other things, Bodhi uses a rising tone to simultaneously comment on the
world around him and demand articulation. That is to say, in using a rising tone, Bodhi
makes both a pragmatic and a mathetic choice, which seems to be a different way of
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expressing meanings than the typically developing child in the transition phase of
language.
The main feature of the transition phase of language that Bodhi does not have is the
increasing use of utterances based on the adult system of language. This is the area that
has never really developed for Bodhi. As shown in this study, whilst Bodhi has a small
number of words, he has never really developed the intermediate stratum of the
lexicogrammar. To paraphrase Halliday (1975), this means he does not have an openended system with massive potential that “can create indefinitely many meanings and
indefinitely many sentences and clauses and phrases and words for the expression of
those meanings” (p.35-36). The system is limited by both his lack of a lexicogrammar
and his severe intellectual disability, but the way these two interact is hard to unravel and
has not been the task of this study. However, as the study has shown, not having a
lexicogrammar does not mean that Bodhi cannot make meaning. Indeed, he uses his
multimodes to make a variety of meanings, albeit limited.
It is nevertheless interesting to speculate whether the lack of a lexicogrammar is due to
his severe intellectual disability. Given that people with communication disorders and no
or less intellectual disability strive to make a wider range of meanings than Bodhi does,
and given that Bodhi has been immersed from birth in an enormously stimulating and
language-rich environment, I conjecture that this is the case. However, we do not know
for certain.
Returning to the question what kind of language Bodhi has, clearly, his version of
language has features of both the proto and transition phases of language. However, the
question is, does his language have any features of adult language, and if not, is it
adequate to label him a different meaner, rather an infant meaner?
Painter (2004) briefly sums up the key milestones in the development of language as the
emergence of a system of signs, the transition to a three-level semiotic, the development
of the informative function and the ability to frame generalisations. As shown in this
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study, Bodhi clearly has a system of signs and has developed the informative function,
but does not really have a three-level semiotic and cannot frame generalisations.
Halliday (1993) however, provides an alternative breakdown of the features of language
learning from early childhood through to early adolescence. This breakdown allows for
an examination of which semiotic resources Bodhi is able to use. Halliday (1993) outlines
21 features of language development. These features will be listed and addressed
individually to the point Bodhi has reached. Following that, they are simply listed:
1. Symbolic acts (“Acts of Meaning”): Starting to construct signs.
Clearly Bodhi is capable of symbolic acts of meaning.
2. Iconic (natural) symbols: Constructing signs that resemble what they mean.
Halliday gives the example from his own data of Nigel as grasping and releasing an
object to indicate the desire to hold the object. Bodhi frequently points to objects to
indicate desire, such as when he wants a drink, he may point to the juice bottle or the cup.
However, he also uses the more abstract mode of pointing to a pictorial to request these.
3.

Systems of symbolic acts: Organising signs into paradigms (protolanguage)

Bodhi clearly has systematic choices of symbolic acts that he selects from in order to
make meanings. Halliday (1993) links this achievement to the freedom of movement in a
developing child.
4. The lexicogrammatical stratum: Constructing a three-level semiotic system
(language).
As shown in the data, using vocalisations and pictures, Bodhi can name things, though he
does not express the system of reference. Further, whilst Bodhi has developed a restricted
system for giving information, as he has not developed a lexicogrammar, he does not
have the multidimensional semantic space that Halliday speaks of. As demonstrated, he
occupies a very restricted semantic space.
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5. Non-iconic (conventional) symbols: Taking up signs that do not resemble their
meanings.
For this feature to occur, Halliday (1993) states there must be a level of purely abstract
coding that mediates between meaning and expression. This is somewhat the case for
Bodhi, as shown, he has some arbitrary signs, such as the hand sign for ‘toilet’, however,
as this relates to the “explosion into grammar” (p.97), it is extremely limited.
6. “Trailer” strategy: Anticipating a developmental leap that is to come.
While there is no evidence of this in the corpus, Bodhi intermittently takes a new step
forward in communication. However, unlike typically developing children, who then
come to that step a little later on, Bodhi often does not develop the step. For example, as
mentioned in Chapter 7, once when Bodhi had got out of the bath he pointed to two
pictures in a row: ‘bath’ and ‘finished’, as if to construe a move with two (or three)
constituents “bath’s finished”. However, he has never formed a move using two pictures
in this way again.
7. “Magic Gateway” strategy: finding a way in to a new activity or to a new
understanding.
Halliday (1993) explains that this feature is complimentary to feature 6, the “trailer”
strategy and is about the child finding a special way in to a different world of meaning.
The only time this seems to have occurred with Bodhi is when I first provided him with
pictorials to point to and he understood how to use them and began to use them straight
away in a very intensive and intentional manner. Otherwise, this is clearly an area where
Bodhi is severely limited.
8. Generalisation (classifying, taxonomising): Naming classes (“common terms”)
and classes of classes.
In this corpus, Bodhi’s naming is mostly limited to asking about the people he is naming,
in the manner of a protolanguage. However, at the time of writing and during the duration
of this study, Bodhi regularly points to cars that are the same as his father Mark’s car, and
says /DQd/DQd/, to say that the cars are the same sort. (This is verified by his
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contentment with the communication partner’s response). Without a lexicogrammar, his
ability to classify and taxonomise is severely restricted. However as he shows little
interest in doing so, perhaps there is nothing to drive this process.
9. The “Metafunctional” principle: Experiential and interpersonal meanings (from
single function utterances, either pragmatic [doing] or mathetic [learning], to
multifunctional ones, both experiential and interpersonal).
As demonstrated, Bodhi makes both experiential and interpersonal meanings within the
one move.
Bodhi is basically locked out from what is on offer from features 10 onwards, as well as
more than partially from many of the earlier features because these are all features that
relate to having a lexicogrammar. Features 10 to 21 are:
10. Semogenic strategies: Expanding the meaning potential (refining distinctions,
moving into new domains, deconstructing linked variables).
11. Construal of “Information”: From rehearsing shared experience to imparting
unshared experience.
12. The interpersonal “Gateway”: Developing new meanings first in interpersonal
contexts.
13. Dialectic of system and process: Constructing language from text, constructing
text from language.
14. Filtering and the “challenge” zone: Rejecting what is out of range and working on
what is accessible.
15. Probability – the quantative foundation: Construing relative frequencies.
16. Discourse – The third metafunction: Construing a parallel world of semiosis.
17. Complementarities: Construing experience from different angles of vision.
18. Abstraction and Literacy: Understanding abstract meanings and moving into the
written mode. (p.116)
19. Reconstruction and regression: Backing off to an earlier “semiotic” moment while
reconstruing both content and expression.
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20. Grammatical metaphor (nominalising, technologising): From commonsense
grammar to the grammar of objects and technical hierarchies.
21. Synoptic/dynamic complementarity: Reconciling two semiotic models of human
experience.
Typically developing children move through these steps in some kind of order, where the
building of the language system is cumulative and consistent. Unlike these children,
Bodhi does not have this cumulative progression; it is patchy and incomplete at best. For
example, in classifying, he does not classify the world, except in concrete terms, such as
different cars, or different places he’s going. Not being able to move beyond these
limitations are evidence of his intellectual disability.
Thus Bodhi is clearly missing major pieces of the adult language system. He has not
followed the typical developmental trajectory and seems to be stuck with a
protolanguage, even though it is one that has some features of a transition language and
even a few of the adult system of language. However even though Bodhi has what is
more akin to a protolanguage than a language, characterising Bodhi’s version of language
as different rather than infantile provides a more sharply defined picture. In other words,
one needs to look at the features that make it different in order to typologise it. In order to
attempt to typologise Bodhi’s protolanguage, its features need to be explicated.
Firstly, while a protolanguage is a face-to-face language, there are other fully developed
languages that are also face-to-face languages, such as sign languages like Auslan
(Johnston 1996). Face-to-face languages have particular features including being
grounded in the here-and-now context, so the context plays a crucial role in the meaning
making. However, it is not just the immediate here-and-now context that has a
role/function in Bodhi’s communication, but also the context of Bodhi and his life. As
demonstrated by Hasan (1996), relying on contexts outside the here-and-now implies a
fairly restricted circle of communication partners. To quote her again on the implicit style
of Urdu:
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Whoever is able to supply the correct intended meanings here must possess
knowledge that goes beyond the here-and-now of the discourse. Thus the
correct retrieval of the intended meanings … argues for the existence of
interaction in the past, and for a consequent rapport between speaker and
the addressee (p.204).
A second feature of face-to-face languages is that meaning is not arrived at instantly, but
via a spiraling down or bringing into focus, as it were, from the general to the more
specific. As was also shown in this study, Bodhi communicates in this way, providing
one experiential clue and some interpersonal clues about what he is meaning, and then in
many cases, working with the communication partner to jointly negotiate the meanings
being construed. This implies a willingness on the part of the communication partner to
enter into a communication environment where they will be required to work with Bodhi
to construct meaning. However, as Klotz (2001) suggests, “the patience, empathy and
acceptance that is necessary to engage with another who has very idiosyncratic and
limited dispositions is [or can be] one that is difficult to create” (p.328-329). In other
words, the success or effectiveness of Bodhi’s communication requires a particular set of
attributes in the communication partner.
Therefore the third feature of Bodhi’s protolanguage is the communication partner and
their contributions to the meaning making. The communication partner must enter, as it
were, a space of mutuality with Bodhi (Klotz 2001). This means a willingness to share
his world on his terms, and to negotiate with him the meanings he is trying to make.
Whilst ‘normal’ conversation also requires interlocutors to enter a shared space (Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs 1986), it is all the more so with Bodhi, and can be likened to the situation
that occurs for other people with language disorders and their communication partners,
where the contributions of the communication partner helps build the overall coherence
of the conversation (Ferguson 1992b).
Thus the communication partner needs to have a willingness to enter the communicative
space with Bodhi. Specifically, this means:
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1. to look at, listen to, jointly construct with and articulate for Bodhi, if necessary.
2. to draw on a variety of resources including Bodhi, the surrounding environment,
any past knowledge and the resources provided by the systems of language, such
as collocation.
The fact that the communication partner’s contributions must be taken into account raises
the question of where to draw the line with the unit of multimodal communication. Are
we to view the communicative turns of people like Bodhi in isolation, or are we to view
them in conjunction with the communication partner’s turns? As has been recommended
in the AAC and Aphasia literature, I propose that both are taken into consideration so that
the meaning potential of people like Bodhi is framed as what they are able to mean in
conjunction with the communication partner’s contributions. This is a joint process of
meaning making, led by the person with the communication disorder/difference. If we do
not take this into account, it seems that only half the communication picture can be seen.
To conclude this section on Bodhi’s meaning making, I shall characterise him as having
an idiolect that has features of a face-to-face language, where immediate and past
contexts play a role, and where meaning is arrived at through a spiraling down from an
initial multimodal expression that is provided by Bodhi, through the joint construction of
meaning with a communication partner. This is a protolanguage that has features of a
transition language and of language.
Bodhi’s communication can therefore be configured in the following way in Figure 10.1:
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Figure 10.1: Meaning making with Bodhi
Action exchange

Salient multimodal meaning

Bodhi: /´i hi ih hi/
(standing near chair)

(T1/E74)

(New)

(T1/E48)
Knowledge

Immediate

of past context

Knowledge exchange

material context

Knowledge

Bodhi: /i/i/ (contact

of language

pointing puzzle piece)

Mark: What? What do you
want to show me?

Dodo: You show me where

Shooshi: he wants to sit in

that one goes

the chair with Dodo and
have a cuddle I think

Mark: Do you want to sit

Confirmation and clarification questions
or replays by Bodhi

here with Dodo?

Bodhi: /i/ (continues to
point to piece)

Bodhi: /i/ (chest tap)
For Action exchanges:

For Knowledge exchanges:

Mark: Ok. I’ll get up.

Action performed,

Articulation of

Dodo: That’s the

Yeah I’ll go and have

postponed or denied

move in words

blue truck

some porridge
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Figure 10.1 shows that from an initial multimodal move the exchange spirals down to
completion through the process of joint negotiation. The features that contribute to this
are the communication partner’s knowledge of language and the past context of Bodhi’s
life, clues in the immediate situational context, as well as replays from Bodhi and
clarification or confirmation questions from the communication partner.
Figure 10.1 shows successful results are different for action exchanges and knowledge
exchanges. For actions exchanges, the desired result is that the action is performed,
postponed or denied. For knowledge exchanges the desired result is the articulation of
Bodhi’s move in words.
Bodhi’s language also fits into a larger taxonomy of languages that was introduced at the
start of the thesis:
Figure 1.1 A simple taxonomy of languages
speech
languages
Language

signed languages (e.g. Auslan)
non-speech
languages
multimodal languages
(e.g. Bodhi’s)

Having typologised Bodhi’s communication as a transmodalised protolanguage with
features of other phases of language, this taxonomy can now be revised to account for the
fact that Bodhi’s language is more of a protolanguage than a language:
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Figure 10.2 A simple taxonomy of languages - revised
speech
languages
Language

signed languages (e.g. Auslan)
non-speech
languages

three-tiered
semiotic
multimodal languages
proto+ (e.g.
Bodhi’s)

Figure 10.2 shows multimodal languages further divided into those that are a complete
three-tiered semiotic, and those, like Bodhi’s, that are more like a protolanguage, with
extra features as explained above. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate who
might have a three-tiered multimodal language that is not a sign language.

•

What resources does Bodhi use to make his meanings?

This question was formulated to allow for a systematic examination of how Bodhi
realises semantic options that are typically realised using speech. Beginning in Chapter 4,
the study showed that Bodhi is truly a multimodal communicator, using a range of modes
of expression, including vocalisations, gestures, both distal and contact, signs, actions,
eye gaze and behaviours. The multimodality also extends to the types of mode expressed
in his moves in that some are more linguistically semiotic than others. That is to say,
some modes, such as signing, approximating words and pointing to picture symbols, can
be construed as being of a higher order semiotic than others (Matthiessen 2004), because
there is an intermediate layer of meaning making between the content and expression.
That is, there is a symbolic representation of meaning being used. Other modes of
expression, such as behaviours, are more like a simple primary semiotic (Matthiessen
2004), in that there is no symbolic layer of meaning making sandwiched between the
semantics and the expression of it. However, all modes are semiotic in that they convey
meaning.

•

What kind of discourse roles does Bodhi take up?
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This question was designed to explore the meanings made across the conversational turns
in order to both account for the role of the communication partner, but also to see how
Bodhi navigates the conversation environment. The study showed that Bodhi is quite
competent in his turn-taking abilities, both as initiator and responder to a variety of
moves. Whilst it was shown that Bodhi initiates to give information, and demand both
information and goods-&-services, there were many moves, both synoptic and dynamic
that Bodhi did not make. In terms of speech function, the move Bodhi did not make was
to give goods-&-services.
In particular, moves that are typically found in longer stretches of conversation were
totally absent from Bodhi’s repertoire. What was particularly evident was that
conversations with Bodhi are limited, both by his lack of speech language and by his
inability and disinterest to move beyond conversation structured by pairs of moves. This
seems to be evidence of his intellectual disability, and points to the fact that at least this
part of his communication is like a protolanguage.

•

Is Bodhi drawing on the same underlying system of language that speakers use,
and if not what does his system look like?

Having completed this study, there seems to be no doubt that the underlying system of
language that Bodhi draws on is the same system of language that speakers of English
use. This is most likely because of two main factors. The first is that Bodhi is embedded
within a speaking community, and all his communication partners are speakers of
English. English is the language through which his modes get transmodalised. Therefore,
it seems that it would be almost impossible to be using a completely different system of
language from everyone with whom you are communicating. Whilst Bodhi does not
speak the language himself, he was still immersed in and apprenticed into, as it were, the
English language, as were the other speaking children in his family. His engagement in
and with speakers and the language system is evident from the data. Secondly, and linked
to the first point, while it is unclear exactly what of spoken language Bodhi understands,
from the data, it is clear that he understands at least some of it. So whilst he may not
engage and produce speech language in the same way that speakers do, he is still part of
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the speaking community as a listener of speech and a producer of a multimodal
communication system that participates in the speaking system. Phylogenetically Bodhi
draws on the system as it has evolved amongst speakers, but ontogenically he is on a
different trajectory. Phylogenetically he fits into the human system of meaning making,
only not in the mainstream. The fact that I have been able to describe Bodhi’s
communication using the SF model of semiosis means that as a meaning making system,
Bodhi’s communication is part of, even if on the edge of, language.
10.3

The applicability of SF theory to multimodal communication

As SF theory has never been used to study nonverbal multimodal communication, one of
the challenges of this study was to see whether it was an appropriate theory for the task.
As we can locate Bodhi somewhere in the human semiotic community, then a theory that
is able to describe other human communication systems, such as art (O’Toole 1994),
movement (McInnes 1998), gestures (Martinec 1998, 2000), images (Kress & van
Leewin (1990) and space (Stenglin 2004), should be able to describe Bodhi’s
communication. Whilst it seems that SF theory is able to do this because it is a theory
developed on ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ uses of language, there needs to be some adjustment
or some broadening in particular areas, such as how to analyse moves like laughter or
dual moves that are not really accountable for within the theory, but clearly have a
heightened function and use in the multimodal context.
Bedrosian’s (1997) typology of features needed for a language theory to be adequate in
the multimodal context can be compared to the analysis done in this study. To recap,
according to Bedrosian (1997), the right theory would need to:
1. account for all the components (linguistic and non-linguistic), of multimodal
communication;
2. be able to identify exactly what a multimodal unit of language consists of;
3. consider the partner’s communicative attempts as part of the meaning making
process;
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4. be able to be sensitive to the unique patterns of multimodal communicators’
communication.
This study has attempted to account for all the components of multimodal
communication, specifically taking into account all the modes, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, that Bodhi used to communicate. It has identified what a multimodal unit of
communication consists of, that is, a multimodal turn in the interaction. However, it was
also identified that in the nonverbal multimodal context, silence can also be meaningful
as it indicates Bodhi is satisfied with the communication partner’s response to his move.
In using Exchange Structure Analysis as one of the analytical tools, this study also
considered the communication partner’s contributions as part of the meaning making
process. Finally, in using SF theory to study Bodhi’s communication, it seems that this
study can be seen to have been sensitive to the unique patterns of his multimodal
communication. The study was able to take into account not only what Bodhi cannot do,
but also what he can do. It was able to show the multimodal resources he uses, the kinds
of meanings he makes and the kind of communicator he is. What remains to be seen is
the kind of communicator he will become as time passes.
Thus, the findings from this study show that SF theory is useful for the study of
multimodal communication. However, the labour-intensive nature of the analysis could
be a drawback for researchers in the field of AAC, who are often also clinicians with
limited time and budgets. From discussions with practitioners in the field, there is a
reluctance to engage in detailed, multilayered and time-consuming studies, such as Light
et al’s (1985a, b & c). Additionally, as noted in Chapter 2, people like Bodhi, that is
people who are highly communicative yet have low intellectual capacity, are not common
subjects of research in the AAC field. Is Bodhi completely unique, or is there just a gap
in the research? From what I know as a mother of a child like this, coming into contact
with other families like our own, Bodhi is not unique in this manner. There are plenty of
severely intellectually disabled people who are highly communicative in the community.
They are just not represented in the literature. In terms of describing communication
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patterns, the field of AAC seems to predominantly focus on intellectually high
functioning people with physical disabilities, or people with severe intellectual and
physical disabilities. There is clearly an opening here to further explore the
communication of people like Bodhi, in order to contribute to and expand the field of
AAC.
10.4

The applicability of this study to multimodal communicators

This section discusses what the findings of this study can contribute to the lives of people
like Bodhi. A number of issues will be covered including transmodality; the joint
negotiation of meaning and the role of the communication partner; the reconstrual of the
speech function network; and the training of communication partners.
As has been shown in this study, Bodhi’s communication environment is transmodal. He
communicates multimodally and the communication partner responds and filters his
move through speech. Recognition of the effect the transmodal environment has on
multimodal communicators is important in order to understand the nature of their
communication. Additionally, recognition of the importance that articulation may have as
part of the multimodal communication of people like Bodhi is also important because it
necessitates a recognition of the importance of the role and specifically, the skills of the
communication partner.
The communication partner, as discussed above, needs to be willing to jointly negotiate
and construct the meaning with communicators. It is as if the communication partner
provides the missing intermediate tier of language, the lexicogrammar, for the
multimodal communicator, enabling them to express their meanings. This points to the
necessity of the confirmation and clarification question, as it is the vehicle through which
the communication partner can verify the correctness of their interpretation.
Further, in order to assist communication partners in their role as joint negotiator, training
using the guide for communication partners as illustrated in Figure 9.5 (p. 258) could be
transformative. As explained in Chapter 9, Figure 9.5 firstly assists communication
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partners to navigate the speech function network, in order to work out whether the
multimodal communicator is giving or demanding information or goods-&-services;
secondly, it guides them to explore the experiential content of the move using questions.
The aim of such training would be to promote successful communication through a
decrease in frustration and misunderstanding of multimodal communicators.
SF theory implicitly construes language as a joint negotiation of meaning by describing it
as a form of social behaviour. Communication is something we do together. But as SF
theory is generally normalised, we are not used to the extent to which multimodal
communication is jointly negotiated and constructed. Without joint negotiation, Bodhi
doesn’t have much communication. This joint construction and negotiation is a social act
and out of it comes meaning, however, this is not really visible until one analyses the
communication of someone like Bodhi. This study calls upon ‘normal’ speakers to
recognise and attend to a type of communication that is different from what we are
typically used to. Thus, the applicability of this study to multimodal communicators like
Bodhi lies in a recognition and understanding of their style of communicating, in training
the communication partners in the joint construction/negotiation of meaning.
10.5

Future directions

Future research could take a number of directions that can broadly be divided into two
groups. The first relates to more research about Bodhi and his communication, and the
second relates to research into the communication of other nonverbal multimodal
communicators.
Studies of Bodhi
To begin with, there are numerous other analyses that could be applied to the data set
used in this study. For example, the move network as developed by Eggins and Slade
(1997) and expanded by Benson et al (2002) and used by the latter to analyse the
interactions of the Bonobo, Kanzi, and his carer, Sue, could be used to analyse Bodhi’s
communication. Further, Rhetorical Unit analyses as conducted by Cloran (2000) in her
study of mother-child interactions could be used with Bodhi’s communication, although,
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as stated, the framework would only be able to be applied to the communication partner’s
contributions because it relies on the identification of the Mood elements Subject and
Finite.
In addition to doing other forms of analysis on the current data set, further research that
involves the collection of new data could be undertaken. For example, as Bodhi’s
communication is restricted partly by the fact that his communication resources are
restricted, it remains to be seen whether, with the provision of much more comprehensive
AAC resources, his communication abilities would expand. The current study could be
taken as a baseline, and then an intervention constructed whereby he would be provided
with a particular set of communication resources, and then new data could be collected to
examine whether the resources made any impact on his meaning making abilities.
However, given that comprehensive AAC systems do not have the same flexibility, speed
and independence as more readily accessible modes of communication such as sound,
sign and single keyword pictures that Bodhi currently uses, it is not a given that he will
be interested in using them. Anecdotally from our own preliminary trials, he is not
interested in making longer and more complex messages, for example, by combining
constituents in a syntagm; he would rather get the communication partner to do the work
with him and for him in co-constructing meanings.
Additionally, given that Bodhi is only eleven years old, data could be taken at intervals at
different stages of his life to see whether and how his communication changes as he and
his life change.
Another area of research could involve an exploration of the effect of the use of
confirmation and clarification questions on the success of multimodal communication. In
other words, as this thesis has identified these types of questions as a tool for the
communication partner to promote the success of Bodhi’s communication, data could be
taken of Bodhi (and or other multimodal communicators like him) in communication
with partners who are instructed not to use confirmation and clarification questions, and
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partner who are instructed to use them. The aim of this would be to ascertain whether
these questions are as useful as this study claims.
It could also be illuminating to find a way to gather data from Bodhi’s communication
interactions with a much wider variety of communication partners, to see whether his
communication changes depending on how familiar or unfamiliar the communication
partner is, as has been seen to be the case for other nonverbal communicators.
Finally, this study has not engaged in any investigation of the causes of Bodhi’s lack of
speech language. In order for a person to be able to both speak and understand speech
there are certain neurological processes that need to take place (Liberman 1993). Clearly,
Bodhi can understand much more speech than he can produce. As to where in the process
of speech production the problem lies, we currently do not know. Whilst this is not within
the realms of linguistic research, the field of neuroscience may have something to offer
by way of understanding what it is that prevents Bodhi from speaking.
Studies of other multimodal communicators
In terms of research into the communication of other nonverbal multimodal
communicators, the joint construction of meaning is seen to be an important aspect of
multimodal communication (see, for example, Bedrosian 1997). However, it seems that
the way this happens, that is the process of the joint construction has not been
investigated in any systematic way. It would be of particular interest to see if the way
Bodhi uses the communication partner’s language abilities to have his multimodal
communication articulated back to him is the same as the way others in similar situations
do this. A possible study could explore this co-construction from a Systemic Functional
perspective.
10.6

Bodhi and me

I conclude by asking two questions:
1. What does this study mean for me? and
2. What does this study mean for Bodhi?
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On the one hand, Bodhi is a growing boy, not an infant, yet his output is much like an
infant’s. This, of course, has caused me to reflect on whether intellectually he is like an
infant, and I am sad to say, that based on my observations, he is, in many ways. Watching
him grow and change physically at a ‘normal’ rate, but seeing how his intellectual and
linguistic growth is so slow and so delayed is most confronting. Will we end up with an
infant in an adult’s body? And if so, what will his and our lives be like?
As Bodhi’s mother, I am one of the few people who can understand him and who love
him enough to give him a quality of life that is his right as a fellow human being. So for
Bodhi, although it is hard to replicate parental love, perhaps we can educate others to be
more informed and better communication partners, and in this way they will get to know
Bodhi and he will hopefully be able to make the meanings he wants to make, regardless
of the developmental level he is at.
In terms of the significance of this study for people like Bodhi, I hope I have gone some
way into providing a resource for understanding how the ‘other’ – the intellectually
disabled multimodal communicator – makes meaning.
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